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Since	 the	 last	 edition	 of	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Report	 (FSR),	 published	 last	
October,	 the	 medical	 advances	 against	 the	 pandemic	 have	 improved	 the	
prospects	of	an	end	to	the	health	crisis	and,	as	a	result,	the	economic	outlook.	
That	said,	notable	risks	to	financial	stability	persist. The economic crisis triggered 
by the outbreak of the pandemic has weakened the financial position of certain 
segments of households and firms. It has also reduced the profitability and the capital 
generation capacity of financial intermediaries, in particular in the banking sector. The 
mitigating response by the authorities, without which the recession would have been 
deeper and longer lasting, has significantly increased public debt. As a result of these 
developments, the Spanish economy’s vulnerability to the possible materialisation of 
various perceived risks has increased. These include, notably, the risk of less favourable 
economic activity developments, the activity outlook still being subject to the uncertainty 
over the course of the pandemic. Also, recent financial market developments entail the 
possibility of sharp financial asset price corrections and adverse bank credit supply 
shocks (see Figure 1). The materialisation of these risks may hamper financial 
intermediation and weigh on real activity, compounding the effects of the pandemic.
tHE Stability OF tHE SPaniSH Financial SyStEM: 
Main VUlnERabilitiES anD RiSKS
THE STABILITY OF THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MAIN VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS (a)
Figure 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In this report, the vulnerabilities (V) are defined as those economic and financial conditions that increase the impact or probability of materialisation of 
the risks (R) to financial stability. The latter are identified in turn with adverse changes in economic and financial conditions, with an uncertain probability 
of occurring, which hamper or prevent financial intermediation, with negative consequences for real economic activity. Both concepts are interrelated, 
since the materialisation of risks can alter the level of vulnerabilities existing. The mitigating effects of the various economic policies (fiscal, monetary, 
prudential) improve the economic and financial conditions, and reduce the probability and expected impact of the materialisation of risks.
V1. Financial weakness of certain
groups of households and firms
Monetary policyFiscal policy
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V2. Growing public debt
V3. Low profitability and capital generation
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SOURCES: Eurostat y Banco de España.
a A baseline scenario is projected for the Spanish economy, along with two altternative scenarios (mild and severe), which differ according to the assumptions 
regarding the pandemic and its medium-term consequences. For further information see Macroeconomic projections 2021-2023, March 2021.
DECEMBER 2019 MARCH 2021 (BASELINE SCENARIO)
MARCH 2021 (MILD SCENARIO) MARCH 2021 (SEVERE SCENARIO)
OBSERVED
1  REAL GDP SPAIN. LEVEL (a)














































There follows a brief description of what are currently perceived to be the main 
risks to financial stability and their interaction with the Spanish economy’s 
vulnerabilities.
The main identified risks are: 
—   R1. Downside risks to the economic growth outlook remain. The 
approval by the health authorities of vaccines for the SARS-CoV-2 
coronavirus, and the progress of their dispensation, has reduced the 
probability of the most unfavourable medium-term scenarios. However, 
developments in the last two quarters have been adversely affected by the 
need for fresh containment measures. Assuming that the progressive 
administration of vaccines will allow containment measures to be gradually 
withdrawn, so that they have practically disappeared by the end of 2021, 
Spanish economic growth will accelerate in the second half of the year and 
remain robust in 2022. In any event, a less favourable pandemic trajectory 
cannot be ruled out. This would increase the persistence of its negative 
economic effects, in the form of destruction of the productive system, 
higher unemployment and, thus, lower incomes for households and firms 
and a deterioration in their ability to pay their debts and, consequently, 
higher default rates on loans and other debt. Such adverse developments 
would lead to a less vigorous economic recovery than envisaged in the 
baseline projection scenarios (see Chart 1) and, foreseeably, an increase in 
its heterogeneity across geographical areas, industries and population 
groups (see Chart 2). 
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—   R2.	Recent	international	financial	market	developments	mean	that	a	
financial	asset	value	correction	cannot	be	ruled	out. The price of risky 
assets on international financial markets has been driven by lower risk 
aversion and improved growth expectations, despite the uncertainty over 
economic performance and the weak financial position of some agents. For 
certain asset classes in certain geographical areas, prices are higher than 
would be expected according to the historical relationship with their 
fundamentals (see Chart 3). Among the possible triggers for a potential 
abrupt correction of these overvaluations, the role of long-term interest rates, 
which have already increased in recent months, particularly in the United 
States, stands out. These interest rates may be subject to further upward 
pressure, in particular if there are further increases in inflation expectations in 
the United States that are passed through to other economic areas. Asset 
value corrections could also arise from downward revisions by investors to 
their expectations of future economic growth, to the corporate sector’s ability 
to pay its debts or to the duration of public support programmes. Also, the 
presence of close interconnections between financial markets, as well as 
between different types of intermediaries, would facilitate the transmission of 
an initial correction in those markets with greater signs of over-valuation to 
others. Accordingly, the overall impact could be large and pervasive, affecting 
all the different types of financial intermediaries (see Chart 4).
—   R3.	Possible	adverse	bank	credit	supply	shocks. The banking sector 
has supplied abundant financing during the crisis (see Chart 5), in the face 
SOURCES: Datastream and Refinitiv.
a The breakdown is based on a weighted average of different corporate bond valuation models. Risk aversion is the first component of VIX and VSTOXX. The 
unexplained factor is the difference between the observed value and the value predicted by the corporate bond model. The observed value of the risk 
premia and the breakdowns are calculated as deviations relative to the historical average of the period November 2001 to March 2021.
b Cumulative change in investment fund net capital inflows and outflows, as a percentage of the total net assets of the funds of each country on 15 
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of a significant increase in the liquidity needs of households and firms as a 
result of their reduced revenues. The supply of bank credit has been 
fostered by the numerous monetary, fiscal and regulatory policy support 
measures adopted. Looking ahead, the negative effects of the possible 
materialisation of downside risks to economic activity and of the deterioration 
in the credit quality of households and firms could be exacerbated by a 
credit supply contraction, especially given the doubts regarding the 
incentives for financial institutions to use the available capital buffers.
Turning to the Spanish economy’s vulnerabilities, the main ones are:
—   V1.	The	weak	financial	position	of	certain	segments	of	households	and	
firms. The persistence of the pandemic continues to have negative effects on 
firms’ revenues, especially in those activities most affected by the crisis. 
Against a background of rising corporate indebtedness in recent quarters, this 
jeopardises the viability of some firms, constrains investment and employment 
plans and exposes firms to a deterioration in financing conditions. In the case 
of households, the increase in the saving rate and the reduction in the volume of 
credit at aggregate level mask the existence of segments that have seen their 
financial fragility increase significantly. The materialisation of the risks mentioned 
above would generate a further reduction in the ability of households and firms 
to repay their debts, increasing the credit default rate and leading to further 
deterioration in the banking sector’s financial position.
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
a The budget deficit and government debt estimates for 2020 and 2021-2023 do not include the assumption of Sareb debt by the general government, a fact 
known after the preparation of the forecasts.
b Macroeconomic scenarios of the Banco de España projections published on March 23, 2021. The squares of 2020 correspond to the data published 
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—   V2.	 The	 significant	 increase	 in	 government	 debt. The corollary of the 
economic deterioration arising from the health crisis and the application of 
public support measures to mitigate its impact has been a substantial 
increase in the general government deficit and debt in 2020 (see Chart 6). The 
action of the European Central Bank during the crisis, including a new 
pandemic asset purchase programme, for public debt in particular, has so far 
maintained highly favourable financing conditions for the public sector. 
However, the increase in indebtedness along with the elevated structural 
general government deficit has increased the Spanish economy’s vulnerability 
to possible changes in financing conditions and in investor sentiment, which 
may be passed through to other economic agents (see Chart 7).
—   V3.	 Low	 bank	 profitability	 and	 capital	 generation	 capacity. The 
economic crisis caused by the pandemic has put downward pressure on 
the profitability of financial intermediaries, particularly as a result of 
provisioning requirements, lower net interest income and intangible asset 
impairment (see Chart 8). To date, the impact can be considered contained, 
given the magnitude of the activity shock, as a consequence of the 
important economic policy measures adopted. In fact the non-performing 
loan ratio has remained steady and capital levels have increased over the 
past year. However, the materialisation of the risks mentioned would put 
further upward pressure on credit risk and would increase the volume of 
SOURCES: Securities Holding Statistics by Sector and Banco de España.
a Government bond holdings are shown according to their market value at the end of 2020 Q3. The information relates to resident financial sectors, 
at unconsolidated level. 
b The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in consolidated profit for December 
2020 with respect to December 2019. The black diamonds show ROA excluding the goodwill adjustments recorded in 2019 (-€2.8 billion) and 
2020 (-€12.2 billion) and the deferred tax asset adjustment in 2020 (-€2.5 billion). The pink diamond shows ROA in 2020 excluding, in addition to 
the adjustments already mentioned, the decline in value due to accounting reclassification of a significant institution (-€5.6 billion) and the positive 
extraordinary profit for 2020 (€1.2 billion).
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non-performing loans and the negative effects on bank profitability (see 
Chart 9). Moreover, bank profitability was already low before the crisis as a 
result of various factors, including: the existence of over-capacity, despite 
significant capacity reductions in recent years; the balance sheet clean-
up, which is also well advanced, although still relevant for some institutions 
and assets; and the challenges of a low (or even negative) interest rate 
environment, which may hamper the generation of net interest income. 
These challenges are compounded by those arising from adaptation to 
digitalisation and the emergence of new competitors.
Economic	 policy	 (monetary	 and	 fiscal)	 is	 the	 main	 factor	 mitigating	 the	
identified	risks	and	must	remain	sufficiently	expansionary	until	the	recovery	
takes hold. To avoid intensifying the vulnerabilities that affect financial stability, it 
seems essential that economic policy should be appropriately adapted to the 
health and economic situation (see Chart 10) and to the uneven persistence of the 
damage to the productive system across sectors and population groups. To this 
end, a broad set of instruments is needed that can be flexibly adapted to the rate 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart depicts the change in the aggregate probability of default by sector in percentage points, after weighting each firm’s probability by its market 
value within the relevant sector or country. The brown dot represents the change between the average pre-pandemic value (January-February 2020) and 
the value at end-2021 Q1. The stacked bars depict the change attributable to the first wave of the pandemic (March-May 2020), to the period between the 
first and second waves (June-November 2020), to the third wave (December 2020-February 2021) and to the period of 2021 Q1 after the third wave 
(February-March 2021). The pink dot represents the peak change in 2008-2009 with respect to the 2006-2007 average.
b The vertical shaded bands represent the period of the last financial crisis in Spain (2009 Q1-2013 Q4) and the crisis unleashed by the pandemic as from 2020 
Q2. The December 2020 data are provisional. The broken red horizontal line depicts the CCyB activation threshold of 2 pp for the credit-to-GDP gap.
c The output gap is the percentage difference between actual GDP and its potential value. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See Cuadrado, P. 
and Moral-Benito, E. (2016), Potential growth of the Spanish economy, Occasional Paper No 1603, Banco de España.
d The adjusted credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the difference in percentage points between the actual ratio and its long-term trend, calculated by applying 
a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000. This value best fits the financial cycles observed historically in Spain (see 
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of recovery of activity in each sector, as well as the outlook for its future viability. 
A premature withdrawal of support may aggravate the economy’s vulnerabilities 
and financial stability risks. 
In	 the	 current	 context,	 economic	 policy	 needs	 to	 focus	 especially	 on	
supporting	 those	 firms	 that	are	viable	but	 face	 financial	difficulty	and	 the	
most	severely	affected	population	groups. In line with this objective, various 
measures have recently been adopted, including, among others, the extension of 
guarantee scheme durations and payment holidays and direct financial aid to 
compensate businesses and the self-employed for the fall in their turnover, in the 
sectors and geographical areas most affected, and to recapitalise firms. The effectiveness 
of these schemes will depend on their rapid and homogeneous implementation 
and on the distribution mechanisms allowing assistance to be selectively focused 
on viable firms with solvency problems. The volume and use of the committed 
funds also need to be flexible, so they can be adapted to the course of the pandemic 
and the possible materialisation of risks.
At	the	same	time,	there	is	a	pressing	need	for	implementation	of	an	ambitious	
programme	 of	 structural	 reforms	 to	 enhance	 the	 growth	 potential	 of	 the	
economy	 and	 for	 a	 fiscal	 consolidation	 plan	 to	 be	 designed	 that	 can	 be	
gradually	 implemented	when	 the	 recovery	 takes	hold. The European NGEU 
funds may be particularly important for these objectives, provided that projects 
capable of increasing the growth potential of the economy are prioritised.
In	the	banking	supervisory	and	regulatory	sphere,	the	priority	must	continue	
to	be	the	identification	and	mitigation	of	the	risks	arising	from	the	crisis.	We 
supervisory authorities have continued to stress that it is appropriate for capital 
buffers to be used by banks for credit impairment recognition and to continue 
providing solvent credit to households and firms. Banks will have sufficient time 
to comply once again with their capital requirements and the start of the process 
of reconstitution will never be before the main effects of the pandemic have 
dissipated. At the same time, given the uncertainty still persisting, that the impact 
of the pandemic has not yet been fully manifest in bank balance sheets and that 
banks continue to have the benefit of various public support measures, we have 
recommended that banks act with extreme prudence in their dividend distribution 
policies. Also, banks must pursue a policy of early recognition of impairment 
losses, ensuring that this is appropriate and timely, as stipulated in supervisory 
guidelines. Finally, the results of new supervisory stress tests will be published in 
the middle of the year which will help to calibrate the resilience of the sector to 
possible adverse macroeconomic scenarios.
We	supervisors	and	regulators	must	also	ensure	 that	 the	resilience	of	 the	
financial	sector	is	maintained	in	the	face	of	the	new	risks	that	emerge. In this 
respect, it should be noted that the Basel III global reforms, which all members of 
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the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, including the European ones, have 
committed to, are still to be fully and timely implemented. As regards new risks, 
the need to address those arising from the greater importance at global level of 
non-bank intermediation, which is being analysed by the Financial Stability 
Committee, stands out. Also notable are those relating to the impact of digitalisation 
and climate change. Regarding the latter, early and decisive policy intervention 
can facilitate an energy transition that is orderly and predictable, mitigating physical 
and transition risks with a high impact on financial stability. We supervisors must 
ensure that banks correctly assess these risks and incorporate them into their 
management. Lastly, it should be noted that in February the Banco de España 
presented for public consultation a project to amend Circular 2/2016 on the 
supervision and solvency of credit institutions, in order to introduce the new 
macroprudential instruments recently provided by national primary legislation. 
These will allow the Banco de España to establish a countercyclical capital buffer 
requirement in specific sectors, limits on the sectoral concentration of lending 
relative to bank capital and requirements for credit standards (e.g. the loan-to-
collateral value ratio).
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The first chapter of the FSR analyses the macro-financial environment of the Spanish 
economy in the recent period and that of the countries with which it shares the 
closest trade and financial ties, highlighting the most significant risks. These risks 
remain partially linked to the course of the pandemic, despite the vaccine roll-out 
having reduced the likelihood of the most adverse medium-term scenarios. However, 
the continuation of the pandemic into the quarters immediately following this 
publication increases the probability of more persistent effects on the financial 
capacity of households and firms, and on the productive system itself. Against this 
backdrop, an adequate economic policy response stands as the main mitigating 
factor. In the financial markets, prices of risk-bearing assets have risen in recent 
months, buoyed by an improving macroeconomic outlook following the emergence 
of effective vaccines against the coronavirus. However, high valuations for certain 
assets have generated some concern regarding the sustainability of these prices, 
particularly if less favourable macro-financial scenarios were to materialise. In the 
residential property market, sales have declined markedly relative to 2019, while 
prices have continued to show a degree of downward rigidity. Lastly, vulnerability 
has increased markedly due to the crisis weakening the financial position of the 
various non-financial sectors, particularly general government, while the deterioration 
in the private sector (households and firms) has focused on certain specific segments.
1.1 Macroeconomic environment
1.1.1  Systemic and materially important countries for the Spanish economy 
and banking system
Global	economic	activity	recovered	in	2020	H2,	but	was	adversely	affected	by	
the	worsening	 of	 the	 pandemic	 from	 late	 2020	 onwards.	Having slumped in 
2020 H1, global activity surged in Q3 thanks to the easing of the containment 
measures and the support provided by economic policies. However, the recovery 
lost steam from the end of the last year, in the face of the worsening of the pandemic 
and the reintroduction of restrictions. The effect of the pandemic has been uneven 
across regions, owing to differences in how it has unfolded, the containment 
measures implemented, the degree of exposure to the hardest-hit sectors and the 
economic policies introduced. In 2020, world GDP declined by 3.3%, with marked 
regional differences (see Charts 1.1.1 and 1.1.2). Among the advanced economies, 
euro area GDP shrank by 6.7%, with the services sector being particularly affected1 
1  See A. L. Gómez and A. Río, (2021) “The uneven impact of the health crisis on the economies of the euro area in 
2020”, Occasional Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
1 RiSKS linKED tO tHE MacRO-Financial EnViROnMEnt
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 Financial Stability REPORt. SPRinG 2021  1. RISKS LINKED TO THE MACRO-FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
(see Chart 1.1.3). Spanish GDP declined by a notable 10.8%, while GDP in Germany 
fell by 5.3%. The contraction stood at 3.5% in the United States, 4.9% in Japan and 
9.8% in the United Kingdom. Among the emerging economies, the most adverse 
effects were felt in Latin America, where GDP fell by 7% on average. By contrast, 
activity in China, the first economy to be affected by the pandemic, grew 2.3%. 
The impact of the pandemic has been uneven across regions, shaped by the course of the pandemic, exposure to the most affected sectors 
(mainly the services sector) and the support measures provided in economic policies. The development of effective vaccines has improved 
the outlook, although the spread of variants of the virus represents a downside risk. Emerging financial markets registered a recovery in 
recent months, which was likewise reflected in exchange rate movements, which moderated from February onwards.
THE BASELINE SCENARIO OF A GRADUAL RECOVERY IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN 2021-2022 IS GROUNDED ON
EXPECTATIONS OF A DECLINING INCIDENCE OF COVID-19 AND THE ADEQUATE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
Chart 1.1
SOURCES: Consensus Forecast, national statistics, Reuters and Eurostat.
a Vulnerable services include those most exposed to the containment measures (22.4% of total euro area GVA): wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation and hospitality (G-I) and artistic and entert. activities and other services (R-U).
b Other = primary (A); energy; non-market services (O-Q); other market services (communications; financial and insurance act., real estate act. and 
professional, scientific and auxiliary act.).
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The	economic	outlook	has	improved	thanks	to	the	availability	of	vaccines,	but	
some	 uncertainty	 persists	 as	 to	 the	 course	 of	 the	 health	 situation	 and	 the	
intensity	of	the	recovery. Following a weak start to 2021 due to the worsening of 
the pandemic, the recovery is expected to accelerate in H2 as those sectors that 
require greater social interaction are revived by progress in the vaccination 
programmes. Added to this would be the additional stimuli provided through 
economic policies, such as the extension of support measures for households and 
firms in most euro area countries and in the United States.2 In Europe, plans to 
bolster the economy using funds from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme, 
which have yet to be determined, will prove most effective if the funds are allocated 
to high value-added investments and are supplemented by reforms to strengthen 
potential growth. The analysts’ consensus expects the world economy to grow at a 
rate close to 6% in 2021 and above 4% in 2022 (see Chart 1.1.2). The consensus 
figures for the euro area, which are in line with those of the ECB’s March projection 
exercise, forecast GDP growth of around 4% in both years, meaning pre-pandemic 
activity levels would not be reached until 2022 H2.
In	the	near	term,	the	risks	for	the	world	economy	remain	associated	with	the	
pandemic	 and	 in	 particular	 with	 the	 headway	 made	 in	 the	 vaccination	
programme.	Looking	ahead,	 there	 is	still	 a	 risk	 that	solvency	problems	will	
emerge	 for	 non-financial	 corporations	 after	 the	 crisis.	 The downside risks 
revolve, first, around the spread of new and more resistant variants of the virus or a 
delay in the vaccination process, which may lead to fresh social distancing measures. 
Second, insufficient support from economic policies, or the premature withdrawal 
thereof, could result in solvency problems for businesses. Likewise, the potential 
spillover effects of an increase in long-term interest rates in the United States, 
against the backdrop of the impact had by fiscal expansion on activity and inflation 
in this country, could lead to a tightening of financial conditions in other economic 
areas that are in a different cyclical position. Lastly, high government and private 
indebtedness could curtail spending and hinder the recovery process. On the 
positive side, the outlook could be improved by more favourable progress in the 
vaccination programme. Meanwhile, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, which was 
among the risks identified in the previous FSR, has faded thanks to the withdrawal 
agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union.
The	 main	 emerging	 economies	 where	 Spanish	 banks	 have	 a	 significant	
presence3	likewise	recorded	a	recovery	in	2020	H2,	which	lost	momentum	in	
early	 2021.	Broadly speaking, emerging markets recovered much of the losses 
2  See Box 3 “Analysis	of	US	fiscal	policy	plans”, Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy 2021 Q1.
3	 	Each	 year	 the	Banco	de	España	 identifies	 a	 list	 of	 non-EU/EEA	 countries	 (third	 countries)	 that	 are	materially	
significant	for	the	Spanish	banking	system,	based	on	the	volume	and	weight	of	the	Spanish	banking	system’s	
international exposures. This exercise is conducted pursuant to the recommendations of the European Systemic 
Risk	Board	(ESRB).	In	2020,	six	emerging	countries	were	identified	in	this	category:	Mexico,	Brazil,	Turkey,	Chile,	
Peru and Colombia.
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registered from March 2020. Capital inflows increased from November onwards and, in 
some segments and regions, offset the outflows recorded in the first months of 2020. 
However, several of these countries have recently seen long-term interest rates increase, 
as a result of rising long-term interest rates in advanced economies, and currency 
depreciation. Financial conditions and capital flows towards emerging economies may 
be adversely affected if these trends continue going forward. In this regard, the main 
emerging countries in terms of Spanish banking exposures find themselves affected both 
by pandemic-related risks and those relating to macro-financial imbalances:
— In Mexico, GDP fell by 8.5% in 2020, more than the Latin American average, 
partly owing to less fiscal stimulus,4 greater exposure to tourism and the 
sharp decline in the US manufacturing sector in the early stages of the 
pandemic.5 The Mexican economy is also exposed to a potential tightening 
of global financial conditions, along with local factors such as uncertainty 
stemming from proposed reforms to the energy sector6 and to the Banco 
de México Law.7 These could undermine investor confidence and the 
country’s credit rating, which remains adversely affected by the PEMEX 
situation. On the positive side, Mexico may be among the economies to 
benefit most from the fiscal stimulus in the United States via its trade and 
remittances channels.
— In Brazil, by contrast, GDP fell by a more moderate 4.1%, owing to less 
stringent restrictions on movement and sizeable monetary, and particularly 
fiscal, support. The outlook for 2021, however, is less auspicious, since much 
of the credit support programmes and fiscal stimuli, particularly transfers to 
households, have expired8 and a monetary tightening has begun, which is 
discounted to last until 2022. The weaker relative performance of the Brazilian 
real is also a reflection of the continuing political tensions over the reforms 
and fiscal adjustment needed to tackle the high level of government debt (see 
Chart 1.1.4). 
— Turkey was one of the few countries to record GDP growth in 2020 (1.8%), 
thanks in part to the support measures introduced, particularly for credit. 
4	 	See	the	IMF	policy	response	tracker:	Policy Responses to COVID-19. 
5  See Banco de España (2020), Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2020, for a description of the 








8  The Brazilian government did not reintroduce transfers to households that expired at the end of 2020 (4.4% of 
GDP),	and	replaced	them	with	an	income	support	program	of	a	much	lower	amount	(0.6%	of	GDP).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 Financial Stability REPORt. SPRinG 2021  1. RISKS LINKED TO THE MACRO-FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
However, these stimuli exacerbated the country’s macro-financial 
imbalances, such as high inflation and reliance on external financing. This 
has been reflected in the depreciation of the lira and diminishing reserves, 
leaving the country considerably vulnerable to a tightening of global financial 
conditions. Against this backdrop, the Turkish central bank shifted towards 
a more restrictive monetary policy (see Chart 1.1.4) so as to keep inflation 
and depreciation pressures in check.9 More recently, the dismissal of the 
head of the country’s central bank triggered a further sharp depreciation of 
the lira and capital outflows, resulting in significant financial turmoil.
1.1.2 Spain
As	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	the	developments	in	the	Spanish	economy	since	
the	spring	of	2020	have	been	entirely	conditioned	by	COVID-19. In 2020, Spanish 
GDP registered an annual average contraction of -10.8%, the steepest drop in recent 
history. The impact was concentrated in H1, followed by an incipient recovery from 
Q3 onwards (see Chart 1.2). During this period, private consumption and investment 
were severely weighed down by the drop in income, heightened uncertainty and the 
restrictions to contain the pandemic. Foreign trade flows have also plunged, leading 
the external balance to make a net negative contribution to GDP growth in real terms. 
The decline in tourism exports has been particularly severe, heavily affected by the 
restrictions on international travel.
The	upturn	in	activity	was	robust	in	2020 Q3,	but	ground	to	a	halt	in	Q4	as	a	
result	of	adverse	epidemiological	developments.	In any event, the recovery has 
been only partial thus far. Reduced control over the spread of the virus during the 
winter months negatively affected the confidence of households and firms, with the 
attendant adverse bearing on aggregate demand, and led to more stringent 
restrictions on mobility and economic activity,10 with additional negative effects. 
However, these had a far smaller impact on GDP than in Q2, thanks to economic 
agents adapting to the new environment. Nevertheless, at the turn of the year Spain 
was still among the economies hardest hit by the pandemic, with quarterly GDP in 
2020 Q4 down 8.9% on pre-crisis levels, while that gap for the euro area as a whole 
stood at more than 4% (see Chart 1.2).
In	the	near	term,	economic	activity	growth	is	expected	to	be	modest	until	the	
population has been immunised. Under the baseline scenario of the Banco de 
España’s most recent projections, GDP would grow robustly in 2021 H2 thanks to 
 9	 	In	addition,	the	Turkish	central	bank	and	banking	supervisory	authority	began	to	unwind	the	stimulus	measures	
for lending.
10  See Ghirelli, Gonzalez, Herrera and Hurtado, “Weather, mobility and the evolution of the COvID-19 pandemic”, 
Working Paper No 2109, Banco de España.
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headway in the vaccination process, the use of NGEU funds11 and the international 
economic performance. Spanish GDP would grow by 6% in 2021 under this baseline 
scenario, with the recovery in activity continuing in 2022 and 2023 (see Chart 1.2.2).
However,	owing	to	the	very	high	level	of	uncertainty,	two	alternative	scenarios	
were envisaged. Uncertainty regarding the duration of the health crisis appears to 
have diminished given the anticipated progress in the vaccination process. 
Nonetheless, doubts persist regarding the extent of the pandemic’s potential 
negative economic effects beyond the short term, which is not entirely unconnected 
with the duration of the pandemic itself. Resolute and coordinated action through 
economic policy, providing private agents with income and liquidity, has been a key 
factor in limiting the damage to the productive system. However, it will not succeed 
11  See Box 1 “Macroeconomic	projections	for	the	Spanish	economy	(2021-2023)”, Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy March 2021.
Spanish GDP declined 10.8% year-on-year in 2020, the sharpest drop in its recent history and larger than that of comparable European 
countries. The impact was concentrated in H1, with an incipient, albeit incomplete, recovery as of Q3. Thus, in the last quarter of 2020, economic 
activity in Spain stood considerably below pre-pandemic levels (-8.9%). Under the baseline scenario of the projections, based on the gradual 
disappearance of the pandemic’s adverse economic effects, Spain would recover the GDP level observed prior to the onset of the crisis in 2023 
H2. As a result of the uncertainty as to precisely how the health situation will unfold and the degree of permanence of the economic impacts felt 
in 2020, additional scenarios have been considered, generating a range of possible GDP trajectories around the baseline projection.
AMONG THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE PANDEMIC HAS HAD A PARTICULARLY SEVERE IMPACT ON SPAIN'S GDP,
WHICH UNDER THE BASELINE SCENARIO WOULD RECOVER PRE-CRISIS LEVELS IN 2023
Chart 1.2
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a GDP year-on-year change in 2020 Q4.
b A baseline scenario and two alternative scenarios (mild and severe) are projected for the Spanish economy. These alternative scenarios differ from 
the baseline scenario in terms of the course of the pandemic and the medium-term consequences thereof. For more infomation, please see March 
2021 Macroeconomic Projections in Spain 2021-2023.
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in preventing such damage altogether, particularly if the health crisis persists for an 
extended period of time. The scenarios also differ in another respect: the degree of 
persistence of the behavioural changes prompted by COVID-19 among economic 
agents. To this end, different assumptions were considered regarding household 
spending decisions in Spain and the rest of the world (through tourism exports).
The	 additional	 risks	 for	 the	 baseline	 scenario	 include	 more	 adverse	
epidemiological	developments	(particularly	in	the	near	term),	uncertainty	over	
the	resilience	of	households,	and	the	scale	of	the	incipient	structural	changes	
that	 the	 pandemic	 may	 have	 accelerated. First, potential epidemiological 
developments that are more adverse than anticipated (for instance, relating to new, 
more contagious and more vaccine-resistant strains of the virus) could jeopardise the 
pace of the recovery in 2021, owing to their direct negative effects on aggregate 
demand as a result of impaired confidence and the need to introduce more stringent 
restrictions on movement. Second, despite the forcefulness of the measures 
introduced (particularly the schemes to preserve employment in the near term and to 
provide liquidity to firms, added to which would be the impact of the NGEU programme 
in 2021), the prolongation of the health crisis increases the likelihood of a downturn in 
the labour market and of rising business insolvencies, causing persistent damage to 
the productive system. A further source of uncertainty is the pandemic accelerating 
certain pre-existing structural transformation processes, such as digitalisation, which 
would require a reallocation of economic resources of an unknown magnitude.
1.2 Financial markets and the real estate sector
1.2.1 Financial markets
Since	the	cut-off	date	of	the	last	FSR,	the	development	of	effective	vaccines	against	
cOViD-19 and progress in the vaccination process on a global scale have driven 
price	gains	for	risk-bearing	assets	on	international	financial	markets,	despite	the	
new	waves	of	the	virus	that	were	exacerbated	by	the	emergence	of	new	strains. 
Following the uptick in risk aversion in late October, triggered by the worsening of the 
pandemic in Europe and uncertainty over the outcome of the presidential elections in the 
United States, the publication of data on vaccine effectiveness in early Novermber and, 
since the beginning of this year, the progress of the vaccination campaign have generated 
optimism among investors. This has been reflected in gains on stock market indices, 
declining credit risk premia and a decrease in asset price volatility, likewise supported by 
the elimination of other risk scenarios, such as the United Kingdom withdrawing from the 
European Union without an agreement12 (see Charts 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). 
12	 	There	 was	 sporadic	 volatility	 increase	 on	 the	 S&P	 500	 (VIX)	 index	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 January,	 linked	 to	
coordinated transactions by retail investors; since mid-February, volatility increased on US sovereign bond 
options	(MOVE)	owing	to	steepening	at	the	long	end	of	the	yield	curve.
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Long-term	yields	on	higher-rated	sovereign	debt	have	risen	in	the	year	to	date,	
particularly	in	the	United	States. These developments have been shaped by lower 
risk aversion, more favourable economic expectations, an increase in expected 
inflation and fiscal spending packages, which will require new issuances by 
treasuries. Because these act as safe-haven assets, the returns demanded on them 
declined significantly during the height of the uncertainty at the onset of the 
The development of effective vaccines against COVID-19 and progress in their distribution have generated optimism among investors, which 
has been reflected by rising stock market indices, declining credit risk premiums and narrowing sovereign debt spreads in the euro area, 
along with lower volatility for asset prices. Rising equity prices have lifted US stock markets to very high levels relative to the companies’ 
cyclically adjusted earnings.
MEDICAL ADVANCES AGAINST COVID-19 HAVE FAVOURED THE REVALUATION OF RISK-BEARING ASSETS IN RECENT
MONTHS, ALTHOUGH DOUBTS HAVE BEEN RAISED OVER THEIR SUSTAINABILITY IN SOME CASES
Chart 1.3
SOURCES: Robert J. Shiller and Thomson Reuters Datastream.
a High yield: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch High Yield index. Investment grade: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Corporate index.
b Average three-month volatility of USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD.
c The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio between the share price and the 10-year moving average for earnings.
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pandemic. With the exception of Japan, these yields remain below the levels 
observed in early 2020 (see Chart  1.4.1). This lower risk aversion has also been 
conducive to the sustained depreciation of the US dollar, which also acts as a safe-
haven asset, although that trend looks to be reversing this year due to better 
expectations for economic recovery in the United States (see Chart 1.4.2).
In	euro	area	sovereign	bond	markets,	long-term	yield	spreads	between	countries	
have	continued	at	reduced	levels	in	the	first	quarter	of	2021.	This has been driven 
by the ECB purchase programmes, particularly the PEPP (which was extended in 
December following the recalibration of monetary policy instruments), and by the 
agreement on the EU’s recovery fund (see Chart 1.3.2).
In	the	final	stretch	of	2020,	the	strongest	gains	on	stock	market	indices	came	
in	those	sectors	that	had	experienced	the	largest	losses	since	the	onset	of	the	
pandemic. Accordingly, prices in the banking sector have accumulated stronger 
gains since early November than other sectors, such as telecommunications or 
technology. In keeping with these developments, and as a consequence of the 
different sectoral composition of the stock markets, European indices, particularly 
the IBEX 35, have posted more robust gains than the S&P  500.13 However, the 
indices of more cyclical sectors (including the banking index) and some of the 
13	 	In	particular,	the	banking	sector	has	a	weight	of	approximately	5%	on	the	S&P	500,	6%	on	the	EURO	STOXX	50	
and	22%	on	the	IBEX	35,	while	the	weight	of	the	technology	sector	is	28%,	13%	and	6%,	respectively.
The long-term yields of higher-rated sovereign bonds have risen, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, shaped by lower 
risk aversion, more favourable economic expectations, an increase in expected inflation and the fiscal spending packages. Lower risk 
aversion has also helped the US dollar to continue its depreciation in the final stages of 2020, although that trend seems to have reversed 
since the start of 2021 owing to improved economic recovery expectations in the United States.
LONG-TERM YIELDS HAVE RISEN FOR HIGHER-RATED SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE US DOLLAR HAS CEASED ITS
DEPRECIATION SINCE THE TURN OF THE YEAR
Chart 1.4
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European overall indices remain below pre-crisis levels. By contrast, the US index 
has reached all-time highs (see Chart 1.3.1).
In	recent	months,	corporate	credit	risk	premia	have	declined	more	sharply	in	
the	high-yield	segment	than	in	the	investment-grade	segment,	all	the	segments	
now standing close to pre-pandemic levels. This performance appears to have 
been underpinned by central banks’ asset purchase programmes and by lower risk 
aversion (see Chart  1.3.2). In the United States, where the central bank includes 
investment-grade and high-yield bonds in its purchase programme, issuances of 
both types of instrument ended 2020 at record highs, while in the euro area and 
Spain this was only true of the investment-grade segment. Since the beginning of 
2021, US and euro area issuances in the high-yield segment already exceed those of 
previous years.
The	 number	 of	 corporate	 bond	 credit	 rating	 downgrades	 has	 declined	
significantly	 in	 recent	 months,	 although	 a	 slight	 rebound	 was	 observed	 in	
March. This reduction has also been observed in the case of Spanish companies. 
Since the onset of the crisis, the cumulative number of downgrades worldwide and 
in the euro area is lower than that observed in the equivalent period following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Nonetheless, a notable proportion 
of issuances with BBB rating continues to have a negative outlook.
The	 rapid	 recovery	 in	 the	prices	of	 risk-bearing	assets	 in	certain	segments	
has	raised	concerns	regarding	their	sustainability,	particularly	if	certain	risks	
materialise. Price corrections could be triggered for some assets – particularly 
those with the most evident signs of high valuations – by a worsening of the 
epidemiological situation, a downward revision of corporate earnings expectations 
or a premature withdrawal of State support measures. In particular, the cyclically 
adjusted price-to-earnings ratio (PER) of S&P 500 firms is currently high, standing 
above its historical average. This is largely due to the price performance of a handful 
of large firms, particularly in the technology sector. By contrast, equity prices in the 
euro area and Spain do not appear high compared to the cyclically adjusted earnings 
of the listed companies (see Chart 1.3.4). The credit risk premia on corporate debt 
markets are low relative to the historical relationship with their fundamentals, 
particularly in the high-yield segment, which may be linked, among other factors, to 
the effect of asset purchase programmes run by central banks (see Box 1.1).
1.2.2 the real estate market in Spain
House	sales	fell	by	17.7%	in	2020,	weighed	down	by	a	sharp	fall-off	during	the	
initial	 months	 of	 the	 pandemic.	 Following the stringent lockdown last spring, 
house sales began a gradual recovery trajectory that extended until the end of the 
year, underpinned by the release of the demand that was pent up during the first 
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wave of COVID-19. This upward trajectory in transactions in 2020 H2 did not continue 
into early 2021; sales declined year-on-year in January and February (see Chart 1.5). 
The less favourable developments in transactions in the first two months of the year 
were concentrated in the second-hand housing and the multi-family housing 
segments. By regions, this reduced buoyancy was largely seen in the regions that 
tend to present higher transaction volumes. Meanwhile, sales of new or single-family 
House sales ended 2020 with a negative balance, weighed down by the slump in transactions during the early months of the pandemic.  
Despite this context, house prices did not record widespread declines, but rather continued the pre-existing slowdown. The new housing 
segment registered a more favourable trend, which may reflect a certain shift in the preferences of agents. New lending for house purchase 
recovered significantly in 2020 H2, partially offsetting the decline recorded during the spring lockdown. Lending standards for new mortgages 
appear to have tightened slightly in recent quarters.
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPACTED BY THE COURSE OF THE PANDEMIC, AS HAS NEW LENDING FOR ITS
PURCHASE, WHILE PRICES HAVE CONTINUED TO DECELERATE
Chart 1.5
SOURCES: INE, Colegio de Registradores and Banco de España.
a Cumulative three-month data.
b Quarterly data. Four-quarter average.
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homes have demonstrated greater resilience since the start of the recovery than 
those of second-hand or multi-family housing. This pattern could continue if the 
apparent shift in buyer preferences – towards larger homes with open spaces and 
located in peripheral areas of cities – takes root, insofar as new or single-family 
housing is able to adapt flexibly to these changes. 
House	prices	continued	the	trend	slowdown	that	began	prior	to	the	pandemic,	
with	 no	 across-the-board	declines	observed	 thus	 far. The house price index 
rose 1.5% year-on-year in 2020 Q4, with a notable acceleration in new-build prices 
(8.2%), which may, at least in part, reflect investment decisions taken before the 
crisis as well as the above-mentioned shift in demand trends (see Chart 1.5.2). By 
contrast, second-hand house prices continued to slow (0.4%). The resilience of 
residential property prices to date stands in contrast to the sharp declines observed 
during the global financial crisis. Several factors are behind this. First, the current 
crisis was not prompted by an oversized real estate sector or the financial excesses 
thereof. Further, forced property sales have so far been kept in check thanks to the 
introduction of income protection mechanisms – such as mortgage moratoria and 
furlough schemes – for those households most affected by the crisis, together with 
the far more stringent credit standards for house purchase in recent years and lower 
levels of indebtedness. Lastly, prior to the onset of the pandemic there were no clear 
widespread signs of property market overvaluation. The future evolution of house 
prices is also affected by the uncertainty about the intensity of the recovery in 
economic activity.
In	 the	 real	 estate	 credit	 market,	 new	 loans	 for	 house	 purchase	 have	 also	
recovered	somewhat,	while	credit	standards	appear	to	have	tightened	slightly.	
2020 H2 saw a significant recovery in the volume of mortgage loans for house purchase, 
which helped to partially offset the heavy fall-off in such lending in the months following 
the outbreak of the pandemic (see Chart 1.5.3). However, this performance has been 
accompanied by a slight tightening of credit standards. Accordingly, the proportion of 
new loans with a loan-to-price ratio (LTP) of over 80% has declined (see Chart 1.5.4). 
Among these, the share of mortgages with long repayment periods has decreased. 
Moreover, the interest rate spread against the risk-free reference rate held practically 
unchanged in 2020. These developments suggest that institutions remain somewhat 




online	 sales	 accounting	 for	 a	 larger	 share. The number of transactions has 
plunged and prices have declined across the board, albeit moderately. Against this 
backdrop, new mortgages secured by commercial real estate show no sign of 
recovery and credit standards have tightened. This is reflected in, for instance, the 
decline in the share of mortgages with a high LTP ratio.
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1.3 the non-financial sectors 
1.3.1 non-financial corporations and households
the cOViD-19 crisis is having a severe impact on corporate earnings. On the 
information available for the sample of firms contributing to the Central Balance 
Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), which are predominantly large firms, the 
percentage of companies with a negative ROA14 increased to 34% in 2020, up 8 pp 
compared to 201915 (see Chart 1.6.1). According to the microsimulations conducted,16 
the drop in profitability was particularly steep for SMEs and, in particular, in the 
hospitality and entertainment, motor vehicles, wholesale and retail trade and 
transportation and storage sectors.
The	 degree	 of	 financial	 pressure	 borne	 by	 firms	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	
indebtedness also seems to be increasing. The aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased by 12 pp over 2020 (see Chart 1.6.2). Slightly two-thirds of this increase 
would be due to the decline in output. These developments also appear to have 
resulted in an increase, albeit far more muted, in the interest burden ratio, thanks 
to low financing costs. On CBQ data, the performance of firm-level debt in 2020 
indicates that the heightened financial pressure borne by this sector owes more 
to their lower earnings than their increased net debt.17 Box 1.2 examines the 
uneven developments in bank debt across firms that presented different financial 
characteristics prior to the outbreak of the crisis. Box 1.3 explores measures 
geared towards boosting firms’ solvency, in reaction to these recent 
developments.
The	 degree	 of	 final	 pressure	 on	 households	 also	 appears	 to	 be	 rising,	
particularly	among	 those	households	most	affected	by	 the	crisis.	However,	
the	public	support	measures	seem	to	have	helped	 to	considerably	mitigate	
these	effects	thus	far.	According to the Spanish Survey of Household Finances,18 
the percentage of more vulnerable households was higher in the sectors hardest hit 
by the pandemic.19 In any event, social transfers in the form of unemployment 
14	 	Return	on	assets	=	(ordinary	net	profit	+	financial	costs)	/	assets	net	of	non-interest-bearing	liabilities.
15  See “The	impact	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	on	the	financial	position	of	non-financial	corporations	in	2020:	CBSO-
based evidence”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin	4/2020,	Banco	de	España.
16	 	Microsimulations	were	conducted	based	on	corporate	information	sourced	from	the	integrated	CBSO	database	
for	2018	and	2019	to	estimate	the	behaviour	of	firms	in	2020.
17	 	See	Box	 “Recent	developments	 in	 the	 indebtedness	of	 the	non-financial	 corporate	 sector”	 in	 the	Analytical	
Article “Results	of	non-financial	corporations	to	2020	Q4.	Preliminary	year-end	data”, Economic Bulletin,	1/2021,	
Banco de España.
18	 	The	 latest	 available	 Spanish	 Survey	 of	 Household	 Finances	 relates	 to	 2017.	 However,	 the	 household-level	
information	 that	 the	survey	provides	on	wealth	distribution	among	Spanish	households	 tends	 to	be	 relatively	
stable over time. 
19  See “The	financial	position	of	the	workers	most	affected	by	the	pandemic:	an	analysis	drawing	on	the	Spanish	
Survey of Household Finances”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin	3/2020,	Banco	de	España.
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benefits, furlough schemes20 and the minimum living income21 have helped cushion 
the drop in income for these households. Likewise, the moratoria on the debt burden 
of households most affected by the crisis, along with those on rent payments and 
energy consumption, seem to have eased the pressure on these lower income 
households, albeit temporarily. Both the aggregate debt ratio and the debt burden in 
terms of gross disposable income (GDI) increased slightly in 2020. This owed to the 
decline in GDI (which was concentrated among certain groups) being largely offset 





21  In March 2020, the minimum living income had been granted to more than 203,000 households comprising 
565,000 individuals.
The COVID-19 crisis has entailed a sharp deterioration in corporate earnings. On the information available for the sample of firms reporting 
to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey, the percentage of them with a negative ordinary return on assets increased to 34% 
in 2020, up 8 pp on the previous year. Firms’ liquidity needs have been largely covered by recourse to credit, supported by the measures 
deployed by authorities, which, together with a sharp contraction of GDP, has resulted in an increase in the debt ratio and, to a lesser extent, 
debt burden for the first time in a decade.
THE COVID-19 CRISIS HAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE PROFITABILITY OF FIRMS, WHICH HAVE INCREASED THEIR
INDEBTEDNESS AFTER A DECADE OF DELEVERAGING
Chart 1.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The data are from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ). Return on assets = (Ordinary net profit + Financial costs) / Assets 
net of non-interest-bearing borrowing.
b R: ordinary return on net assets.
c The debt burden of firms only includes interest payments, given the difficulty of reliably estimating the amount of repayment instalments.
DEBT RATIO DEBT BURDEN (right-hand scale) (c)R<=0 % 0 %<R<=5 %
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degree	 of	 heterogeneity	 in	 income	 and	wealth	 levels	within	 the	 sector. The 
household saving rate reached record highs, with most of the funds channelled 
towards deposits. However, in all probability, the growth in the most liquid wealth was 
concentrated among the least vulnerable households. The negative impact on 
households’ employment income has varied markedly depending on the sector of 
employment (see Chart 1.7.2). Box 1.2 also examines the heterogeneous response to 
the COVID-19 crisis of bank debt among individuals with different characteristics in 
terms of income, employment status and other attributes that provide insight into the 
fragility of their income. 
1.3.2 General government in Spain
The	year	2020	ended	with	a	pronounced	deterioration	of	public	finances	in	
Spain	owing	to	the	effects	of	the	pandemic	and	the	associated	containment	
measures. At end-2020, the general government deficit stood at 11% of GDP, 
notably up on the 2.9% recorded in 2019, and public debt reached 120 % of GDP 
(see Chart 1.8.1). The reclassification of SAREB as part of the public 
Despite the pandemic, Spanish households have continued reducing their debt in aggregate terms. However, the decline in income, which 
has been concentrated among workers with the closest ties to those industries hardest hit by restrictions on social interaction, has driven up 
the debt-to-GDI ratio.
ALTHOUGH HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE REDUCING THEIR DEBT, THE FALL IN INCOME HAS DRIVEN UP THE AGGREGATE 
DEBT RATIO OF THIS SECTOR
Chart 1.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The debt burden of households comprises interest payments and debt repayments.
b Social Security registrations are seasonally adjusted.
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sector22 contributes 0.9 pp to the rise in deficit and 3 pp to the increase in public 
debt. The rest is explained by both a decline in revenue (-5%) and, above all, an 
increase in spending (10%). The former was marked by the impact of the fall-off 
in activity on tax bases and by the tax moratoria introduced to help firms 
experiencing liquidity problems; in the case of personal income tax, these were 
partly offset by the general government measures to support the income of 
private agents. In turn, spending increased as a result of the measures adopted 




situation, marked by a continuous series of losses in later years. In accounting terms, this operation is registered 
as a transfer of capital from the public sector to the rest of resident agents in 2020, for the negative net accounting 
value of SAREB, and a rise in public debt, for an amount equal to the liabilities of SAREB.
23  See Macroeconomic scenarios for the Spanish economy (2021-2023).
The resolute action taken by fiscal authorities in 2020 has been effective in counteracting the adverse economic effects of COVID-19. 
However, the resulting deterioration of public finances means greater vulnerability to potential additional shocks. In the short term, favourable 
financing conditions and European fund programmes should allow the expansionary fiscal policy stance to continue. The main risk for public 
finances continues to be a setback in resolving the health crisis that gives rise to more pronounced and persistent effects on economic 
activity. In the medium term, once the effects of the crisis are overcome, a credible and sustained consolidation process is required.
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS NOTABLY IMPAIRED THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL POSITION IN SPAIN
Chart 1.8
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative data.
b The budget deficit and government debt estimates for 2020 and 2021-2023 do not include the assumption of Sareb debt by the general government, 
a fact known after the preparation of the forecasts.
c Macroeconomic scenarios of the Banco de España projections published on March 23, 2021. The squares of 2020 correspond to the data published 
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the	general	government	balance	in	2021-2023. The persistence of COVID-19 has 
led to the extension until 30 May 2021 of the extraordinary measures relating to 
furlough schemes and temporary discontinuation of activity schemes for the self-
employed. The expiries of loan guarantee facilities have also been extended and 
new direct support measures for firms have been introduced. Later, a new package 
of measures has been approved to support firm solvency, including direct aid, for a 
total amount of €11 billion. However, a series of factors will help partially correct the 
deficit this year. First, a significant recovery in government receipts is expected 
thanks to the projected improvement in economic activity, especially in 2021 H2, 
and, to a lesser extent, increased tax revenue stemming from the new income 
measures budgeted for 2021. Second, the progressive disappearance of the bulk of 
the measures approved in 2020 should result in far more moderate spending growth. 
Overall,	in	2021	the	general	government	balance	could	stand	between	-6.8%	
and	 -9.1%	 of	 GDP,	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 macroeconomic	 scenario	 is	
closer	to	the	baseline	scenario	or	the	severe	scenario	envisaged	by	the	Banco	
de España in March (see Chart 1.8.2). The correction of the imbalance in public 
finances looks set to continue in 2022 and 2023 thanks to the expected cyclical 
improvement. Nonetheless, under any of the scenarios the deficit would remain 
above 3% of GDP in 2023. Government debt will hold at very high levels under any 
of the envisaged scenarios.
The	 European	 authorities’	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	will	 constitute	 one	 of	 the	
main	catalysts	for	activity	in	the	short	and	medium	term. The monetary measures 
adopted by the ECB have helped ward off tensions in the sovereign debt markets, 
making for highly favourable financing conditions. In the fiscal realm, the launch of 
the NGEU, which could finance investment projects for up to €140 billion in Spain in 
the next six years, will allow the country’s fiscal policy to maintain an expansionary 
stance.
Thereafter,	rebuilding	Spanish	public	finances	will	require	considerable	effort.	
Authorities should devise, without further delay, a credible and sufficient fiscal 
consolidation programme over a long period, with implementation commencing once 
the health and economic crisis ends. This is needed to curb the spread of vulnerabilities 
from general government to other economic sectors and to foster long-term growth.
1.3.3  Financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the international 
investment position
In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2020,	 acquisitions	 of	 foreign	 assets	 by	 residents	
moderated	very	significantly	 relative	 to	 the	 first	half	of	 the	year,	while	non-
residents	disinvested	in	the	Spanish	economy.	This resulted in a reduction in the 
financial account surplus of the Spanish economy's balance of payments in half 
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(€33.6 billion, down from €62.5 billion in the first half of 2020), excluding Banco de 
España (see Figure 1.9.1). On the asset side, this different behaviour in the first and 
second half of the year is mainly explained by the disinvestments in the heading of 
another investment worth €47.1 billion (compared to investments of €62.3 billion in 
the first half of the year), in particular in short-term deposits of monetary financial 
institutions. On the liability side, the disinvestments of long-term government debt 
(€23.6 billion) and of short-term deposits from monetary financial institutions (€25.7 
billion) stand out. The financial account of Banco de España again presented a 
debtor position, although smaller in the second half of 2020 than in the first, linked 
to purchases of Eurosystem assets (the APP and PEPP programmes). This translated 
into a bulging increase in the TARGET debtor balance throughout 2020, worth €108 
billion.
The	Spanish	economy’s	negative	net	 international	 investment	position	 (IIP)	
increased	 slightly	 in	 2020	 (€	 19.6	 billion),	 while	 gross	 external	 debt	 has	
In 2020 H2, the current account surplus in the Spanish economy, excluding the Banco de España, moderated with respect to H1. This owed 
to purchases of foreign assets by resident sectors standing well below those of H1. The negative net international investment position (IIP) 
grew in GDP terms owing primarily to the decline in output. For its part, Spain’s gross external debt in terms of GDP rose in 2020 to record 
highs due to the decline in output, but also as a result of the rise in external liabilities flows, specifically of the Banco de España and general 
government, and valuation effects.
IN RECENT QUARTERS, THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S NEGATIVE NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION AND GROSS
EXTERNAL DEBT IN TERMS OF GDP HAVE RISEN, WITH THE LATTER REACHING RECORD HIGHS
Chart 1.9
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Net change in assets less net change in liabilities.
b A positive (negative) value in the series denotes a credit (debit) position.
c The negative net IIP is the difference between the value of the external liabilities of the resident sectors and that of the assets to the rest of the world.
d External debt comprises the balance of all liabilities that entail future repayment of principal, interest or both (i.e. all financial instruments, except 
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increased	considerably.	 In 2020, the negative net IIP rose by 10 pp of GDP to 
84.4%, as a result not only of the increase in the numerator, but especially because 
of the decrease in the denominator (see Chart 1.9.2). The country’s gross external 
debt grew in the same period by €115.2 billion, triggered by the rise in the Banco de 
España’s external liabilities flows and, to a lesser extent, those of general 
government, and by the increase in the market value of these instruments. Gross 
external debt stood at 199.7% of GDP, an all-time high and up 29.3 pp on the figure 
at end-2019. The current favourable financial conditions make it easier to finance 
Spain’s external debt, although the high level of such debt represents an element of 
vulnerability to a potential tightening of conditions on international financial markets. 
While the composition of the debt, with the public sector accounting for a large 
share and lengthy average repayment periods, helps mitigate these risks to some 
extent, its high level could magnify the impact of the financial stability risks 
considered in this FSR.
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Recuadro ?.?
TÍTULO RECUADRO
This box analyses the extent to which recent developments 
in corporate credit risk premia in the euro area and in the 
United States, both for the investment-grade and high-
yield segments, are explained by the historical relationship 
with their fundamentals. This is done using corporate bond 
valuation models based on four factors: expected 
enterprise value, the uncertainty around this value, 
corporate sector leverage and the degree of investor risk 
aversion.1 The risk premia are measured for each segment 
as the corporate bond yield spread over the swap curve in 
the euro area and in the United States.2 The enterprise 
value is proxied by the average earnings per share 
expected by analysts for the firms comprising the 
corresponding area’s stock market index (EURO STOXX 
50 or S&P 500) in a 2 or 3-year time frame, while the 
uncertainty is captured using the standard deviation of the 
analysts’ forecasts for those earnings. Leverage is 
measured through the debt-to-GDP ratio of the non-
financial business sector in each area3 and, lastly, investor 
risk aversion is proxied by the implied volatility of the stock 
market indices (VIX and VSTOXX).4 The model is estimated 
at a monthly frequency for the period from January 2001 to 
March 2021. As was to be expected, the models estimated 
suggest that an increase in expected earnings leads to 
lower risk premia, while an increase in uncertainty, leverage 
or risk aversion causes the risk premia to rise.5
Charts 1 to 4 show, in deviations relative to the historical 
average and based on the models estimated, the 
breakdown of the credit risk premia for both segments 
(investment-grade and high-yield) and for both areas (euro 
area: Charts 1 and 2; United States: Charts 3 and 4) in 
2020 and Q1 2021.6 The results show that prior to the 
pandemic these risk premia stood below their historical 
average in most segments. The portion unexplained by the 
model7 was negative in the United States and was larger in 
absolute size for high-yield bonds in that region. This 
means that these risk premia stood below the values 
explained by their fundamentals, which is probably why 
some analysts viewed risk premia compression as a 
financial stability risk.
Following the outbreak of the crisis, most factors 
contributed to an increase in credit risk premia, especially 
investor risk aversion, particularly in the high-yield 
segments. With the exception of euro area investment-
grade corporate bonds, the increases observed in these 
risk premia during the initial months of the crisis were more 
moderate than the historical relationship with their 
fundamentals would suggest. This is captured in the charts 
as a more negative unexplained component, which 
became very large in both market segments in the United 
States and in the euro area high-yield market.
Over the subsequent months, the explained component 
tended to gradually decrease, driven largely by the lower 
risk aversion and lower uncertainty, which has a larger 
impact in the high-yield segments. These changes in the 
explanatory variables appear to be partly linked to the 
support policies deployed by the economic authorities 
during the crisis. However, part of their impact, in particular 
the effect of the central bank asset purchase programmes, 
is not reflected, which would account for why the 
unexplained portion became more negative.
The latest figures show that those unexplained 
components, in absolute value, stood at around 15 bp and 
112 bp in the investment-grade and high-yield segments, 
respectively, in the euro area, and at 115 bp and 185 bp in 
corresponding segments in the United States. In the US 
markets, these levels are close to the peak for the series 
since 2001 and are higher than those observed in the 
years prior to the global financial crisis.
In short, the current levels of credit risk premia are lower 
than might be expected judging by the historical 
Box 1.1
REcEnt DEVElOPMEntS in cORPORatE RiSK PREMia anD tHEiR DEtERMinantS
1	 	For	further	details	on	the	model,	see	J.	M.	Gálvez	and	I.	Roibás	(2021),	“Asset	price	misalignments	in	financial	markets:	an	empirical	analysis”,	Working 
Paper, Banco de España (forthcoming).
2	 	Specifically,	the	ICA	Merrill	Lynch	high	yield	(B)	and	investment	grade	(AAA-AA)	indices	for	the	euro	area	and	the	United	States	are	used.
3	 	For	the	United	States,	the	corporate	debt	information	published	on	the	website	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis	(FRED)	is	used,	and	for	the	






7  Although in the charts the portion not explained by the model is calculated in the form of deviations relative to the average, it is important to note that, 
by construction, the average of this component is close to 0.
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Recuadro ?.?
TÍTULO RECUADRO
relationship between these and their explanatory 
variables, particularly in the case of US corporate bonds 
and those of the euro area high-yield segment. Much of 
this could be attributable to the public support measures, 
monetary policy in particular, or more optimistic 
expectations for future economic growth than those 
reflected in the variables of the models used. Thus, any 
potential adverse changes to investor expectations 
regarding the economic performance or the duration of 
the public support measures could lead to corrections in 
corporate bond prices, which would have a negative 
impact on the financing conditions for the issuers of 
these securities and on the value of bondholders’ 
portfolios. 
Box 1.1
REcEnt DEVElOPMEntS in cORPORatE RiSK PREMia anD tHEiR DEtERMinantS (cont'd)
SOURCE: Datastream.
a The breakdowns are based on a weighted average of different corporate bond valuation models. Risk aversion is the first component of VIX and 
VSTOXX. The unexplained factor is the difference between the observed value and the value predicted by the corporate bond model. The observed 
value of the risk premia and the breakdowns are calculated as deviations relative to the historical average of the period January 2001 to March 2021 
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The COVID-19 pandemic is having a highly uneven impact 
both on firms and on individuals, depending on their links 
with the economic activities more or less affected by the 
health situation. However, the differences that existed prior 
to the crisis, in terms of financial strength (for firms) or 
income level, wealth and job stability (for individuals), 
interact with the income shock prompted by the pandemic 
and could generate differential effects in terms of financing 
needs and impairment of ability to pay.
Those agents whose income is relatively more impaired 
may have to resort to more debt to cover their short-term 
expenses, which would mean, ceteris paribus, an increase 
in the financial exposures assumed by the funding 
providers, but it would avert second-round effects on 
economic activity by sustaining consumption and 
investment, and would increase the likelihood of firms and 
jobs being preserved. 
However, if the deterioration of longer-term expectations 
for income generation proves sufficiently severe, a 
contraction of solvent demand for credit, or a more 
restrictive supply-side response in the face of heightened 
risk perception, could lead to a reduction of debt in these 
sectors. Ceteris paribus, the credit exposures immediately 
assumed by financial intermediaries with these 
counterparties would be lower, but the possibility of 
business closures and sharp contractions in consumption 
by some households could increase. Consequently, 
determining which of these two potential theoretical 
patterns is predominating is an empirical matter.
Although the support measures, such as payment 
moratoria and ICO guarantees for business credit (analysed 
in greater detail in Boxes 2.1 and 2.2), may facilitate access 
to bank credit for the most affected agents, the ultimate 
distribution by type of firm and household will again 
depend on the relative behaviour of supply and demand.
The Banco de España’s Central Credit Register (CCR), in 
combination with other data sources such as the Banco de 
España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office and the 
Mercantile Registries (CBB database), contains sufficiently 
disaggregated information to conduct a preliminary study 
on the heterogeneity in the response of the bank debt of 
different types of individuals and firms to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
As Chart 1 shows, there are significant differences in credit 
growth across the sectors of activity, with the rate of 
change standing 5.8 pp higher in the most pandemic-
sensitive sectors.1 The use of ICO guarantees appears to 
be associated with higher growth in lending to firms (close 
to 30 pp higher both for all sectors and for the most 
sensitive sectors).2 The business characteristics assessed 
were the firms’ age, capital ratio (equity-to-assets), 
average cost of debt, ROA and labour productivity (net 
revenue per employee).3 For each of these, the firms were 
divided into two groups – high and low – pursuant to their 
position relative to the median of the distribution, 
calculating the weighted rate of change of the relevant 
variable for each of the two groups. 
It can be observed that the rate of change in credit has 
been somewhat higher for younger firms; higher also for 
firms that have a lower average cost of debt and those that 
are more profitable or more productive; and considerably 
higher for less indebted firms (see Chart 1). These 
differences in behaviour across non-financial corporations 
with different levels of financial strength are more 
pronounced when only the sectors most sensitive to the 
effects of the pandemic are analysed. All of which would 
suggest that, broadly speaking, it was not the most 
vulnerable firms that increased their bank debt most in the 
past year; instead priority appears to have been given to 
containing financial risks, increasing the exposure to 
stronger firms. Significant demand-side factors are 
likewise evident in the stronger credit growth in sensitive 
sectors and among the youngest firms (older firm age 
appears to be associated with lower growth). These results 
also suggest that, in the absence of support measures, 
lending to the more vulnerable firms would have presented 
a larger negative growth differential.
Box 1.2
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Box 1.2
HEtEROGEnEity in DEVElOPMEntS in tHE banK DEbt OF inDiViDUalS anD FiRMS DURinG tHE cOViD-19 
PanDEMic (cont'd)
SOURCES: CIRBE, CBBE, INE and Banco de España.
a The differences are presented in pp for the rates of change between non-financial corporations classified into two groups (high and low) based on 
their position relative to the median for each financial variable within the study sample (e.g. high (low) ROA if above (below) the median). The financial 
characteristics are taken from the CBB database (last complete sample for 2018, meaning that the variables reflect the pre-crisis financial situation). 
The ICO Guarantee indicator divides the sample firms into those with and those without an ICO-backed loan. For this study, the sensitive sectors are 
manufacturing (excluding the manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco); retail and wholesale trade; repair of vehicles; transportation and 
storage; hospitality; and arts, entertainment and recreation.
b The differences are presented in pp for the rates of change between individuals classified according to characteristics relating to their income and 
ability to pay. Each characteristic is dichotomous or allows the individuals to be classified into two groups (high and low) based on their position 
relative to the median. The Moratoria indicator identifies whether the individual has benefitted from a loan moratorium at any time in 2020. The 
income of the individual is attributed through matching with INE data on income by postcode. The differences based on the characteristics of 
individuals are compared both for the overall total and for individuals that have made use of at least one moratorium.
c Problem assets are those considered non-performing or with past-due payments, even when for less than 30 days. In Chart 2, for the sensitive 
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In terms of problem loans, which in this analysis are 
considered to be non-performing and past-due loans,4 the 
growth differences for ROA and productivity stand out, 
with the better-positioned firms in each of these metrics 
recording lower rates of change (see Chart 2).5 It is likewise 
observed that there has been a greater ex-post 
materialisation of credit risk among those firms that have 
made use of ICO guarantees. In the sensitive sectors, the 
association between greater financial strength (for 
instance, higher ROA or productivity) and a lower rate of 
change in problem loans is even more evident than in the 
overall population of firms. In sensitive sectors, firms with 
a higher cost of debt show a distinctly poorer performance 
in terms of loans. However, in some cases the disruption 
caused by the pandemic could mean that the pre-crisis 
financial position has less ex-post explanatory power for 
the credit risk assumed.6 For example, across all sectors 
of activity, higher growth in problem loans is observed for 
firms that had a lower ex-ante cost of debt.
A similar exercise has been conducted for individuals, 
assessing the effect of age, gender, employment status, 
nationality and income level (proxied by the average 
income in the postcode area of residence), since there is 
previous evidence in the literature that young people, 
women, foreign workers and, naturally, the unemployed 
could have experienced the largest reductions in income 
during this crisis. In some cases, this owes to the type of a 
large part of the employment contracts among these 
groups and, in others, to their presence in the most 
affected sectors.
Chart 3 shows how the unemployed, foreigners, older 
individuals and lower-income earners have registered a 
larger decline in total credit. By contrast, there are no 
significant gender-based differences. The existence of 
moratoria has been conducive to a more favourable 
change in the stock of credit (with growth 1.2 pp higher for 
those individuals benefitting from moratoria). This is 
particularly true in these more vulnerable groups, where a 
less negative differential performance is observed, with 
the exception of foreigners, whose total credit declined to 
a greater extent among those making use of moratoria. 
With regard to developments in non-performing and past-
due loans (see Chart 4), relevant growth differences are only 
observed for the unemployed (with higher rates of change 
than other individuals) and foreigners. Overall, it seems that 
the individuals most economically affected by the pandemic 
have seen their bank credit decrease more than others, 
while, by contrast, this group has also recorded a smaller 
reduction in credit risk. Among the individuals who made use 
of moratoria, it is observed that unemployment and lower 
income are associated with lower rates of change in problem 
assets, which would indicate that the moratoria are 
preventing the emergence of credit problems in some of the 
more vulnerable segments. By contrast, the rate of change 
in problem loans among foreigners with access to moratoria 
has been relatively high.
Certain limitations of this analysis should be acknowledged. 
First, developments in bank debt do not offer a full picture 
of changes in the financial situation of households and 
firms. Further, the entire population of bank loans is not 
available due to the reporting threshold of €6,000 (cumulative 
by holder in the CCR) and the need to match the CCR with 
the CBB database – to which not all firms report – in order 
to segment credit by the firms’ financial positions. However, 
this sample is sufficiently representative to assess whether 
any cross-sector imbalances in credit developments exist 
before they materialise to a significant degree.
The analysis indicates that developments in credit in 2020 
would largely be shaped by risk considerations, with 
relatively weaker credit growth in the more vulnerable 
segments of firms and individuals, which also registered a 
poorer performance in terms of growth of problem loans. 
The analysis in this box, further complemented by Boxes 2.1 
and 2.2, indicates that the existence of support programmes, 
such as the ICO guarantees and credit moratoria, appears to 
have had a significant effect in containing, but not cancelling 
out, these trends. In other words, in the absence of the 
support programmes, the groups of firms and households 
with a higher risk profile would probably have experienced 
credit constraints. Going forward, close monitoring is 
required to identity any potential credit constraints for viable 
firms, which could affect the path of economic recovery.
Box 1.2
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The economic literature highlights the fact that high 
corporate indebtedness can weigh down on investment, 
generating adverse effects on productivity and economic 
growth.1 High indebtedness also entails a risk to financial 
stability. The COVID-19 crisis has given rise to an increase 
in corporate indebtedness which, against the backdrop of 
a still-uncertain outlook, may ultimately generate solvency 
problems in specific company segments. 
Against this background, Royal Decree-Law 5/20212 
envisages a series of extraordinary measures aimed at 
supporting business viability: (1) a specific-purpose direct 
aid fund totalling €7 billion,3 (2) a range of tools to facilitate 
the restructuring processes of loans with a public 
guarantee to firms and the self-employed who should 
need it, including a facility worth €3 billion, (3) a 
recapitalisation fund of €1 billion for pandemic-affected 
companies and (4) the extension until end-2021 of the 
suspension of the obligation for insolvent debtors to 
initiate bankruptcy proceedings.
Regarding the direct aid, it poses at least two fundamental 
design challenges: (i) selection of aid recipient firms and (ii) 
incentives structure for participating firms. Not having an 
appropriate selection criterion could give rise to a poor 
redistribution of productive resources, keeping low-
productivity firms going or providing support to companies 
that do not need it to reduce their debt level. Conversely, an 
unsuitable design could leave out companies that are viable 
but facing solvency problems. The heterogeneity of the 
distribution of business productivity, profitability and the 
debt ratio prior to the COVID-19 crisis (see Charts 1 and 2) 
points to a very different potential impact of the programme 
depending on the firms that are the ultimate recipients. 
The introduction of sector-based eligibility criteria, by firm 
size and with regional compartmentalisation elements, in 
Royal Decree-Law 5/2021 is related to some extent to 
these optimal selection criteria; but their implementation 
will determine to what extent the criteria are ultimately 
observed, given that the level of indebtedness is not 
explicitly taken into account. This is a key measure for 
assessing business solvency. Further, it cannot be ruled 
out that there are viable companies with solvency problems 
arising from the crisis that are operating in sectors not 
among those most affected by the crisis and which could, 
therefore, remain outside the aid-eligible set. However, the 
subsequent amendment of the aid programme, 
empowering regional governments to extend the granting 
of aid to other sectors not initially envisaged in Royal 
decree-law 5/2021, limits this possibility.4 
Furthermore, the direct aid fund is intended for solvent 
companies and individual entrepreneurs (in accordance 
with the criterion of not having filed negative personal or 
corporate income tax bases in 2019), under a commitment 
to maintain activity. This requirement of a positive tax base 
in 2019 correlates to productivity, but it is a backward-
looking and partial measure that could leave out young 
firms or companies that were to undertake major 
investment projects that year.5 
The swift and uniform implementation of this aid is 
particularly significant in this setting, and the distribution 
mechanisms should be adjusted to selectively target the 
aid precisely on companies that are viable but have 
solvency problems. Flexibility in the volume and use of the 
committed funds is also necessary, to adapt them to the 
course the pandemic is following and to any future 
materialisation of risks. 
The second course of action, namely the restructuring of 
bank debt backed by the ICO, seeks to alleviate the 
financial burden on viable firms with specific solvency 
problems. It does this, first, by extending the term of the 
guaranteed loan, converting it into a participating loan,6 
Box 1.3
bUSinESS SOlVEncy SUPPORt MEaSURES
1  See Myers, S. C., 1977, Determinants	of	Corporate	Borrowing,	Journal	of	Financial	Economics,	Vol.	5,	Issue	2,	pp.	147-175.
2  See publication in BOE of Real	Decreto-ley	5/2021.
3	 	This	fund	would	provide	for	the	coverage	of	overheads	(utilities,	suppliers,	etc.)	and,	should	anything	be	left	over	after	covering	these	expenses,	also	
for	new	debt	commitments	entered	into	after	March	2020.
4  The announcement on 20 April 2021 of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers authorises the regional governments and the city-enclaves of Ceuta 
and	Melilla	to	grant	aid	to	companies	in	sectors	other	than	the	95	initially	established	under	Royal	Decree-Law	5/2021	on	the	basis	of	the	percentage	
of employment in such sectors under furlough schemes, and of the persistence of the use of furlough schemes since the start of the pandemic.





variable alike, is generally deductible for corporate income tax purposes.
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and, exceptionally, through the reduction of its principal. 
The facility set aside for this purpose, in coordination 
with the lender institutions, is subject to the lenders 
assuming their proportional share and to subscription of a 
code of good practices. The code of good practices 
should retain the capacity banks have to use the greater 
information they have on their borrowers.
The third component of the decree, the recapitalisation 
fund, complements the actions of the SEPI-managed fund 
for strategic firms in the sphere of medium-sized firms.
In short, these measures have the potential to contribute 
to preserving the productive system; but their 
implementation is complex and their impact will hinge on a 
correct selection of the participating companies. Moreover, 
the quicker their implementation is, the greater their 
effectiveness will be. In this regard, the relatively simple 
selection mechanism in the measures adopted would have 
the potential virtue of facilitating their quick implementation. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, if the macroeconomic 
situation proves worse than expected, it might be 
necessary to recalibrate their size and the selection criteria.
Box 1.3
bUSinESS SOlVEncy SUPPORt MEaSURES (cont'd)
SOURCES: CBB Database, CCR and Banco de España.
a Productivity is measured as the ratio of gross value added to personnel costs (as a percentage). The data are for 2018, the latest year for which a 
representative sample is available in the CBB Database. The density function is proxied using a kernel estimator, which provides for a continuous 
and smoothed representation.
b The debt ratio shown corresponds to the sum of current and non-current liabilities over total assets. The sectors most sensitive to the COVID-19 
crisis belong to manufacturing activities (excluding the food, beverages and tobacco industries), transport and storage, hospitality, wholesale and 
retail trade, and vehicle repair and other services (artistic, recreational and entertainment activities). The most (least) indebted sectors are those 
that have a debt ratio higher (lower) than the 75th (25th) percentile of the distribution of sectors according to the two-digit CNAE classification.
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Chapter 2 of this FSR focuses on analysing developments in the Spanish banking 
sector and in the other financial intermediaries during 2020, a year in which the 
COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the financial system, albeit an 
impact which the economic policy response has largely cushioned. Thus, lending 
grew in Spain during the year and NPLs continued to decline. However, this was largely 
conditioned by the credit support schemes implemented (State guarantees and loan 
moratoria), which will need to be monitored closely. The impact of the pandemic on 
banking activity and the economic outlook, along with several extraordinary 
adjustments, gave rise to negative profitability in the banking sector in 2020, albeit 
unevenly across institutions. However, this unfavourable profitability performance did 
not translate into a worsening of the sector’s solvency, and capital ratios increased, 
underpinned in part by the reform of European capital requirements and by the 
authorities’ recommendation on dividend distribution restrictions. As regards the non-
bank financial sector, the net flows contributed to investment funds stabilised in the 
second half of the year, although these intermediaries were exposed to the risk of 
abrupt changes in financial market conditions. Interconnections between financial 
sub-sectors through common holdings of marketable securities, particularly those on 
the edge of investment grade, are a potential propagation channel for this risk.
2.1 Deposit institutions




the	year.	The year-on-year growth rate stood at 3.5%,1 although credit expansion 
was particularly strong in Q2, coinciding with heightened deployment of the ICO 
guarantee scheme for loans to firms (see Chart 2.1).2 This is the first time bank 
lending has grown in Spain since 2008, reflecting the banking sector’s ability to meet 
households’ and firms’ liquidity needs and the effect of the economic policy measures 
1	 	In	December	2020	growth	was	affected	by	a	corporate	transaction	consisting	of	the	absorption	of	an	SLI	into	a	
significant	deposit	institution	(DI).	In	any	event,	excluding	this	transaction,	growth	for	2020	as	a	whole	was	2,9%.
2  Royal Decree-Law	8/2020 of 17 March 2020 approved a State guarantee facility of up to €100 billion to help 
preserve employment and mitigate the economic effects of the health crisis. Royal Decree-Law	25/2020 approved 
a	second	facility	to	cover	funding	needs	for	new	investments.	Royal Decree-Law	34/2020 extended the application 
deadlines and improved the conditions of the previously approved guarantee facilities.
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taken to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis, in particular the credit support 
schemes (ICO guarantees and moratoria).
Total	 new	 lending	 granted	 in	 2020	 to	 households	 and	 to	 non-financial	
corporations	 (NFCs)	and	sole	proprietors	exceeded	 that	granted	 in	2019	by	
4.1%. However, behaviour was mixed: lending to NFCs and sole proprietors increased 
by 6.6% and that to households decreased by 5.6%. The volume of credit drawn in 
transactions linked to the ICO guarantee facilities represented 18% of total new 
lending granted by deposit institutions in Spain in 2020 (see Chart 2.1) and 34% of 
new lending granted to NFCs and sole proprietors. These developments have also 
been sustained more broadly by the raft of fiscal and monetary measures adopted 
in response to the COVID-19 crisis.
Non-performing	loans	to	the	resident	private	sector	continued	to	decrease	in	
2020,	 albeit	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 than	 in	 previous	 years. The stock of problem 
assets of this kind declined by 3.8% year-on-year (see Chart 2.2), compared with the 
decreases recorded in 2018 (-29.1%) and 2019 (-19.1%). The severe contraction of 
the Spanish economy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic explains the worse 
relative performance of NPLs in the past year, with a rebound in Q2 followed by a 
return to the downward path associated with certain sales of these portfolios. 
The stock of credit of deposit institutions (DIs) to the private sector resident in Spain grew by 3.5% in 2020, although there was some 
sluggishness in H2. The volume of new credit granted was 4.1% higher than in 2019. Business lending with ICO guarantees accounted for 
34% of the credit drawn down on new loans to non-financial corporations and sole proprietors, thus critically contributing to preventing the 
contraction of lending to the private sector.
THE SUPPORT MEASURES HAVE SUSTAINED THE FLOW OF NEW CREDIT IN 2020, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROWTH 
OF THE STOCK IN THE YEAR, WHICH WAS CONCENTRATED IN Q2
Chart 2.1
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The	 net	 flow	 of	 NPLs	 was	 less	 negative	 than	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	 with	
comparable	 rates	 of	 NPL	 inflows	 and	 outflows. Inflows into NPLs decreased 
slightly with respect to 2019 but recoveries and outflows to write-offs also declined. 
This, together with fewer asset sale transactions, has given stability to the balance 
of NPLs. In contrast with the two previous economic crises in Spain, when NPLs 
rose strongly during the first year, with a smaller economic contraction, to date an 
increase in these problem assets has not been recorded during the current crisis 
(see Chart 2.2). It is highly likely that there will be a significant increase in new NPLs 
in the coming quarters that outflows will be unable to offset. 
The	NPL	 ratio	also	continued	 to	decline,	once	again	more	moderately	 than	 in	
recent	 years,	 confirming	 the	 change	 in	 its	 determinants	 observed	 since	mid-
2020. The moderate fall in the balance of NPLs in the numerator of the ratio, along with 
the aforementioned growth of loans in the denominator, caused the NPL ratio to continue 
its downward trend of recent years, to stand at 4.4% (0.4 pp less than in December 
2019). If the current pace of growth of lending does not hold, or NPLs increase owing to 
the worsening of economic agents’ financial conditions, the NPL ratio could rise in the 
coming months, especially in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic.
The	economic	policy	support	measures	adopted	to	mitigate	the	negative	effects	
of	the	pandemic	would	largely	explain	the	lower	sensitivity	of	NPLs	to	changes	in	
activity. As discussed in Chapter 1, measures such as furlough schemes, tax moratoria 
and public guarantee and debt moratoria schemes are specifically designed to improve 
firms’ ability to pay and have proved to be effective to date. However, part of the effects 
of these measures could be merely temporary, and, as mentioned earlier, if economic 
activity remains stalled for some time, especially in certain sectors, this would ultimately 
give rise to greater increases in NPLs owing to the worsening of firms’ and households’ 
solvency over the coming quarters. This deterioration of the credit portfolio could 
condition the supply of credit by banks, impacting the strength of the recovery. In this 
connection, ongoing monitoring of exposures linked to the public guarantee scheme for 
loans to firms (see Box 2.1) and the debt moratoria scheme (see Box 2.2) is necessary to 
measure the scope and duration of their mitigating effects. 
There	were	also	some	signs	of	credit	quality	impairment,	of	varying	intensity,	
in	the	performance	of	refinanced	and	Stage	2	 loans,	and	in	non-performing	
loans	in	specific	segments. While forborne loans continued to fall year-on-year in 
2020, these declines have been much more moderate since the onset of the 
pandemic, possibly indicating banks’ greater recourse to them to mitigate payment 
difficulties encountered by some borrowers. Stage 2 loans, which signal impairment 
more specifically, increased substantially in 2020, especially in Q4.3 Also notable is 
the pick-up in the growth of non-performance in the consumer portfolio in 2020.
3	 	Pursuant	to	Circular	4/2017,	a	loan	is	classified	as	a	Stage	2	exposure	when	credit	risk	has	increased	significantly	
since initial recognition, even though no event of default has occurred.
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In	2020	Spanish	deposit	institutions	increased	their	total	volume	of	assets	at	
consolidated	level	by	3.5%,	despite	the	drop	in	the	stock	of	loans	to	the	private	
sector (see Annex 1). The decline in credit to the private sector was a consequence 
of the overall decrease for the foreign countries where Spanish deposit institutions 
have a significant presence, not for lending in Spain, which has expanded. In 
particular, financial assets abroad (which account for one half of consolidated 
NPLs decreased less than in prior years owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which translated into fewer recoveries that hardly 
offset the inflow of new NPLs. Compared with past crises, which affected non-performing assets more rapidly, in the current crisis this impact 
is being cushioned by the measures adopted to mitigate the effects of the pandemic. Also, the NPL ratio continued to decline, also owing to 
the growth observed in credit. However, the rate of growth of forbearance slowed and Stage 2 loans and non-performance in specific 
segments, such as consumption, increased substantially, signalling the possibility of a future increase in non-performing loans.
NPLS MODERATED THEIR FALL WITH RESPECT TO OTHER YEARS, AND THE NPL RATIO CONTINUED TO DECLINE OWING
TO THE GROWTH OF CREDIT, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME EARLY SIGNS OF IMPAIRMENT
Chart 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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financial assets) decreased by 4.8% in 2020 (compared with a 9.2% increase one 
year ago), in part owing to decisions to divest in certain countries adopted by some 
banks and to exchange rate developments. 
The	main	Spanish	deposit	institutions’	business	abroad	was	adversely	affected	
by	 the	 COVID-19	 pandemic,	 conditioned	 by	 the	 depreciation	 of	 currencies	
other	than	the	euro,	in	particular	emerging	market	currencies. Lending volume 
in the United Kingdom (the main country where Spanish deposit institutions operate) 
was less affected than in Mexico, Brazil and Turkey, in part owing to the greater 
depreciation of their currencies in the past year. In fact, these three countries 
recorded lending volume increases in local currency, which, however, did not offset 
the negative effect of the depreciations. The strong fall in lending in the United States 
was the result of the divestment decision made by one of the main Spanish deposit 
institutions, with its consequent reclassification to non-current assets held for sale. 
The NPL ratio declined in the main countries, except in Mexico (see Chart 2.3.1), 
where it stood at 2.6% as at December 2020, far lower than the 6.4% posted in 
Turkey. Chart 2.3.2 shows that despite the severity of the negative impact caused by 
COVID-19 in most of the countries where Spanish deposit institutions are present, 
The volume of credit in the main emerging countries in which Spanish deposit institutions are present fell in the past year owing to the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and to the depreciation of their currencies against the euro. Meanwhile, it grew in the United Kingdom. The fall in 
the United States resulted from the divestment decision adopted by one of Spain'a main banks. However, if the exchange rate effect is not 
taken into account, year-on-year credit growth and, in general, a positive relationship between the year-on-year rate of change in credit and 
estimated GDP growth are observed, although with differing dynamics depending on the credit support measures adopted by the different 
countries. The NPL ratio has declined in all significant countries, except in the United Kingdom and, especially, in Mexico.
THE VOLUME OF CREDIT ABROAD OF SPAIN'S MAIN DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS HAS BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC, PARTIAL DIVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE APPRECIATION OF THE EURO. HOWEVER,
THE CREDIT SUPPORT PROGRAMMES HAVE COUNTERED THESE IMPACTS IN PART
Chart 2.3
SOURCES: Banco de España and IMF (April 2021 WEO).
a The data in the panels refer to the four main Spanish banking groups with significant international activity.
b Credit rate of change in constant euros, adjusted by year-on-year change in exchange rate (i.e.: rate of change in credit = [credit Dec-20 x (exr €/currency Dec-20 
/ exr €/currency Dec-19)] / credit Dec-19 – 1).
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the measures adopted to counter its adverse effects4 have driven up the volume of 
lending, with positive year-on-year rates of change being recorded in local currency. In 
many countries, this greater buoyancy of credit has been linked to the approval of support 
schemes (for instance, Mexico did not adopt measures to promote lending and credit 
growth was lower than in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Brazil and Turkey).
Spanish banks have increased their sovereign exposures at consolidated 
level,	although	to	a	lesser	extent	than	in	previous	crises	and	than	the	average	
of	European	banks.	The increase in public debt issuance to defray the fiscal cost 
of the measures taken to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic was reflected in an uneven 
change in the sovereign exposures of European banks. While these grew by 2.5% in 
year-on-year terms for Spanish banks as at December 2020, this growth reached 
12.1% for French banks (see Chart  4.1). German banks reduced their sovereign 
exposure by 3.7% in 2020. As a percentage of total assets, Spanish banks’ sovereign 
exposures declined by 0.2 pp in 2020, similar to the European average reduction 
(-0.3 pp). Spanish banks’ exposure to sovereign debt stood at 13% of total assets in 
4  See Box 2.1 Effects of the pandemic on the international banking systems most relevant to Spain, in the Autumn 2020 FSR.
As at December 2020 the exposure to sovereign debt represented 12.5% of total assets at European level. In Spain, the weight was 13%, 
slightly above the European average and only exceeded by Italy (16.8%). The volume of sovereign exposure varied unevenly across the 
largest European countries' banks, from -3.7% in Germany to 12.1% in France. The proportion of debt issued by European banks' own home 
country was 51.3% of the total sovereign exposure. The weight of Spain's domestic sovereign exposure (51.8%) was similar to the European 
average, and to that of countries such as France (53.3%) and the Netherlands (50.5%).
THE INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT DEBT ISSUANCE TO FINANCE MEASURES TO TACKLE COVID-19 WAS REFLECTED 
IN THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN BANKS' GOVERNMENT DEBT HOLDINGS
Chart 2.4
SOURCE: EBA.
a The data for Spain are shown in red and those for the United Kingom in yellow.
b The EBA data include Iceland. From 2020 Q1 aggregate data for the EU no longer include figures from UK banks and include data from UK bank 
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December 2020, in line with the average for European banks. European banks’ 
sovereign exposures are concentrated in bonds issued by their own country, which 
on average accounted for 51.3% of the total sovereign exposure (see Chart 2.4.2).
Liquidity and financing conditions
Purchase	programs	and,	to	a	 lesser	extent,	refinancing	operations	explain	
the	expansion	of	the	Eurosystem’s	balance	sheet	and	the	liquidity	maintained	
by	 banks (see Chart 2.5). The balance of asset purchase programmes has 
increased by €467 billion since end-October 2020, the date of the last FSR, to 
€3,985  billion,5 driven by the expansion of the pandemic emergency purchase 
programme (PEPP) announced in December 2020.6 European banks have continued 
to have recourse to the Eurosystem’s refinancing operations (TLTRO III) to obtain 
liquidity. Operations alloted in the latest TLTRO III tender7 amounted to €331 billion, 
up from €50 billion allotted in December 2020, with a net increase in the liquidity 
obtained by banks through this channel of €353  billion after these latest two 
tenders.8 Overall, European banks continue to have high liquidity levels, up 
€833 billion since the cut-off date of the last FSR. 
These	 high	 liquidity	 volumes,	 along	 with	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 favourable	
funding	conditions	for	banks	and	the	expansion	of	the	PEPP,	have	contributed	
to	bringing	money	market	interest	rates	down	to	record	lows (see Chart 2.5.2). 
The euro short-term rate (€STR)9 has declined gradually, currently standing below 
the pre-pandemic levels (around -55 bp), very far from its highs in April. Similarly, the 
€STR trading volume has declined from its highs, stabilising at levels close to those 
recorded before March. It has also been observed that money market transactions 
with very short (overnight) maturities have gained weight over those with longer-term 
maturities since the beginning of the crisis.
European	banks’	 access	 to	 the	Eurosystem’s	 refinancing	operations	 –	with	
very	 favourable	 conditions	 –	 has	 improved	 their	 interbank	 funding	 costs,	
which are expected to remain low over a prolonged period. The expected 
interbank funding spread, calculated as the difference between expectations for 
EURIBOR and for risk-free interest rates, as determined by the OIS curve, provides 
5	 	Data	updated	as	at	20/4/21.
6  As a result of the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 10 December 2020 to expand the PEPP 
envelope to €1.85 trillion at least until March 2022. 
7	 The	dates	of	the	latest	two	tenders	were	16	December	2020	and	24	March	2021	respectively.	




each business day by the ECB based on the information provided by the 48 euro area MMSR reporting banks.
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an indicator of market expectations regarding changes in interbank funding costs.10 
This spread narrowed substantially during the second half of 2020 as a result of the 
10	 	This	indicator	is	calculated	based	on	the	work	carried	out	by	Jondeau	et	al.	(2020). It is calculated as the 3-month 
EURIBOR-OIS	forward	rate	spread:	FF=	Feuribor3,3 - FOIS3,3,	where	Feuribor3,3	represents	the	3-month	forward	rate	for	
3-month EURIBOR and FOIS3	the	forward	rate	based	on	the	overnight	index	swap	(OIS)	curve	with	the	same	time	
horizon.	The	following	derivatives	are	used	as	a	reference	for	EURIBOR:	a)	Forward	Rate	Agreements	(FRAs)	for	
between	1	 and	12	months,	 and	b)	 Interest	Rate	Swaps	 (IRS)	 for	 between	1	 and	10	 years,	where	 3-month	
EURIBOR is the underlying rate. 
Money market interest rates are at historic lows as a result of excess liquidity and the latest monetary policy measures adopted. Also, the 
Eurosystem's financing operations have contributed to a notable improvement in banks' financing conditions, which are expected to remain 
at low levels over a prolonged period. Borrowing costs on the wholesale market also declined in 2020 as a result of these measures.
THE ECB'S MONETARY POLICY HAS LED TO A RISE IN EXCESS LIQUIDITY, TO RECORD HIGHS, CONTRIBUTING TO AN
EASING OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Chart 2.5
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The solid lines show the spread between the three-month forward rate for 3-month Euribor and the forward rate based on the OIS curve for 
a three-month period, and the levels of these two rates, while the broken lines show the projections for the forward Euribor and OIS curves, 
respectively, and the spread between them.
b Only one issuance of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) was carried out in 2019. The cost for Spanish banks' issues is shown based on the 
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liquidity injection received by banks through TLTRO III operations since June and the 
decision to maintain the interest rate on these operations at low levels for longer.11 
Despite an expected increase in this indicator in 2021-2022, explained by EURIBOR 
recovery expectations and the continuation of the risk-free interest rate level, it would 
remain moderate and comparable with the pre-crisis level (see Chart 2.5).
The	cost	of	new	issues	denominated	in	euro	has	decreased	or	held	steady	for	
all	debt	instruments	in	the	wholesale	funding	market. The decrease is particularly 
noteworthy in the case of bonds meeting the Tier II capital requirements and of 




increased somewhat. The average cost of private sector deposits remains at 
minimum levels, while the average cost of debt on the liability side of the balance 
sheet has increased minimally. In the individual balance sheet of business in Spain 
the volume of private sector deposits increased in 2020 (by 9% year-on-year), 
possibly driven by households’ and firms’ precautionary reasons, yet their weight in 
total funding decreased by 1.2  pp. The weight of private sector deposits in the 
consolidated balance sheet also fell by 0.3 pp in 2020, to stand at 66.8% of total 
funding (deposits and debt issuance on the balance sheet). In contrast, the weight 
of deposits received from central banks in total consolidated funding increased by 
4.4 pp compared with December 2019, standing at 10.6% at December 2020. This 
change was prompted by the accommodative monetary policy adopted by the ECB 
and other central banks. Box 2.3 conducts a preliminary analysis of the consequences 
of the possible introduction of a digital euro for financial stability and monetary 
policy, where banks’ deposit-taking activity plays a key role.




on	the	profit	recorded	in	2019. This translates into a return on assets (ROA) of 
-0.21% (a fall of 72 bp from 0.51% in 2019) and a return on equity (ROE) of -3.1% 
(a fall of 10 pp from 6.9% recorded a year earlier).
11  Decision of the ECB Governing Council meeting of 10 December 2020. The interest rate applied to TLTRO III 
remains	50	bp	below	the	MRO	rate	until	23	June	2022.	For	banks	meeting	certain	criteria	the	rate	may	be	up	to	
50	bp	below	the	average	deposit	facility	rate.




extraordinary	 items,	 the	 sector’s	 profitability	 would	 be	 positive,	 with	 ROA	
standing	at	0.3%	and	ROE	at	4.3%. In particular, as noted in the previous FSR, the 
two largest banks recorded adjustments to their goodwill for an amount in excess of 
€12 billion in the first half of 2020, along with other adjustments, such as those linked 
to tax assets. In addition, as a result of the approval of its merger, another bank 
recorded an adjustment to fair value for an amount exceeding €5.5 billion in its year-
end accounts, in accordance with accounting standards.12 These negative 
adjustments were partially offset by positive extraordinary adjustments exceeding 




decreased	substantially	with	respect	to	the	previous	year. Chart 2.6 shows how, 
12  International Financial Reporting Standard 5 (IFRS 5) “Non-current assets held for sale and discontinued 
operations”,	which	indicates	that	assets	meeting	the	requirements	for	classification	as	held	for	sale	should	be	
valued	at	the	lower	of	carrying	amount	and	fair	value	less	costs	to	sell.
As a result of the impact of the pandemic on banking activity and on the worsening of the economic outlook, the decrease in profit in 2020 was 
widespread among banks. However, the negative net accounting profits of the largest banks are influenced by the appreciation of the euro, the 
negative extraordinary adjustments relating to goodwill and deferred tax assets and the accounting adjustments linked to merger processes.
MOST BANKS HAVE REDUCED THEIR NET PROFIT IN 2020 WITH RESPECT TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR
Chart 2.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The charts show the ROA and ROE density functions for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the amount of average total assets and average equity, 
respectively. The density function is approximated by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, 
smoothed graphic representation of the function. The vertical lines indicate the ROA and the ROE of the Spanish banking system as a whole in 2019 (blue) 
and 2020 (red).
b The negative mode closest to zero relates to large significant institutions whose results in 2020 are largely explained by negative extraordinary 
adjustments. The most extreme mode relates to another significant institution with accounting adjustments linked to a merger process.
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both for the ROA and the ROE, the distribution of profit in 2020 shifted significantly 
towards more negative values. Along the same lines, Chart 2.7.1 shows that most 
banks (more than three quarters of the sector) recorded a decline in net profit from 
the previous year, while their average total assets (ATAs) increased. For the system 
as a whole, ATAs increased by more than 4% year-on-year in 2020, while average 
equity decreased by more than 3%.
The	impact	of	the	pandemic	on	net	interest	income	and	fees	and	commissions	
resulted	 in	both	 items	posting	year-on-year	declines	of	around	10%	in	2020 
(see Annex 2). Part of this decrease in net interest income and net commissions is 
due to currency depreciation in the main countries in which Spanish banks have a 
significant presence, especially emerging countries. 
Gains	on	 financial	assets	and	 liabilities	and	operating	expenses	were	 the	
only	 items	 improving	 significantly	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	
decline	 in	 operating	 expenses	 was	 particularly	 notable (see Chart 2.7.2). 
Breaking the trend of recent years, gains on financial assets and liabilities 
increased by 35% in 2020, driven by the sale of securities portfolios accumulating 
In 2020 most institutions have recorded a fall in net income, while their ATAs have increased. The main determinants of the sharp fall in profits 
include the decrease in net interest income and in fees and commissions, the increase in impairment losses and the negative extraordinary 
adjustments (goodwill, tax assets and the deterioration in value arising from accounting reclassification, included in other items), while the increase 
in results on financial assets and liabilities and, in particular, the decline in operating expenses, contribute to improving income for the year.
THE IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON BANKING ACTIVITY AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK HAS SEVERELY AFFECTED 
PROFITABILITY IN THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR
Chart 2.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in consolidated profit in December 
2020 with respect to December 2019. The black diamonds show the ROA excluding both the adjustments to goodwill recorded in 2019 (-€2.8 billion) 
and 2020 (-€12.2 billion) and the deferred tax asset adjustment recorded in 2020 (-€2.5 billion). The pink diamond shows the ROA in 2020 excluding, 
in addition to the aforementioned adjustments, the deterioration in value arising from accounting reclassification (-€5.6 billion) and the extraordinary 
positive results recorded in 2020 (€1.2 billion).
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capital gains. This helped limit to some extent the adverse effects on gross 
income, which, however, declined by 5.1% year-on-year. Operating expenses 
decreased by more than 10%, in part owing to a lower contribution of extraordinary 
restructuring costs. This notable decline caused operating income to increase 
slightly with respect to the previous year (0.7%). As with net interest income and 
fees and commissions, the performance of other income and operating expense 
headings is at least partly explained by currency depreciation in the countries 
where Spanish banks have a significant presence, especially in the case of 
emerging countries (see Chart 2.3).
Operating	income	from	activity	in	Spain	has	been	more	resilient	to	the	impact	
of	the	pandemic. Recurrent banking activity was less affected in business in Spain 
than in total business in 2020. Thus, net interest income fell by barely 0.7% between 
December 2019 and December 2020 and fees and commissions increased by 1.4% 
in the same period. Gross income decreased by 1.9%, but since the decline in 
operating expenses was greater (-5.8%), the performance of operating income was 
ultimately positive. 
Impairment	losses	increased	significantly	in	the	year,	especially	in	the	first	six	
months. As a result of the potential negative impact of the COVID19 pandemic on 
credit quality, financial asset impairment losses increased by more than 50%, giving 
rise to the recording of provisions that were €8.7 billion higher in 2020 than in 2019. 
However, most of this increase was posted in the first half of the year ( the increase 
in provisions between June 2020 and June 2019 was already €7.6 billion), with the 
pace of provisions slowing significantly from June. Impairment losses in the business 
in Spain account for more than 40% of total provisions and in this case the pace of 
provisioning in the second half of the year, although somewhat slower, remained 




The provisions recorded in 2020 for the business in Spain amount to 21.5% of those 
estimated for 2020-2022 under the Banco de España FLESB framework for stress 
testing on the assumption of a moderate impact of the support measures, and to 
33.6% on the assumption of a medium impact of the support measures13 (see Box 2.1). 
In any case, significant dispersion between banks was observed in the provisioning 
effort made (see Chart 2.8).14
13  Under the moderate impact assumption, the quality of ICO-guaranteed loans is average for the portfolio of loans 
to	business,	while	under	the	medium	impact	assumption,	 the	quality	 is	at	a	midpoint	between	the	moderate	
impact	assumption	and	a	maximum	impact	assumption	where	the	guarantee	schemes	are	used	in	full	to	absorb	
the	worst	quality	credit	(for	further	details,	see Chapter 2 of the Autumn 2020 FSR of the Banco de España.
14  See also Box	5	of	the	ECB’s	Financial	Stability	Review,	November	2020,	where	different	explanatory	factors	of	the	
heterogeneity	across	banks	regarding	the	increase	in	their	provisions	owing	to	the	pandemic	are	discussed.	
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in the largest European economies there is to some extent a positive 
relationship	between	the	the	falls	in	activity	and	the	credit	risk	provisioning	
effort.15 In general, it is observed that the countries which have resorted more 
heavily to these support measures tend to be those which have endured a sharper 
contraction. This suggests that governments whose economies are more vulnerable 
to the pandemic have fostered more ambitious plans (see Chart 2.8). Credit 
institutions also seem to have made a greater provisioning effort in jurisdictions 
15	 	The	measure	used	to	reflect	the	scale	of	the	provisions	is	the	cost	of	risk	reported	in	the	EBA Risk Dashboard 
2020Q4.
The pace of impairment provisioning in 2020 would broadly have been adequate to absorb the credit losses estimated in the FLESB stress 
test exercise for the 2020-2022 horizon, but the effort should be maintained over time in order to fully absorb the estimated credit impairment 
for the period. There is, however, heterogeneity across banks and uncertainty about the medium-term impact of the support measures 
implemented, mainly the ICO credit guarantees, and about the macroeconomic scenario. Among the main European countries, a negative 
relationship was observed in 2020 between the performance of GDP and the intensity of provisions, with limited change in the intensity of 
the measures relating to GDP.
SPANISH INSTITUTIONSSHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR PROVISIONING EFFORT TO ABSORB THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS
ON CREDIT QUALITY, THE SCALE OF WHICH HAS BEEN CONDITIONED IN 2020 BY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND BY THE
SCOPE OF THE SUPPORT MEASURES
Chart 2.8
SOURCES: Banco de España and ESRB.
a The numerator of the ratios considers the provisions recorded by Spanish banks for credit risk for business in Spain in 2020. The denominator 
considers the required provisions estimated by the FLESB framework for the baseline scenario in the 2020-2022 horizon.The denominator 
considers two assumptions regarding the impact of the support measures (mainly the ICO guarantee scheme): moderate and medium. Under 
the moderate impact assumption, the quality of credit guaranteed by the ICO is similar to that of the portfolio of loans to business activities as 
a whole, while, under the medium impact assumption, quality is at the midpoint between the moderate impact assumption and the maximum 
impact assumption where guarantees are used in full to absorb the worst credit quality (see Chapter 2 of the Autumn 2020 FSR of the Banco de 
España) for further details). The chart shows the density function of such ratios for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by total credit volume. 
The density function is approximated by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, 
smoothed graphic representation of the function. 
b Each dot represents an EU country. The dot's area is proportional to the instensity of provisioning recorded in 2020, estimated based on the 
measurement of cost of risk of the EBA's dashboard for December 2020. The X axis represents the fall in GDP during that year and the Y axis 
represents the volume of measures used in relation to GDP in 2019, in accordance with Special Feature of the ECB's Financial Stability Review, Autumn 
2020. The measures considered include direct tax transfers, furlough and similar schemes, tax and loan moratoria, use of public guarantees for 
bank credit and potential additional credit (not for credit already granted) resulting from the release of capital buffers and the effect of the reform of 
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recording larger GDP declines, which means that the measures might not have been 
sufficient to offset all the credit risk increase associated with this crisis.
At	European	level,	the	main	component	of	gross	income	in	the	banking	sector	
continued to be net interest income. According to the latest banking supervision 
statistics released by the ECB (December 2020), banks in the Netherlands and Spain 
were the most dependent on net interest income, which accounted for 77.9% and 
68.7%, respectively, of gross income, while for those in France and Germany it 
accounted for approximately 50% (see Chart 2.9.1), which is explained by the different 
business models of their largest banks. Spanish banks made the biggest recent effort 
among European banks in terms of seeking alternative sources of income through the 
growth of net fees and commissions (see Chart 2.9.2). However, this ratio shows a 
lower level in business in Spain (0.47%) than at consolidated level (0.6%), the first figure 
being lower than the average for European banks at consolidated level (0.58%), and the 
second being higher, owing to the contribution of business abroad. The adaptation of 
its business model in areas where this item weighs less than average provides Spanish 
banks with greater potential for further growth in this source of income.
Against	 this	 backdrop,	 the	 weight	 of	 business	 abroad	 in	 Spanish	 deposit	
institutions’	ordinary	profit	has	increased. Thus, without taking into account the 
Despite the growing weight of net fees and commissions in total assets as an additional source of income in recent years, net interest income 
continues to be the main source of gross margin for the main European countries, although there are differences across countries. However, 
this growing trend has halted as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.
NET INTEREST INCOME IS THE MAIN COMPONENT OF GROSS INCOME FOR EUROPEAN BANKS, ALTHOUGH A GROWING
WEIGHT OF NET FEES AND COMMISSIONS AS A SOURCE OF INCOME WAS OBSERVED, WHICH WAS HALTED BY THE
COVID-19 CRISIS
Chart 2.9
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Includes the 19 Euro area member countries.
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adjustments made by Spain’s main banking groups to the goodwill of their subsidiaries 
in the United Kingdom and the United States, ordinary profit from business abroad 
accounted for over 80% of the total (see Chart 2.10.1). Business in Spain made a 
smaller contribution to the ordinary profit of Spain’s main banking groups as a result 
of the larger relative increase in impairment provisions in 2020 (see Chart 2.10.2). As 
discussed earlier, impairment losses in business in Spain represent a high proportion 
of total provisions in 2020. 
Solvency
In	2020,	despite	the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic,	the	CET1	ratio	of	the	Spanish	
banking	system	increased	by	71	basis	points	(bp),	to	13.3%. This increase was 
recorded in the second half of the year. The same trend, i.e. a rise in the ratios mainly 
Ordinary profit obtained abroad by deposit institutions with a strong international presence fell across the board (e.g. -31% in Brazil or -28% 
in Mexico), in part owing to currency depreciation in emerging countries, but its relative contribution to ordinary profitability at the 
consolidated level increased. This is explained by the larger fall in business in Spain (-50%), affected by relatively higher impairment losses 
than the average for the other countries. However, the smaller contribution to consolidated profit made by business abroad was on account 
of the goodwill adjustment at the subsidiaries in the United Kingdom and the United States. The extraordinary COVID-19-related provisions
were also concentrated in the first half of the year.




a The panel data refer to the four big Spanish banking groups with significant international activity.
b Ordinary attributable profit does not include impairment of goodwill or other adjustments (e.g. restructuring costs, adjustments for deferred taxes, 
etc.), and for Spain it does not include the contribution by the corporate centre.
c Ordinary attributable profit was affected by the appreciation of the euro, against the emerging currencies (i.e. Brazil, Turkey and Mexico) and against 
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in the second half of the year, was followed by the Tier 1 capital ratio and the total 
capital ratio, which stood at 14.7% and 16.8%, respectively (see Chart 2.11.1). The 
downturn in profitability did not lead to a negative adjustment of banks’ solvency, 
largely because negative extraordinary items (e.g. goodwill impairment) affect 
balance sheet items that are not counted towards banks’ prudential capital.
The	decrease	 in	 the	 risk-weighted	assets	 (RWAs)	of	 the	 largest	 institutions	
contributed	to	the	 increase	 in	the	solvency	ratios. Although prudential capital 
levels rose in 2020 in the numerators of the ratios for the banking sector as a whole 
(CET1 by 0.8%, Tier 1 capital by 1.4% and total capital by 1.9%) the decline in RWAs 
was more pronounced, nearly 5% in 2020 (see Chart 2.11.2). The fall in RWAs in the 
past year was largely due to the measures adopted by the authorities to mitigate the 
effects of the pandemic (guaranteed loans, the CRR quick fix, etc.) and to exchange 
rate effects in the two banking groups with the strongest international presence, 
thus partially offsetting the adverse effects of these exchange rate movements in the 
volume of CET1 denominated in euro.
The	increase	in	capital	levels	was	driven	by	the	authorities’	recommendation	
on	dividend	distribution	restrictions	and,	to	a	greater	extent,	by	the	CRR	quick	
fix.	Specifically, the CRR reform exempts part of banks’ investments in intangible 
fixed assets related to software from deduction. In addition, a further discount to risk 
weighting was added to credit to SMEs. Also, the prudential treatment of eligible 
income for solvency purposes results in it not being affected by the negative 
In 2020, the CET1 ratio increased by 72 bp to stand at 13.3% at the end of the year. The rise occurred in the second half the year and, 
although CET1 capital increased slightly, it was mainly a consequence of the decline in RWAs, partly due to currency depreciation. The Tier 1 
capital and total capital ratios also increased in 2020. The European quick fix and the prudential filters prevented the deterioration in 
profitability (due to negative extraordinary adjustments) from translating into a deterioration in solvency, and also contributed to the 
improvement in the ratios.
THE AGGREGATE CAPITAL RATIOS OF THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR INCREASED IN 2020 DESPITE THE PANDEMIC
Chart 2.11
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extraordinary items identified in the previous section and, therefore, the rest of 
profit generation contributes positively to the numerator’s performance. Chart 2.12.1 
shows that the increase in CET1 is widespread among banks (the same is true for 
the other two types of capital), while in the case of RWAs there are greater 
disparities, with increases and reductions. Thus, the decrease in the Spanish 
banking system’s aggregate RWAs in 2020 is due to the decline in most (10) of the 
(12) significant institutions supervised by the SSM while, for the rest of the system, 
RWAs broadly increased.
As	regards	the	composition	of	the	CET1	ratio,	capital	instruments	and	reserves	
together	 account	 for	 more	 than	 90%	 of	 the	 CET1	 ratio (see Chart  2.12.2). 
However, over the past year there was some change in the relative weights of these 
two items, with capital rising and reserves declining. As regards deductions, the 
decrease in those deriving from goodwill and tax assets is notable, as a consequence 
of the downward adjustment to the goodwill recorded by the two banks with the 
largest international presence discussed in the previous section.
Comparison of European banks in terms of solvency and profitability
The	 profitability	 of	 Spanish	 deposit	 institutions	 was	 lower,	 on	 average,	
compared	to	 the	rest	of	 the	European	banking	sector	 in	2020,	although	the	
A large portion of banks increased their CET1 during 2020, whereas negative and positive changes in RWAs were distributed more evenly. 
However, since the largest banks reduced their RWAs (partly as a result of currency depreciation), the aggregate volume of RWAs fell by 
almost 5% in 2020. Deductions associated with goodwill decreased owing to the significant impairment of this component in 2020.
WHEREAS MOST BANKS INCREASED THEIR CET1 IN 2020, CHANGES IN RWAs WERE DIVIDED EVENLY BETWEEN POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE VALUES
Chart 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The dots above the bisector represent increases (decreases) in CET1 over the last year greater (smaller) than the increases (decreases) in RWAs and, 
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aforementioned	extraordinary	factors	could	be	conditioning	this	assessment.	
Chart 2.13.1 shows the European comparison of the ROE ratio based on the latest 
data published by the EBA at December 2020. The main Spanish banks reported a 
negative ROE (-3.9%%), well below the European average (2%) and countries such 
as France and the Netherlands (above 3%). Also, Italy’s and Germany’s main banks 
posted profitabilities close to zero. This behavior in 2020 contrasts with the higher 
than European average profitability of Spanish banks after the financial global 
financial crisis. The negative profitability for the Spanish banking sector has been 
marked, as mentioned earlier, by certain extraordinary items. If Spanish banks’ 
extraordinary profit is excluded, ROE in 2020 is more favourable (4.3%), although 
this is 3.7 pp lower than in 2019.16 
Analysing	solvency	 in	terms	of	RWAs,	Spanish	banks	ranked	last	among	the	
main	 European	 banks	 as	 at	 December	 2020,	 but	 they	were	 in	 line	with	 the	
European	average	in	terms	of	the	leverage	ratio. Spanish banks’ CET1 ratio as at 
that date stood at 12.9% (see Chart 2.13.2), 3 pp below the European average (15.9%). 
16	 	A	 rigorous	 comparison	with	 the	 results	 of	 other	 European	 banks	would	 require	 a	 comparable	 detail	 of	 the	
influence	of	these	extraordinary	items	on	their	results	for	2020.
The ROE of the main Spanish deposit institutions stood at -3.9% in December 2020 – considerably lower than the European average of 2% – 
reversing the trend of recent years. This lower ROE was heavily influenced by extraordinary negative adjustments such as those to the 
goodwill of the foreign subsidiaries of the two major banking groups. Similarly, the CET1 ratio of Spanish deposit institutions continues to be 
the lowest of the largest European countries. However, this ratio grew for Spanish banks in 2020, and even more so for the banks of the other 
main European countries, largely driven by the revision of the capital requirements regulation.
SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS COMPARE UNFAVOURABLY WITH THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTOR, AS A WHOLE,
IN TERMS OF PROFITABILITY AND THE CET1 RATIO
Chart 2.13
SOURCE: EBA.
a The charts show the data for Spain in red and that for the UK in yellow.
b Excluding extraordinary results, the ROE of Spanish banks was 4.3%, -3.7 pp lower than in 2019.
c The EBA data include Iceland. As from 2020 Q1, the EU aggregate data no longer include figures for UK banks but do include data of UK banks' 
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The positive across-the-board performance of this ratio in 2020 was underpinned 
for banks supervised by the SSM by the “quick fix”. It should be borne in mind that 
this difference with the European average, in the case of the solvency ratio in terms 
of RWAs or the CET1 ratio, was already observed before the COVID-19 crisis and it 
is due to greater asset density, in part owing to structural factors such as the greater 
use of the standardised approach by Spanish banks. In fact, if solvency is measured 
in terms of the leverage ratio, Spain’s significant institutions (5.8%) are in line with 
the European average and above those of the larger countries, except Italy.
2.1.3 Deposit institutions’ operational risks
In	recent	years,	the	impact	of	operational	risks	in	terms	of	losses	for	deposit	
institutions has declined. This is explained in part by the fall in customer complaints 
(particularly those relating to mortgage loans), which have sometimes been resolved 
through the courts against Spanish deposit institutions and, in certain cases, are still 
pending resolution (see Chart 2.14.1).17 However, other types of operational risk loss 
events have increased, particularly those relating to external fraud, which is in many 
17  See the Annual Claims Report of the Banco de España (2019) (full version available only in Spanish).
Operational risk losses fell significantly between 2015 and 2018, especially those relating to customers, products and business practices, 
but have stabilised in recent years. By contrast, the number of loss events has continued to rise, particularly external fraud-related loss 
OPERATIONAL RISK LOSSES HAVE FALLEN IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF EVENTS GREW
Chart 2.14
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cases associated with cybersecurity breaches, but their related operational risk 
losses have increased more moderately. The number of events relating to the 
implementation, delivery and management of processes has held relatively steady. 
Meanwhile, events relating to customers overall (i.e. beyond complaints), products 
and business practices have increased. These also account for a greater proportion 
of operational risk losses, although it has declined since 2015 (see Chart 2.14). 
Operational risk-weighted assets have also fallen, declining by 6.5% in the past year, 
mainly owing to the decrease in the sector’s net income and the lower equivalent 
value of the portion of income in foreign currency resulting from the depreciation of 
certain currencies, such as Latin American currencies, this being the main variable 
used to calculate operational risk capital requirements under the standardised 
approach generally used by Spanish banks.
2.2 non-bank financial sector and systemic interconnections
2.2.1 non-bank financial sector
Specialised lending institutions
Specialised	 lending	 institutions	 (SLIs)	 posted	 a	 strong	 decline	 in	 credit	
granted	in	2020	and	a	worsening	of	the	NPL	ratio. The outstanding balance of 
credit granted by SLIs in Spain amounted to €41.3 billion at December 2020, down 
18.9% from the previous year. If the impact of corporate transactions on the sector 
is excluded18 and only the performance of the SLIs existing in December 2020 is 
considered, their outstanding credit would have declined by 6.4% in the past year. 
In any event, this is a significant contraction compared with the rates observed in 
previous years, owing to the impact of the health crisis on consumer lending, which 
is the main source of business for SLIs (see Chart 2.15).
The	 poor	 performance	 of	 credit	 contributed	 to	 the	worsening	 of	 the	 NPL	
ratio	in	the	first	two	quarters	of	2020.	The increase, to 6.5% (0.9 pp more than 
in December 2019), was more subdued in the second part of the year. Yet the 
volume of non-performing loans is experiencing very significant growth, in line 
with the non-performing loans in deposit institutions’ consumer loan portfolios. 
And this despite the fact that borrowers have availed themselves of moratoria for 
significant amounts.
The	income	of	SLIs	also	worsened	substantially	in	the	past	year. In 2020 the 
income of SLIs decreased by 19% year-on-year, in contrast with the positive changes 
18  The absorption of a sizeable SLI by a deposit institution in 2020 accounted for approximately three quarters of 
the overall decline.
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observed in recent years. As they specialise in consumer credit, SLIs were able to 
obtain higher profitability than other institutions, as this is also a riskier business. As 
mentioned earlier, the pandemic impacted consumption more severely than other 
segments. Accordingly, net interest income on fees and commissions declined sharply 
during the year, explaining the fall in profit. As a result of the specialised nature of these 
institutions, both their income and their NPL ratios could experience additional 
impairment pressures over the coming quarters if the restrictions associated with the 
pandemic remain, particularly as regards portfolios under moratoria.
Investment funds
Despite	 the	negative	 impact	of	 the	COVID-19	pandemic	 in	2020	Q1,	 the	net	
assets	of	investment	funds	registered	in	Spain	had	nearly	recovered	their	pre-
pandemic	levels	at	end-2020. Investment funds’ assets declined by only 0.05% in 
2020, despite the 10.5% fall recorded in Q1. This aggregate performance conceals 
the fact that net assets declined at more than half of the funds registered in Spain, 
in particular at equity investment funds (see Chart 2.16.1), which were highly 
influenced by the negative effects of adverse changes in the prices of these types of 
assets in the wake of the pandemic. There is also some heterogeneity in the 
Specialised lending institutions (SLIs) have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The credit extended by these specialists in 
consumer credit declined notably by 6.4% for the year as a whole. The NPL ratio was particularly hard hit in the first two quarters of the year, 
although this effect moderated subsequently, and the ratio ended the year slightly higher than twelve months earlier. As for income, the 
decline in net interest income and in fees was the result of a fall of 19% in annual profit compared with growth in previous years.
THE CREDIT GRANTED BY SLIs IN 2020 DECLINED NOTABLY, THEIR NPL RATIO ROSE MODERATELY AND THEIR INCOME
WAS HIT HARD BY THE PANDEMIC (a)
Chart 2.15
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The analysis was performed with the group of SLIs existing in December 2020 and excluded, therefore, the effects of M&A activity in recent years.
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contribution of the components of net subscriptions and profitability to the change 
in net assets, among both investment funds and investment fund categories. In 2021 
Q1, the net assets of investment funds registered in Spain increased (by 4.7% with 
respect to December 2020), in terms of both net subscriptions and profitability.
Capital	 inflows	 of	 investment	 funds	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 have	 increased	
substantially	 in	 recent	 months. Chart 2.16.2 shows the cumulative change in 
capital flows since early 2020 for a representative sample of investment funds from 
the main euro area countries. Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
significant net outflows were recorded, which reversed from mid-year in all the 
countries except Italy. The recovery picked up in the final stretch of the year, 
particularly in equity funds. This is consistent with the positive impact on this market 
of the news on the COVID-19 vaccines, which led to an increase in investors’ risk 
appetite. In the case of Spanish investment funds, the pattern of capital inflows and 
Following the recovery as from 2020 Q2, in December 2020 investment funds’ net assets reached a similar volume to that of the previous 
year, with a year-on-year rate of change of close to zero. However, the median value of the distribution of the rate of change in investment 
funds’ net assets stood in negative territory, especially in equity funds. In March 2020, with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there 
were significant net capital outflows from the investment funds of certain European countries. However, in 2020 H2 and the beginning of 
2021, net capital inflows recovered in most European countries, especially in Ireland and France, with the exception of Italy.
AFTER THE INITIAL ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, NET ASSETS AND THE NET CAPITAL INFLOWS 
OF INVESTMENT FUNDS RECOVERED ACROSS THE BOARD
Chart 2.16
SOURCES Inverco and Refinitiv.
a The “long-term fixed-income funds” category includes long-term fixed-income investment funds, mixed fixed-income funds, international fixed-income funds 
and international mixed fixed-income funds. The “equity funds” category includes equity investment funds, mixed equity funds, international equity funds and 
international mixed equity funds. The total includes the two previous categories together with hedge funds, short-term fixed income funds, monetary funds, 
passive management funds, absolute return funds, global funds and collateralised investment funds.
b The chart shows the density function of the rate of change in investment funds' net assets, weighted by the previous year's net assets. This density 
function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and 
smoothed graphical representation of that function.
c The components of the contribution to the change in investment funds' net assets (net subscriptions and profitability) show a correlation coefficient 
of 0.01 for the total and for the long-term fixed-income funds, and of 0.20 for the equity funds.
d Cumulative change in investment funds' net capital inflows and outflows, as a percentage of and in relation to the net assets of each country's funds 
on 15 January 2020, based on a representative sample of funds domiciled in euro area countries.
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outflows, in comparison with other European countries, is proving to be more 
stable in this crisis. Thus, there were lower outflows at the onset of the pandemic, 
as well as a lower pace of inflows during the recovery phase. This could be due to 
the high weight of retail investors in the capital of investment funds, whose net 
assets are a priori less sensitive to falls in returns and, in general, to bouts of 
market volatility19.
Pension funds and insurance companies
The	flows	of	net	contributions	to	pension	funds	increased	significantly	in	2020.	
Thus, although gross contributions remained at levels similar to those of the previous 
year, net contributions grew by more than 40%, particularly in the individual systems. 
This dynamic could be affected by the new tax framework applicable to pension 
funds. Pension plan assets increased by 1.8% year-on-year, also showing an 
expansive behaviour in the first quarter of 2021 (growth of 2.4% since December 
2020). The annual average rate of return on pension funds at December 2020 was 
0.7% and the long-term rate of return (25 years) was 3.4%.
The	 insurance	sector	 improved	 its	 solvency	and	profitability	 levels	 in	 2020,	
despite	the	outbreak	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	with	an	uneven	performance	
of	 the	 life	and	non-life	segments. The solvency capital requirement (SCR) ratio 
was 237.8%, compared with 237% in 2019, while the ROE increased from 13.5% in 
2019 to 14.9% in 2020. Premium income in the non-life sector grew slightly (1%) 
owing to the strength of health and multi-risk insurance, while life premiums posted 
a double-digit decrease, giving rise to an overall fall in premium income for the sector 
of 8.2%.20 This drop in income was more than offset by the fall in claims and operating 
expenses, which explains the sustained profitability.
2.2.2 banks’ interconnections with the non-bank financial system
The	 analysis	 of	 interconnections	 between	 the	 different	 components	 of	 the	
Spanish	financial	system	helps	to	identify	common	sources	of	risk,	which	could	
contribute	to	the	transmission	of	tensions	therein	in	the	event	that	the	risks	to	
stability	posed	by	the	current	crisis	materialise. For this purpose, we analyse in this 
section the credit ratings of common holdings – i.e. securities that form part of the 
portfolio of more than one financial sector – of financial sectors’ marketable securities 
19	 	As	regards	the	relationship	between	fund	performance	and	type	of	holder,	see	Javier	Gil-Bazo,	Peter	Hoffmann	
and Sergio Mayordomo, “Mutual Funding”,	The	Review	of	Financial	Studies,	Volume	33,	Issue	10.
20	 	Life	 insurance	may	 cover	 the	 risk	 of	 death	 and/or	 incorporate	 a	 savings	 component	 linked	 to	 the	 insured’s	
survival	(with	the	possibility	of	mixed	policies	combining	the	two	elements),	while	non-life	insurance	covers	a	wide	
range of risks (car, health, claims, home insurance, etc.). Data obtained from ICEA.
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portfolios in 2020 Q4.21 Specifically, these holdings are studied, focusing on securities 
issued by non-financial corporations, for banks, insurance companies, investment 
funds and resident pension funds. Marketable securities portfolios account for 24% of 
total assets in the banking sector and for around 80% of total assets in the resident 
non-bank financial (NBF) sectors mentioned above.22
The	main	risk	is	that	the	credit	ratings	of	certain	vulnerable	issuers	may	be	
downgraded,	possibly	 triggering	 fire	sales	and	 losses	 (realised	or	valuation	
losses)	 for	 banks	 and	 NBF	 sectors. Fire sales could be conducted by some 
financial intermediaries that can only invest in securities above a certain credit rating, 
or by agents, such as investment funds, that could face cash withdrawals in periods 
of stress.23 This could impair liquidity and cause abrupt falls in prices in several 
markets, which could be passed on from one financial sector to another given their 
exposure to the same issuers. To date, the measures adopted to alleviate the impact 
of the health crisis have contributed to temporarily mitigating economic agents’ 
credit risk. Similarly, the decisions adopted in the design of the ECB’s asset purchase 
programme have also mitigated the possible non-linear effects on prices of the 
downgrading of credit ratings.24 Also, credit rating agencies have revised their ratings 
less than in other crises. Nonetheless, numerous issuers, especially NFCs, are 
currently in a vulnerable situation, as suggested by the negative outlooks resulting 
from credit agencies’ analyses and, accordingly, their ratings could be downgraded 
in the event of a worsening or persistence of the economic situation.25 
In	 Spain,	more	 than	 50%	of	 each	 financial	 sector’s	 portfolio	 securities	 are	
classified	 as	 above	 investment	 grade	 (above	 BBB-	 and	 equivalent	 ratings).	
This	percentage	would	be	significantly	higher	if	only	fixed	income	assets	were	
considered. Banks and insurance companies have the highest percentages of 
securities in investment grade, with 66% and 80%, respectively, of their holdings 
above this rating. In the case of investment funds and pension funds, these 
percentages hover around 51% and 57%, respectively, given the greater volume of 
unrated securities in their portfolios. Nevertheless, analysing these two subsectors 
21	 	Marketable	securities	include	both	fixed-income	and	equity	instruments	and	may,	in	particular,	include	holdings	
in	the	capital	of	investment	funds.	Each	issuer’s	rating	at	a	specific	date	is	assigned	to	all	of	its	issued	securities.	
22  The banking sector’s marketable securities portfolio, valued at market prices, amounts to around €661 billion, 
while	the	NBF	sectors’	portfolios	are	much	smaller:	insurance	companies,	€276	billion;	investment	funds,	€263	
billion; and pension funds, €119 billion. 
23  See Section 2.2.2. of the Banco de España’s Autumn 2020 FSR or Rodríguez de Codes et al. (2020), The 
challenges associated with the use of agencies’ credit ratings in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, Section 4,	
Financial	Stability	Review,	Autumn	2020,	Issue	39.
24  In April 2020 the ECB’s Governing Council adopted certain measures to relax collateral eligibility requirements in 
financing	transactions	with	financial	institutions	which	included,	most	notably,	the	easing	of	the	conditions	for	the	




25  See Boxes 1 and 3 of Chapter	2	of	the	ECB’s	Financial	Stability	Review,	November	2020. 
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in more detail, the securities not classified as investment grade were concentrated 
in instruments without assigned rating at the end of last year, which represented 
44.5% and 39% of the total holdings respectively. Within these instruments without 
an assigned rating, holdings in the capital of other investment funds predominated 
(a percentage higher than 30% of the portfolio) which, due to their nature, are not 
subject to credit ratings in the way fixed income securities are. Conversely, the 
presence of fixed income instruments without an assigned rating was marginal.
The	weight	of	securities	holdings	classified	in	the	highest	categories	(from	A-	
to	 AAA+	 and	 equivalent	 ratings)	 is	 greater	 for	 insurance	 companies	 (60%),	
which	is	significantly	higher	than	for	investment	funds	(27%)	and	pension	funds	
and	banks	(35%). These figures largely reflect that banks and insurance companies 
have larger holdings of – mainly Spanish – government debt securities. Lastly, 
holdings bordering on investment grade, in the BBB range, make up between 20% to 
25% of portfolios for the NBF sectors and 31% for the banking sector. 
The	 ratings	 of	 securities	 held	 in	 common	 by	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 NBF	
sectors are concentrated between a- and aaa+ (see Chart 2.17.1). The percentage 
of securities held in common by each pair of sectors26 varies only slightly with 
respect to the similar exercise conducted in 202027 and is particularly high in the 
case of NBF sector. The holdings held in common by banks and NBF sectors that 
are bordering on investment grade represent a relatively small percentage of the 
total bank portfolio, around 12%. The weight of securities bordering on investment 
grade in holdings held in common with other sectors is more significant for investment 
and pension funds (around 20%).
The	weight	of	unrated	holdings	in	investment	and	pension	fund	portfolios	was	
high	in	December	2020.	Specifically, nearly 40% of their holdings are unrated (29% 
in the banking sector and 16% in the insurance sector). This is also reflected in the 
percentage of holdings these two sectors have in common and which each of them 
has with insurance companies. However, leaving aside the participations in other 
funds that, as already indicated, exceed 30% of the portfolio, the holdings that have 
not been assessed by credit rating agencies are not subject to the risk of fire sales 
owing to possible rating downgrades. However, as they are unrated, their secondary 
markets are likely to be shallow, which would make them difficult to sell in the event 
of possible liquidity needs and could generate more downward pressure on prices 




amounts relating to these holdings are computed as common holdings.
27  See the Banco de España’s Spring 2020 Financial Stability Report.
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Banks’	holdings	of	bonds	or	shares	issued	by	NFCs	are	minimal,	around	4.5	%	
of	 their	 marketable	 securities	 portfolio,	 and	 lower	 than	 those	 of	 the	 NBF	
sectors. The weight of these corporate securities in the NBF sectors’ portfolios is 
higher (10% in the case of insurance companies and around 20% in that of investment 
funds and pension funds). Approximately 40% of corporate security holdings held 
by banks are securities issued by Spanish NFCs, while the percentage is lower for 
the NBF sectors, between 18% and 34%28. 
Investment	 funds	 and	 pension	 funds	 maintain	 the	 highest	 percentage	 of	
common	holdings	of	corporate	securities	relative	to	the	size	of	the	portfolio,	
between	12%	and	17%	for	each	sector (see Chart 2.17.2). Holdings on the edge of 
investment grade range between 4% and 6% of the portfolio of these two sub-
sectors. For banks and insurance companies, common holdings of corporate 
28  The data used in this analysis are grouped at sectoral level, but are not consolidated on an intra- or cross-
sectoral	basis.	This	means	that	NFCs	may	have	subsidiaries	classified	in	the	sectors	of	financial	intermediaries	
through	which	 they	are	financed	via	 the	 issuance	of	securities,	but	since	 the	consolidated	 information	 is	not	
available, these exposures are not included in the analysis as securities issued by NFCs.
Investment funds and pension funds hold a relatively high proportion of common holdings of securities issued by NFCs that are on the edge 
of investment grade and are, therefore, more vulnerable to the possibility of a worsening of the economic situation. By contrast, in the 
case of the banking sector and the insurance companies, these securities account for a low proportion of total portfolio.
COMMON HOLDINGS IN DIFFERENT FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES OF SECURITIES ON THE EDGE OF INVESTMENT GRADE ARE
IMPORTANT FOR INVESTMENT AND PENSION FUNDS
Chart 2.17
SOURCES: Securities Holding Statistics by Sector and Refinitiv.
a IF, IC, PF and B denote investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds and banks, respectively. Each sector has common holdings with other 
sectors, as shown by the different columns in the chart, which depict the common holdings between each sector pair. For instance, the first column 
on the left-hand side indicates that the common holdings between banks and investment funds make up 48% of the total banking sector portfolio; of 
these holdings, approximately 12% are investment grade (BBB+ to BBB-). The market value of the holdings reported by the institutions is taken 
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securities are lower, standing at 4% and 6.5%, respectively. Chart 2.17 shows that 
when securities other than corporate securities are excluded, the weight of common 
holdings declines significantly in magnitudes exceeding 30 pp of the total portfolio. 
This effect evidences the importance of other common exposures different from 
corporate securities (particularly government debt) as a possible channel for the 
transmission of market shocks to all the financial sectors.





Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 8/2020 of 17 March 2020 approved 
a public guarantee facility for firms and self-employed 
persons of up to €100 billion. The aim was to provide firms 
with access to the funding they needed to meet their 
liquidity needs generated as a result of the restrictions 
imposed on economic activity and mobility in response to 
the pandemic. RDL 25/2020 activated a second guarantee 
facility, of up to €40 billion, essentially to meet funding 
needs linked to investment.1 RDL 34/2020 extended the 
deadline for application for guarantees to June 2021. It also 
extended, at the request of the firms concerned, the 
duration of the loans guaranteed up to eight years and the 
grace period up to 24 months (from five years and 12 
months, respectively, in RDL 8/2020). 
On data as at December 2020, the amounts guaranteed 
stood at around €88 billion, which represents total financing 
granted to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and sole 
proprietors of approximately €115 billion, including loans 
drawn (€93 billion) and credit facilities (€22 billion). The 
volume of credit drawn by firms and sole proprietors since 
March 2020 has risen by some €30 billion, largely as a result 
of the high volume of loans granted under the guarantee 
scheme, especially in 2020 Q2. In the second half of the 
year, the credit under the guarantee scheme and new loans 
outside the scheme were not sufficient to offset repayments 
and transfers to write-offs, resulting in a small but continuous 
decrease in this credit stock (see Chart 1).
A positive correlation is found between the growth in 
financing granted to NFCs and sole proprietors and the 
weight of the guarantee scheme in credit institutions’ 
relevant portfolios (see Chart 2). Accordingly, it is observed 
that institutions with a higher level of participation in the 
guarantee scheme are associated with higher credit growth 
to business in 2020. 
By comparing firms that obtained ICO-backed loans in 
2020 with those that did not, it is possible to identify whether 
or not the firms that obtained such loans have characteristics 
SOURCES: ICO and Banco de España.
a COVID-19 guarantee facility under RDL 8/2020 of up to €100 billion. Total financing granted under the guarantee facility up to December 2020: 
€115 billion. Total amount effectively drawn by NFCs and sole proprietors: €93 billion.
b The additional change in credit to NFCs and sole proprietors reflects the change in the credit stock that is not explained by the implementation of 
the COVID-19 guarantee programme, corresponding to the net difference between new lending outside the scheme and repayments and transfers 
to write-offs.








































































































































CHANGE IN CREDIT TO NFCs AND SOLE PROPRIETORS, MARCH-DECEMBER 2020






























Proportion of ICO-backed business credit. Dec-2020
Chart 2
IMPLEMENTATION OF ICO GUARANTEE SCHEME AND GROWTH IN CREDIT 
FOR BUSINESS (c)



















1  Subsequently, resolutions of the Council of Ministers of 24 November and 22 December 2020, on execution of this guarantee facility, activated the second, 
third and fourth tranches, in an amount of €2.55 billion, €250 million and €500 million, respectively. The second tranche also covered meeting the liquidity 
needs	of	firms	in	the	restructuring	agreement	stage	of	insolvency	proceedings.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 83 Financial Stability REPORt. SPRinG 2021   2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
Box 2.1
MONITORING	OF	LOANS	WITH	PUBLIC	(ICO)	GUARANTEE	(cont’d)
associated with greater risk.2 For this purpose, the firms 
reporting to the Banco de España’s Central Credit Register 
(CCR) in December 2019 that were not in default at that 
date (a pre-requisite for eligibility for the guarantee scheme) 
were taken and matched with the data held in the Banco de 
España’s Central Balance Sheet (CBB) database at end-
2018 (the last complete sample available). The findings 
show that the firms that took advantage of the guarantee 
scheme had a lower equity-to-asset ratio, a higher average 
cost of debt, a lower level of sales productivity (measured 
as sales to employees) and shorter bank debt maturities 
(see Chart 3). They were also smaller and younger, but their 
profitability and liquidity ratios were higher. All the above 
suggests that the firms that took advantage of the guarantee 
facilities had, ex ante, a somewhat higher risk profile than 
those that did not.3 This conjecture is in keeping with their 
credit risk performance: up to the end of 2020 more of these 
firms were classified as at risk in the CCR (Stage 2, non-
performing for subjective reasons or non-performing) than 
those that did not take advantage of the guarantee scheme. 
A multivariate econometric analysis that controls for all 
these and more characteristics – for example, firm sector 
and geographical location and identity of main lending 
bank – confirms all these findings.
Drawing on the set of firms and sole proprietors in the CCR 
(see Chart 4), it is observed that, for firms, 35.8% of the 
financing drawn linked to the ICO guarantee scheme 
corresponds to borrowers that have at least one Stage 2 
loan in the system overall (29.4% for sole proprietors). 
Around 5% of the amount drawn with ICO guarantee 
corresponds to firms that have at least one loan that is non-
performing for subjective reasons (2.5% for sole proprietors), 
and 5.5% to firms that have at least one non-performing 
loan (5.6% for sole proprietors).4 Analysing the existence of 
impairment exclusively in the financing under the guarantee 







SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For each financial characteristic, the chart shows the relative difference (expressed in %) between its average value for firms with an ICO-backed 
loan and its average value for firms with no ICO-backed loans.
b In the customer-level analysis, all possible loan impairment on all loans, whether or not with ICO backing, granted by any institution under the ICO 
guarantee scheme or not, are identified for each corporation or sole proprietor with an ICO-backed loan. Customers with troubled loans over a 
minimum materiality threshold are flagged as having signs of impairment. In the analysis of customers with guaranteed loans, only possible credit 
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Chart 4
PROPORTION OF ICO-BACKED LOANS OF CUSTOMERS WITH SIGNS OF CREDIT 
IMPAIRMENT. DECEMBER 2020 (b)
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scheme, the problem loan percentages are much lower: for 
firms, Stage 2 loans account for some 8% of the credit 
guaranteed (around 14% for sole proprietors), while the 
volume of non-performing loans is well below 1% (and it is 
even lower for sole proprietors). It is important to note that 
many of these guaranteed loans had a payment holiday that 
will probably not yet have come to an end.
At the European level, on consolidated balance sheet data 
and the latest data published by the EBA in its risk map as 
at December 2020, new loans to NFCs under public 
guarantee schemes amounted to €342.9 billion. They were 
concentrated primarily at banks in France, Spain and Italy, 
which together accounted for 90.7% of the total. However, 
although in the case of French banks the amount guaranteed 
was close to 50% and most of the loans had maturities of 
less than 12 months, in Spain and Italy the sums guaranteed 
amounted to 80% and most were medium and long-term 
loans (see Chart 5). In addition, most new loans backed by 
public guarantee schemes were S1 (performing) loans. 
Thus, new S2 (significant increase in credit risk) and S3 
(non-performing) loans at the European level accounted for 
12.7% of the total. The high share of new S2 and S3 loans 




a Public guarantee denotes the percentage of cover that public guarantees offer these new loans.
b S2 (Stage 2) denotes a significant increase in credit risk, but not default status or classification as non-performance for subjective reasons which 
would correspond to S3 (Stage 3).
c The EBA data include Iceland. From 2020 Q1 the aggregated EU data no longer include the figures of UK banks, but they do include data from their 




















FR ES IT DE NL
> 5 YEARS > 2 ≤ 5 YEARS
> 1 ≤ 2 YEARS > 6 ≤ 12 MONTHS




NEW LOANS SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEMES BY MATURITY 
AND GUARANTEE COVERAGE









NL DE FR IT ES
 S2 (b)  S3 (b)  EU27/EEA AVERAGE (c)
%
Chart 6
NEW LOANS SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEMES BY CREDIT 
QUALITY STAGE
Consolidated data. Deposit institutions. December 2020
5	 	The	EBA	uses	the	IFRS9	S1,	S2	and	S3	credit	risk	categories	(which	are	similar	to	the	performing,	significant	increase	in	credit	risk	and	non-performing	
categories).




MOnitO inG lOan MORatORiUM ScHEMES 
To date, five different types of credit moratoria have been 
approved in Spain, four of which correspond to legislative 
schemes and the other to conventional agreements.1,2 
Combining data for monitoring these schemes reported by 
credit institutions to the Banco de España with data from 
the Banco de España’s Central Credit Register (CCR), this 
box analyses the volume, duration and credit quality of 
these moratoria. 
On December 2020 data, 1.38 million moratoria have been 
granted in Spain, with an acceptance rate of more than 
92%. The amount of credit that has become subject to 
moratoria since March 2020 exceeds €56 billion (8% of all 
the credit in the loan portfolios eligible for moratoria and 
5% of all the credit to the non-financial private sector in 
December 2020). During this same period there have also 
been reductions in the amount of credit subject to 
moratoria (owing to discharges, repayments and 
cancellations) totalling €22 billion, so that the outstanding 
volume of loans subject to moratoria in December 2020 
amounted to €34 billion, slightly more than 3% of all loans 
to the non-financial private sector (see Chart 1). 
Most of this outstanding volume corresponds to 
conventional schemes (more than €32 billion, or 95%). 
More than €15 billion of credit initially subject to legislative 
moratoria is now subject to conventional moratoria; the 
shorter duration of the former means that when they expire 
loans are often transferred to bilateral or sectoral moratoria. 
Around 85% of these outstanding moratoria will expire 
during the first half of 2021 (see Chart 2), with expiries 
concentrated in April and May (over 50%).
As regards the classification of loans whose moratoria have 
already expired or been cancelled and, therefore, are no 
1  Royal Decree-Law	(RDL)	8/2020, on extraordinary urgent measures to address the economic and social impact of COvID-19, established the legislative 
moratorium for personal mortgage debts.  Royal	Decree-Law	11/2020 introduced the moratorium for non-mortgage loan agreements (including consumer 
credit). Essentially, the requirements and effects of both types of moratorium are the same, although they apply to different types of loans. Royal Decree-Law	
19/2020	established	a	special	regime	for	sectoral	framework	agreements	for	the	deferral	of	customer	financing	transactions	concluded	between	lender	
institutions and their customers through their representative associations. For their part, Royal Decree-Law	25/2020 and Royal Decree-Law	26/2020 
established	two	new	moratoria,	applicable	not	only	to	individuals,	like	the	previous	ones,	but	also	to	legal	persons.	These	moratoria	apply	to	loans	granted	to	
the tourism sector and to the public transport of goods and charter bus sector.
2  Conventional moratoria include both the sectoral moratoria covered by the provisions of the sectoral agreements entered into by lender institutions 
through	their	representative	associations,	in	accordance	with	Royal	Decree	19/2020, and other moratoria agreed under the principle of freedom of 
contract	in	the	Civil	Code	that	are	not	covered	by	a	sectoral	framework	agreement	(bilateral	moratoria).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The data on outflows are for the period to November to be consistent with the criterion used to compute the moratoria outstanding in December 
(expiry is not considered to occur until the end of the month, even if it occurs during the month).
b The inflow of credit to moratoria (positive bar) and the outflow of credit from moratoria (negative bar) are shown for each quarter. Also, the (positive 
or negative) net flow of transfers of credit volume received by each scheme from the other is shown for the year as a whole. The last two bars depict 
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Chart 1
INFLOW AND OUTFLOW OF CREDIT TO/FROM MORATORIA AND OUTSTANDING 
VOLUME OF MORATORIA AS AT DECEMBER 2020 (a) (b)




MOnitO inG lOan MORatORiUM ScHEMES (cont’d)
longer in force, almost three-quarters are performing, 
around 20% are in stage 2 and somewhat less than 10% 
are classified as non-performing (see Chart 3). Most of the 
moratoria no longer in force are legislative moratoria, 
specifically for households in a situation of vulnerability. By 
type of guarantee, 21% of mortgage loans which were 
subject to moratoria are in stage 2 (15% of non-mortgage 
loans), and 9% are classified as non-performing (6% for 
other loans, without mortgage security).
An econometric model has been estimated to identify the 
main determinants of the probability that, when it ceases 
to be subject to a moratorium, a mortgage loan is classified 
as non-performing or in stage 2. This model uses data 
from the Banco de España’s Central Credit Register on the 
characteristics of credit transactions (type of moratorium, 
interest rate, original maturity, etc.), collateral 
(unemployment rate of geographical location of collateral, 
etc.), borrowers (income, total debt, age and credit history 
of head of household, etc.) and lender banks. 
The results of this analysis show that loans subject to 
legislative moratoria initially have a 33% higher probability 
of being classified in a category other than performing, 
and that this probability is also greater in the case of loans 
to households with a higher bank debt-to-income ratio in 
2019, lower income,3 poorer credit history (past defaults), 
or that live in regions more severely affected by the 
pandemic in terms of job losses. In particular, the average 
probability of a loan being classified as stage 2 or non-
performing is 50% higher for the most indebted households 
(bottom vis-à-vis top quintile, see Chart 4). The study also 
shows that these household characteristics are associated 
with a higher probability that loans subject to legislative 
moratoria will become subject to conventional moratoria. 
This overlapping of moratoria may be containing risks and 
thus postponing their materialisation in the form of future 
non-performance.
For all these reasons, and given the uncertainty surrounding 
economic developments, credit moratoria need to be closely 
monitored in Spain over the coming months. In addition, the 
current profile of expiries may be affected by the entry into 
force of RDL 3/2021,4 which allows new nine-month 
moratoria to be applied for until March and the duration of 
existing moratoria to be extended to a total duration of not 
more than nine months. The experience built up over these 
months shows that this type of support measure is flexible 
and can be activated and withdrawn relatively quickly, but 
must be used prudently in order to ensure that appropriate 
repayment incentives are maintained.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Chart 3
CREDIT QUALITY OF LOANS LINKED TO EXPIRED OR CANCELLED MORATORIA (a)
Chart 4
PERCENTAGE OF NON-PERFORMING AND STAGE 2 LOANS THAT WERE 
SUBJECT TO MORATORIA NO LONGER IN FORCE AT THE END OF 2020, 
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%%
3 Each household is imputed the average income corresponding to its postcode.
4  Among other measures, Royal	Decree-Law	3/2021 of 2 February 2021 adopting measures to reduce the gender gap and on other Social Security 
and economic matters extends the application period for moratoria and extends their duration to up to nine months.
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At European level, according to the latest data published by 
the EBA on its Risk Dashboard corresponding to December 
2020, the total volume of loan moratoria granted in 2020 to 
non-financial corporations and households, based on 
consolidated bank balance sheets data (i.e., including 
information on subsidiaries in other countries), stood at 
€898.8 billion, of which 26% were classified at the end of the 
year as stage 2 loans (22.3%) and stage 3 loans (3.7%), with 
considerable cross-country heterogeneity.5 Thus, for Spanish 
banks most of the loans under moratoria were to households 
(78.7%), while for banks in France, Italy and the Netherlands 
most of the loans under moratoria were to firms (see Chart 5). 
For Spanish and Italian banks, the share of total loans to non-
financial corporations and households that were under 
moratoria stood above the European average (7.8%), at 
10.6% and 14.2%, respectively. The difference between 
this 10.6% share for Spanish banks, based on consolidated 
data, and the 5% mentioned above for the total volume of 
loan moratoria granted for the business in Spain shows that 
moratoria have been much more widespread in other 
jurisdictions where Spanish banks operate than in Spain. 
Meanwhile, for banks in the Netherlands, Germany, France 
and Spain more than 50% of the moratoria have expired, 
while for banks in Italy unexpired moratoria account for 
more than 65% of the total (see Chart 6). In the case of 
expired moratoria, according to the international 
comparison, based on consolidated data, banks in the 
Netherlands have the highest percentage of stage 2 and 3 
loans (almost 30%), followed by German banks (23.2%), 
while the EU average is 15.5%. As regards unexpired 
moratoria, the highest percentages of stage 2 and 3 loans 
under moratoria are observed in Italy (more than 20% of 
the total), while the average level in Spain stands at 9.7%, 
in line with the EU average (9.4%). 
Box 2.2
MOnitORinG lOan MORatORiUM ScHEMES (cont’d)
SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
a The EBA data include Iceland. From 2020 Q1, the aggregate EU data no longer include figures for UK banks, but do include data for subsidiaries 
of UK banks in EU countries.




















STAGES 2 & 3 (pp) (right-hand scale)
MORATORIA AS % OF LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS AND NFCs (r-h scale)
€bn %
Chart 5  
EBA-COMPLIANT MORATORIA
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Chart 6  
EBA-COMPLIANT MORATORIA (CONTINUED)
Consolidated data. December 2020
5	 	Stage	2	loans	show	a	significant	increase	in	credit	risk,	but	without	default	or	classification	as	non-performing	for	subjective	reasons,	which	would	
make them stage 3 loans.




an initial an lySiS OF tHE POSSiblE intRODUctiOn OF a DiGital EURO 
In recent years, interest in what are known as central 
bank digital currencies (CBDCs) has grown markedly.1 
Society’s increasing digitalisation, new payment 
technology possibilities and the potential monetary policy 
and financial stability implications of private initiatives of 
this kind have led numerous central banks worldwide 
(see Table 1) to analyse the possibility of creating this 
new monetary liability that could grant the entire 
population access to central bank digital currency.
Any decision in this regard needs careful consideration 
given its many implications and the different configurations 
it could take (for example, book-entries vs. tokens, 
centralised vs. decentralised management model, 
remuneration policy). The Eurosystem began its own 
analysis more than a year ago, as it was aware of the need 
to be prepared for a possible decision to issue a digital euro. 
The outcome of an initial study2 focusing on assessing its 
potential advantages and disadvantages and the different 
design alternatives was published in October 2020. 
The report identifies some scenarios where it might be 
useful to issue a digital euro as a complement to cash. 
For example, it could be envisaged as a tool to promote 
digitalisation and payment sovereignty in the European 
economy. Issuing a digital euro could also be necessary 
if the use of cash were to decline significantly, or if foreign 
digital money or a private payment solution not overseen 
by European authorities that was broadly taken up were 
to emerge as a source of risks or instability. 
Despite its potential benefits, the implementation of a 
digital euro could also have undesired effects for the 
stability of the financial system, the functioning of the 
payment system and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, among others. In particular, developing a digital 
euro could diminish the importance of the bank deposit 
activity. This could trigger changes in the behaviour of 
banks (increasing deposit remuneration, bundling 
deposits with other products, turning increasingly to 
more volatile market financing and to central bank 
financing) and customers (greater ability and incentives 
to withdraw funds from the banking sector during crises) 
and have implications for stability. In addition, banks, 
who play a key role in the payment system, could lose 
much of this business, which accounts for a considerable 
1	 	For	an	overview	of	the	number	of	ongoing	initiatives	across	the	world,	see	the	BIS	database	by	R.	Auer,	G.	Cornelli	and	J.	Frost	(2020),	“Rise of the 
central	bank	digital	currencies:	drivers,	approaches	and	technologies”, BIS Working Paper, No 880.
2  See “ECB Report on a digital Euro” of 2 October 2020. 
SOURCE: BIS.
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Box 2.3
an initial analySiS OF tHE POSSiblE intRODUctiOn OF a DiGital EURO (cont’ d)
share of their revenue. As the new equilibrium would 
imply higher costs and lower revenue for banks, lending 
to households and firms would also become more 
expensive, with a knock-on effect on economic activity. 
The loss of information on bank customers due to lower 
deposit activity and the potential deterioration in banks’ 
profitability could incentivise greater risk-taking by the 
banking sector.
The report acknowledges that the design of the digital 
euro could have undesirable implications for the monetary 
policy mandate, something which is to be avoided. At the 
same time, the report does not at this stage analyse the 
possible role of the digital euro in strengthening the 
monetary policy framework. 
A disruption of the transmission channel resulting from 
digital euro-induced changes in banks’ balance sheets 
and behaviour may lead to potential adverse effects 
materialising. For example, replacing deposit funding with 
central bank borrowing could raise banks’ demand for 
collateral, thereby altering the risk-free rate, and increase 
central banks’ exposure to the economy.
Alternatively, remunerating the digital euro through 
interest could directly reinforce the transmission of 
monetary policy both in ordinary times and in times of 
crisis. The risk of bank deposits shifting to the digital euro 
in moments of stress could be mitigated by remunerating 
digital euro holdings at a variable interest rate over time, 
even to the extent of penalising them in the event of a 
bank run, for instance. In ordinary times, the direct effect 
identified by some academic studies3 also stems from 
the fact that such remuneration of the digital euro may 
act as the effective lower bound on interest rates , thus 
making it easier for central banks to control market rates. 
These claims also highlight that the mechanism could 
make it easier for negative rates to be transmitted, thus 
strengthening the policy framework for action when they 
are needed. However, the coexistence of the digital euro 
and cash limits the relevance of this objective. 
The report also includes an initial analysis of these 
impacts on the stability of the financial system and sets 
out a series of essential requirements that the digital euro 
would have to meet to limit these possible adverse 
impacts. These are, namely: to be based on the best 
technology, to allow for a standardised service throughout 
Europe and to be interoperable with private payment 
solutions, attractive as a means of payment (particularly, 
compared with cash), easy to use and secure. Its 
convertibility at par into physical euro should be 
guaranteed and the ECB should be the authority 
responsible for maintaining its value. The degree of 
involvement of financial intermediaries would be 
especially important to mitigate the effects on financial 
stability (see Figure 1).
In addition, an appropriate mix of the different design 
options and the way the support infrastructure is 
configured could help mitigate some of the possible 
adverse implications of issuing digital euro. 
Given the importance of these and other aspects, the ECB 
and the euro area central banks have continued to work 
together to identify and assess all the risks associated with 
the digital euro, and to determine what could be the most 
advisable design to ensure that the Eurosystem objectives 
are properly met. Naturally, for this initiative to be 
successful, user preferences will also have to be factored 
into its design. To this end, since the aforementioned ECB 
report was published, efforts have been made to broaden 
knowledge of the digital currency in two ways.
First, a number of practical experiments have been 
conducted to gauge the possibilities and limitations of 
the different technologies, and a solid opinion has been 
formed on the suitability of the different approaches. The 
results will be useful in facilitating any further research 
that may be conducted in the euro area.
Second, the Eurosystem has also sought to enhance 
dialogue with all the stakeholders by organising a wide-
ranging public consultation for this purpose. This initiative 
has been very well received and has provided valuable 
and detailed information on potential users’ needs and 
preferences. It has also allowed the Eurosystem to become 
familiar with the insight and expectations of the financial 
sector and other professionals, both in academia and in the 
technology industry, regarding the future of the digital euro.
The participation of the Eurosystem in various supra-national 
fora and bodies will also help enrich the Eurosystem’s 
3  M. D. Bordo and A. T. Levin (2017), “Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper No. 23711, National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
4  See Eurosystem report on the public consultation on a digital euro, ECB, April 2021.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 90 Financial Stability REPORt. SPRinG 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
Recuadro ?.?
TÍTULO RECUADRO
understanding of the nature of the digital euro and the 
opportunities it offers, thereby helping ensure that it can be 
fully integrated into the international monetary system. 
All this work will nurture a fresh debate in the ECB 
Governing Council with a view to outlining a possible 
future digital euro roadmap.
Box 2.3
an initial analySiS OF tHE POSSiblE intRODUctiOn OF a DiGital EURO (cont’ d)




REcEnt cORPO atE tRanSactiOnS in tHE SPaniSH banKinG SEctOR
The Spanish banking system is currently undergoing a 
new consolidation process, whose aim is to strengthen its 
business model in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic-
induced economic crisis and pre pandemic profitability 
challenges (e.g. operational efficiency or net interest 
income generation). Against this background, four of the 
12 significant Spanish banks have approved the 
consolidation of their business activities through the 
appropriate corporate transactions. Based on the merger 
plans, the CaixaBank-Bankia and the Unicaja-Liberbank 
mergers would enable the resulting banks to improve their 
profitability and solvency levels, with lower overheads and 
larger economies of scale which will enhance their 
digitalisation and access to financial markets.
Both mergers will be legally implemented through the 
merger by absorption of the smaller banks in each case 
(Bankia and Liberbank), whose shareholders will receive 
new shares of the absorbing bank. The Board of Directors 
of the merged banks will have a greater relative weight of 
directors in the largest banks in each case (CaixaBank and 
Unicaja). The FROB —the main shareholder of Bankia— 
will hold a stake of almost 16% in CaixaBank, following 
application of the exchange ratio to the share capital of 
each bank.
The merger of CaixaBank and Bankia (second and fourth 
largest banks in Spain by asset size) would benefit, in 
terms of culture adaptation and speed of integration, 
from having a similar business, targeting the retail 
segment and with a significant SME portfolio. The 
resulting bank will have a total loan portfolio of €368 
billion, thus becoming the largest bank in terms of 
Spanish operations, with a total market share of almost 
25%. As a systemically important institution, the new 
CaixaBank’s macroprudential buffer will foreseeably be 
revised upwards. The resulting bank would have a non-
performing loans ratio of 3.8% and a non-performing 
loan coverage ratio of 64%.
The merger plans envisage potential cost synergies arising 
from the streamlining of the cost structure of up to €770 
million per year, and potential additional revenues resulting 
from a broader customer base of up to €215 million per 
year. Restructuring costs, estimated at €2.2 billion,1 and the 
fair value adjustment to Bankia’s assets and liabilities will be 
absorbed in the regulatory capital base of the two banks 
prior to the merger, with no risk of breaching capital 
requirements. A fully-loaded CET1 target of 11.5% is 
established for the resulting bank. For 2022, the bank 
resulting from the merger of CaixaBank and Bankia will also 
target a return on tangible equity (RoTE) of 8%.
The merger of Unicaja and Liberbank will give rise to the 
fifth largest Spanish bank, with a loan portfolio 
amounting to approximately €55 billion and a total 
market share of almost 4.5%. Both banks have a similar 
business model, targeting the retail segment and lending 
to SMEs, which could smooth their integration. As 
regards asset quality, the resulting bank will have a non-
performing loans ratio of around 3.6% and a non 
performing loan coverage ratio of 62%. The two bank’s 
deep historical roots in their home regions (Andalusia, 
Asturias, Cantabria, Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha 
and Castilla y León) and their geographical 
complementarity would enable the resulting bank to 
maintain its leadership position in most of them and to 
extend its reach to 80% of Spain.
Based on the banks’ interim estimates, the elimination of 
overlaps will entail integration costs of approximately 
€540 million and future synergies, which will be obtained 
gradually to stand at €159 million per year in 2023. These 
synergies will enable the resulting bank to improve its 
profitability, with an expected RoTE of around 6% for 
2023. Table 1 summarises the key figures for the two 
merger transactions.
The announcement of the CaixaBank-Bankia merger 
negotiations on 4 September 20202 was welcomed by 
the stock market with rises in all bank stocks, since it was 
considered a potential trigger for other mergers in the 
banking sector. In fact, the returns seen in the market on 
that date were significantly higher for all banks than those 
which would have been observed on a day with no 
relevant news or events3 (see Chart 1). The positive 
effects persisted until the merger agreement between 






calculated using a regression that takes into account the performance of the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, changes in the slope of the OIS 
curve and developments in sovereign risk. 




REcEnt cORPORatE tRanSactiOnS in tHE SPaniSH banKinG SEctOR (cont’d)
2020), but only for these two banks and for the other two 
that the market perceived as the likeliest candidates for a 
merger (Unicaja and Liberbank), whereas the favourable 
effect faded for the remaining banks4 (see Chart 1).
The market responded to the confirmation of discussions 
for the merger of Unicaja and Liberbank with further 
larger-than-expected stock price increases (5 October 
2020). However, the merger confirmation on 29 December 
4	 	Chart	1	shows	that,	for	these	four	banks,	the	effects	are	significant	and	positive	until	ten	days	after	confirmation	of	the	merger	agreement	between	
CaixaBank and Bankia.  
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The figures are either the sum or the average of the consolidated financial statements of the banks party to each transaction, which had not been completed 





Total assets (€billion) 661 113
55863)noillib€( sremotsuc ot secnavda dna snaoL
Customer funds (€billion) 562 85
Market share 25% 4.5%
NPL ratio 3.8% 3.6%
NPL coverage ratio 64% 62%
Fully-loaded CET1 ratio 13.9% 15.1%
Estimated RoTE 8% (2022) 6% (2023)




FINANCIAL INFORMATION OF THE BANKS RESULTING FROM THE MERGERS
DECEMBER 2020 (a)
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a The charts show the "abnormal returns" for each bank and the estimation error.
bp
Chart 1
IMPACT OF CAIXABANK-BANKIA MERGER
Initial impact 4 September and accumulated impact from 4 to 18 September (a)
bp
Chart 2
IMPACT OF UNICAJA-LIBERBANK MERGER
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2020 seemed to have already been discounted on that 
date (see Chart 2). Furthermore, the lack of response at 
other banks indicates that the market was not expecting 
any additional mergers.
These consolidation transactions are taking place at a time 
when the European Central Bank (ECB) has just published 
its Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation in 
the banking sector,5 which is intended to clarify the 
prudential supervisory approach the ECB follows when 
determining whether the arrangements implemented by a 
credit institution resulting from a consolidation ensure the 
sound management and coverage of its risks. The 
document covers several key aspects, such as the 
objectives and phases of consolidation processes, and 
their prudential treatment, supervisory expectations 
regarding the resulting bank, and the application of this 
framework to less significant institutions.
The supervisory expectations are focused on the 
sustainability of the business model of the resulting bank, 
which will be examined by the ECB in order to assess its 
solvency, profitability and risk profile. It will also place 
particular focus on the existence of suitable governance 
arrangements and risk management frameworks.
As regards prudential aspects, the Guide highlights the 
post-merger capital requirements, the treatment of 
badwill and the approach to internal models. Specifically, 
for consolidation transactions where no substantial 
supervisory concern has been identified, the Guide 
envisages the following approach:
—  Credible integration plans will not be penalised 
with higher capital requirements (P2R and P2G) 
than those derived from applying the weighted 
average of the banks’ consolidated pre-
combination capital requirements.
—  Prudent recognition of badwill, which is expected 
to materially contribute to the capital of the 
resulting bank and cannot be distributed as 
dividends until the sustainability of the business 
model is established.
—  Temporary acceptance of the use of existing 
internal models, subject to a roll-out plan.
From the resolution perspective, the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) has announced that the resolution plans of 
the absorbed banks and their MREL requirements will 
cease to apply if the mergers take place as envisaged. It 
will also review the absorbing banks’ plans and MREL 
decisions after the merger. Furthermore, the SRB has 
expressed interest in avoiding that these requirements 
hinder this type of transactions, provided that the 
resolvability of the resulting bank under the regulatory 
terms is ensured.
Box 2.4
REcEnt cORPORatE tRanSactiOnS in tHE SPaniSH banKinG SEctOR (cont’d)
5  See SSM Guide to the Supervisory Approach to Consolidation in the banking sector,	published	on	12	January	2021.	
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This chapter analyses the various vulnerability and systemic risk indicators, focusing 
in particular on those used in decisions concerning the counter cyclical capital buffer 
(CCyB), which since the onset of the pandemic have had to be adapted to a context 
of crisis. Continued adverse activity indicators, in particular a negative output gap, 
mean that the CCyB has to remain deactivated. Next, the chapter reviews certain 
prudential measures which have been adopted or are under discussion, both as a 
result of the crisis and regarding the medium-term development of the macroprudential 
framework. Worth noting in this connection is the public consultation of the amendment 
to Banco de España Circular 2/2016 on the supervision and solvency of credit 
institutions, which will make it possible to activate new macroprudential measures 
based on sectoral capital requirements and limits on the sectoral concentration of 
credit risk and on credit standards.
3.1  analysis of macro-financial vulnerability indicators and their relevance in 
the environment generated by cOViD-19
The	acute	stress	unleashed	in	financial	markets	in	March	2020	with	the	outbreak	
of	 the	 COVID-19	 pandemic	 continued	 to	 abate	 in	 2020	 H2	 and	 early	 2021,	
especially	owing	to	ongoing	economic	policy	support	and	medical	advances	to	
combat the coronavirus. This lower financial stress is perfectly reflected in the 
systemic risk indicator (SRI), which brings together information on the money market, 
government debt, equity and financial intermediaries segments, and is designed to 
be particularly sensitive to simultaneous stress across these four segments. This 
indicator performed highly favourably in the final stretch of 2020 and almost completely 
reversed its surge between February and May of the previous year (see Chart 3.1). 
The SRI held at low levels in 2021 Q1. This improvement shows, on one hand, the 
effectiveness of the measures implemented to stabilise markets which include, most 
notably, the ECB’s monetary policy measures. On the other, the approval of the first 
vaccines by the pertinent agencies and the progress of large-scale vaccination of the 
population also had a positive effect on this indicator.
The	abrupt	year-on-year	fall	in	GDP	in	2020	and	the	economic	policy	response	
continue	 to	distort	 the	usual	 interpretation	of	 the	credit-to-GDP	gap,	which	
held	on	an	upward	path	in	2020	Q4	that	exceeded	warning	levels.	This indicator 
recorded highly negative values following the global financial crisis, holding on a 
rising path thereafter, which was consistently below 2 pp, a level usually considered 
as showing signs of imbalances. After the outbreak of the pandemic, this indicator 
has remained above the alert threshold since June 2020. However, this is due to the 
3 SyStEMic RiSK anD PRUDEntial RESPOnSE tO cOViD-19 
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After rising sharply in the early weeks of the pandemic, the SRI has gradually declined since end-April and currently stands at levels similar 
to those recorded in the period immediately before March 2020.
STRAINS IN THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM GRADUALLY EASED TO PRE-PANDEMIC LEVELS (a)
Chart 3.1
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
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stimulus policies and the sharp impact of the shock triggered by COVID-19 rather 
than new endogenous imbalances of the financial system which are susceptible of 
treatment by the activation of macroprudential tools (see Chart 3.2), specifically the 
CCyB. As indicated in previous FSRs, according to BCBS guidance on the CCyB, it 
is not appropriate to activate this buffer automatically when the credit-to-GDP gap 
increases owing to an abrupt decline in GDP1. Nevertheless, the length and intensity 
of the crisis triggered by COVID-19 increases the risk that the higher degree of 
leverage in relation to GDP will be consolidated over time and, consequently, it will be 
necessary to remain vigilant about future developments in the credit-to-GDP gap. 
The	markedly	negative	output	gap	continues	to	indicate	that	it	is	appropriate	to	
keep	the	CCyB	at	current	levels,	whereas	the	downward	path	of	the	SRI	indicates	
that	 financial	 markets	 are	 operating	 under	 no	 strain.	 The SRI – a coincident 
indicator of systemic financial strain – is usually employed to determine when this 
buffer is released in the face of a significant increase in this strain. The improvement 
of the SRI in 2020 H2 shows that financial markets are gradually stabilising, which 
does not necessarily mean that the economic situation is better across the board. 
The negative performance of the output gap is evidence of this. This variable has 
fallen to negative values, which are unprecedented in recent history, although it 
1  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital 
buffer, December 2020. See Principle 3 (“Risk of misleading signals”).
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started to recover slightly in Q4 (see Chart 3.2). Notwithstanding the difficulties of 
estimating potential growth in view of current uncertainty levels, this indicator is at 
present more informative for guiding decisions in relation to the CCyB than the credit-
to-GDP gap.
Indicators	 of	 banks’	 capacity	 to	 face	 adverse	 systemic	 shocks	 are	 also	
considered	to	complement	the	analysis	of	macro-financial	stress.	SRISK2 is a 
notable example of an indicator which quantifies the level of systemic risk in the 
banking sector overall and individual banks’ contribution to such risk, since it assesses 
the impact of an extreme negative event on each bank. This latent risk indicator 
provides an estimate at market value of the expected capital shortfall in respect of a 
bank’s prudential ratio over its assets after a hypothetical severe crisis in equity 
markets entailing an adverse correction of its market capitalisation.
Since	the	onset	of	the	pandemic	SRISK	has	held	at	historically	elevated	levels,	
associated	 with	 the	 decrease	 in	 banks’	 market	 valuations,	 which	 were	
2  See	Brownlees,	C.,	R.	Engle,	2017.	SRISK:	A	conditional	capital	shortfall	measure	of	systemic	risk.	The	Review	of	
Financial Studies 30, 48-79.
At end-2020 the credit-to-GDP gap exceeded the CCyB activation threshold and was higher than in previous quarters as a result of the sharp 
fall in GDP, which is also reflected in a rapid decline in the output gap, but should not therefore be interpreted as a systemic risk warning. 
Although corrections are expected in the coming quarters as positive GDP growth rates are observed, such as the output gap is beginning 
to show, the indicator needs to be monitored continuously to assess the degree of absorption of higher indebtedness by economic agents.
THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP CONTINUED TO RISE ABOVE THE CCyB REFERENCE THRESHOLD, WHILE THE OUTPUT GAP HELD
AT VERY NEGATIVE LEVELS (a)
Chart 3.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The vertical shaded bands represent the period of the last financial crisis in Spain (2009 Q1-2013 Q4) and the crisis unleashed by the pandemic 
as from 2020 Q2. The data to December 2020 are provisional. The broken red horizontal line represents the reference CCyB activation threshold 
of 2 pp for the credit-to- GDP gap.
b The output gap is the percentage difference between observed GDP and potential GDP. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See Cuadrado, 
P. and Moral-Benito, E. (2016), "Potential growth of the Spanish economy", Occasional Paper 1603, Banco de España.
c The adjusted credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the difference, in percentage points, between the observed ratio and the long-term trend calculated 
using a one-sided statistical Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000. This value is calibrated to adapt to the financial 
cycles historically observed in Spain (see Galán, J.E. (2019). "Measuring credit-to-GDP gaps. The Hodrick-Prescott filter revisited." Occasional 
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subsequently	corrected	by	the	measures	adopted	during	the	crisis	(including	
the	easing	of	prudential	requirements).	Changes in the SRISK of European listed 
banks since March 2020, coinciding with the spread of COVID-19, pushed the 
indicator close to the peak levels observed during the 2012 European sovereign debt 
crisis and above the levels of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (see Chart 3.3). As 
from November 2020, this indicator has clearly decreased, in line with the favourable 
performance of financial markets, although it clearly remains above pre-crisis levels. 
This evidence indicates the market’s pessimistic view of the distance between banks’ 
capital and the capital required should there be a significant correction in stock 
prices3. This small distance could have implications for the usability of banks’ capital 
buffers, adversely affecting bank credit supply in that scenario. This underlines the 
importance of measures which prompt financial markets to return to normal, such as 
expansionary monetary policy and the relaxation of capital requirements. These 
measures should, however, be carefully monitored to avoid overvaluations being 
generated in turn. 
The	particular	nature	of	 the	current	crisis	should	also	provide	guidance	 for	an	
appropriate	interpretation	of	the	SRISK	indicator.	This risk indicator has not reached 
alert thresholds as a result of an endogenous increase in the banking sector’s leverage or 
of an abrupt correction of imbalances which have built up in the industry; rather the key 
factor is the decline in banks’ market valuations in the face of COVID-19-related uncertainty.
Stock	market	 performance	 also	 reveals	 a	 latent	worsening	 of	 listed	 European	
firms’	credit	quality,	which	is	mixed	across	sectors.	The application of option valuation 
methods to the data on the prices and the degree of leverage of Eurostoxx 600 firms has 
shown a significant widespread increase in the underlying probability of default since 
March 2020, which is particularly pronounced in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic 
(e.g. tourism). Recent market developments have corrected the scale of this underlying 
credit impairment, although the latter remains above pre-COVID-19 crisis levels; it is 
higher than in the global financial crisis only in specific sectors (see Box 3.1).
House	price	indicators	suggest	that	prices	stand	roughly	at	their	equilibrium	level	
in	a	highly	uncertain	setting.	House price indicators are key to the early identification of 
potential vulnerabilities which could lead to future systemic problems, since they usually 
move in line with the financial cycle and could even amplify it. Accordingly, there are 
currently no signs of overvaluation in this market with respect to its equilibrium level, 
calculated by using different methodologies, although the subdued volume of transactions 
during 2020 and the fact that the indicators are more dispersed are grounds for some 
caution (see Chart 3.3). 
3  This	exercise	considers	the	distance	between	capital	at	market	value	and	a	prudential	requirement	of	4.5%	of	asset	
value	(using	a	book	value	for	debt	and	a	market	value	for	capital),	whereas	in	reality	capital	requirements	are	numerous	
and complex. The SRISK used is, therefore, an informative indicator but not an exhaustive assessment of requirements. 
The	relaxation	of	the	requirements	parameter	was	not	examined	specifically	either.	
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Taking	 this	 set	 of	 macro-financial	 indicators	 into	 account,	 the	 Banco	 de	
España	is	maintaining	the	CCyB	at	0%	and	does	not	envisage	increasing	it	
at	 least	until	 the	Spanish	economy	has	 recovered	 from	 the	 impact	of	 the	
crisis4. The various indicators show different signs, but the scale of the negative 
exogenous shocks inflicted by the pandemic on real activity has seen special 
consideration given to the output gap criterion and the uncertainty surrounding 
growth. The Banco de España continues to consider it appropriate to maintain the 
CCyB at a minimum of 0% to make it easier for banks to be able to sustain the credit 
flow and thus contribute to alleviating the negative pressure on economic growth. 
In this respect, this decision is in line with the press releases and guidance on the 
flexible application of prudential requirements in response to COVID-19 issued by 
the ECB, ESRB, EBA, BCBS and FSB.
4  See “The Banco de España holds the countercyclical capital buffer at 0%”, press release of 24 March 2021.
The systemic risk of listed banks in the euro area – approximated by SRISK as a percentage of each bank’s total assets – increased in March 
2020 with the onset of the pandemic. Subsequently, this indicator has corrected somewhat coinciding with the recovery in financial markets. 
The indicators of imbalances in the real estate market have remained stable on average, although their dispersion has increased since some 
of them have been affected by the decline in household income.
THE SRISK INDICATOR OF BANKING RISK HAS REMAINED ELEVATED SINCE THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC, WHILE,  AT THE 
SAME TIME, OTHER INDICATORS, SUCH AS THOSE OF THE REAL ESTATE MARKET, HAVE NOT YET GIVEN ANY WARNING 
SIGNALS (a)(b)
Chart 3.3
SOURCES: Datastream, SNL, INE and Banco de España.
a SRISK is expressed as a percentage of each institution's total assets. The parameters used are k=4.5% for the capital requirement, C=10% for the market decline 
and h=22 business days for the period over which the hypothetical decline occurs, see for more details Brownlees and Engle, (2017) "SRISK: A Conditional 
Capital Shortfall Measure of Systemic Risk, Vol 30, pp. 48-79". The SRISK index for the months of 2021 Q1 is calculated from the values of assets and liabilities 
of 2020 Q4 with the stock prices data of the corresponding month. The series have been smoothed using a three-month moving average.
b The shaded area represents the minimum and maximum values of the four indicators of imbalances in house prices. The indicators are: i) the real price gap, 
ii) the house prices to household disposable income ratio gap, iii) the ordinary least squares model which estimates house prices based on long-term trends 
in household disposable income and mortgage interest rates, and iv) the error correction model which estimates house prices based on household disposable 
income, mortgage interest rates and fiscal effects. The long-term trends are calculated in all cases using a statistical one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 
smoothing parameter equal to 400,000. The vertical shaded bands represent the period of the last financial crisis in Spain (2009 Q1-2013 Q4) and the crisis 
unleashed by the pandemic as from 2020 Q2.
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In	 November	 2020	 the	 Banco	 de	 España	 announced	 the	 designation	 of	 five	
institutions	 as	 systemically	 important,	 together	 with	 their	 macroprudential	
capital	buffers5. Each year the Banco de España identifies Spanish credit institutions 
which are globally systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) and other systemically 
important institutions (O-SIIs). This designation entails an additional prudential 
requirement in the form of a capital buffer (see Table 3.1), with the objectives of correcting 
these institutions’ potential competitive advantages in the funding market owing to their 
systemic footprint, adjusting their risk-taking and building up additional funds to absorb 
possible shocks to these institutions, whose stability is needed to maintain the stability 
of the system as a whole. Since 2015, when G-SIIs and O-SIIs first appeared in 
legislation, the composition and classification of the list of institutions identified in Spain 
has remained relatively stable. In 2021 the Banco de España will assess again the 
systemic importance of institutions so as to reflect the changes in the structure of 
the banking system in 2020. 
3.2  Prudential measures adopted and other alternative measures
The	coordinated	 action	of	macroprudential,	micro-prudential	 and	 accounting	
policies	continued	to	facilitate	the	financing	of	the	real	economy,	and	to	mitigate	
the	economic	impact	of	the	pandemic,	which	continued	to	influence	activity	in	
the	early	months	of	20216. Persisting uncertainty and pandemic-related obstacles to 
the normal functioning of the economy are the reason why the prudential measures 
approved since spring 2020 have generally remained in place so as to mitigate these 
negative conditions and complement the monetary and fiscal measures which have 
also continued to be in force7. Each area of measures is summarised and presented in 
a summarised chronological order to underline their adaptation to the unfolding of an 
uncertain environment.
The	easing	of	solvency	and	liquidity	requirements	for	European	banks	remains	in	
force.	As covered in previous FSRs, in the field of solvency and liquidity requirements, 
European guidance remained in place for banks to release the CCyB , with the possibility 
of operating temporarily below the P2G level, the capital conservation buffer and the 
liquidity coverage ratio. Rules on the composition of P2R were also modified so that they 
could be partially covered with AT1 and AT2, anticipating the entry into force of CRD V.
The	presence	of	other	support	measures	limited	banks’	recourse	to	buffers	
to	 increase	 lending	 further.	First, the application of the rapid reform of the EU 
5  See “Banco de España updates the list of systemically important institutions and sets their capital buffers”, press 
release of 27 November 2020.
6	 	See	 Anguren,	 R.,	 L.	 Gutiérrez	 de	 Rozas,	 E.	 Palomeque	 and	 C.J.	 Rodríguez	 García	 (2020)	 “The regulatory and 
supervisory response to the COvID-19 crisis”,	Financial	Stability	Review,	No.	39,	Banco	de	España.
7  See 2020 Spring FSR and 2020 Autumn FSR.
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capital requirements regulation – the CCR quick fix – in June 2020 shored up 
European banks’ solvency ratios. This achievement was similar to that relating to 
the restrictions on banks’ dividend payments, which will remain strict in 2021. 
Furthermore, reining in the negative effects of the pandemic on bank profitability 
in 2020 H2 (see Chapter 2), particularly through the moderation of impairment 
provisions, generally avoided capital charges. Expansionary monetary policy, 
including the enlargement of the asset purchase and bank funding programmes, 
also contributed to very relaxed liquidity conditions. In the crisis environment, 
growth of the stock of loans was strongly underpinned by guarantee programmes 
and moratoria (see Chapter 2).
In	 order	 to	 maximise	 the	 impact	 on	 economic	 activity	 of	 more	 flexible	
solvency	 and	 liquidity	 requirements,	 it	 is	 vital	 that	 banks	 do	 not	 face	
obstacles	to	the	usability	of	the	buffers	they	have	built	up.	The use of buffers 
in a context of crisis, which so far has not been observed among Spanish and 
other European banks, could mean banks experience market stigma if the markets 
consider that such action means their capital and liquidity ratios are insufficient 
for maintaining their funding risk at a reasonable level. If this were to happen, 
using buffers would have a negative impact on market valuations of the banking 
sector. Furthermore, banks could also be uncertain about when they will be 
required to rebuild those buffers. In the short term, effective communication of 
the measures’ objectives and guidance on the future rebuilding of buffers within 
a reasonable timeframe, once the crisis is over, play a significant role in avoiding 
these negative effects. In certain regulatory fora, the possibility is under discussion 
that in the medium term, the macroprudential framework may include more flexible 
requirements to counter the materialisation of unexpected risks which can be 
applied to the banking sector as a whole or to broad segments of it to avoid 
specific banks from being stigmatised. If this reformed framework facilitates the 
widespread use of buffers by banks during crises, it would make recessions 
weaker and, as a consequence, loan losses lower.
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS AND ASSOCIATED CAPITAL BUFFERS 
Table 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The identification and the buffer of this entity were effective until its integration into CaixaBank, S.A. in March 2021.
noitangiseDnoitutitsnI)IEL( reifitnedI ytitnE lageL
Capital buffer 
requirement in 2021
% 00.1IIS-O dna IIS-G.A.S ,rednatnaS ocnaB31MAIWYMDDFMQ6003945
% 57.0IIS-O.A.S ,airatnegrA ayacziV oabliB ocnaB17ZA15QW2Z5N7DF7SM8K
% 52.0IIS-O.A.S ,knaBaxiaC78IFGD7K6DIW335SNUC7
% 52.0IIS-O.A.S ,lledabaS ed ocnaB02MRKXCZLQQW0M2GR5IS
549300GT0XFTFHGOIS94 BFA Tenedora de Acciones, S.A.U. (Bankia, S.A.) O-SII 0.25 %(a)
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Different	authorities	have	continued	to	recommend	credit	institutions	to	exercise	
prudence regarding dividend distribution during the cOViD-19 pandemic. In 
December 2020 the ECB published a new recommendation8 on dividend distribution 
during the pandemic (replacing its previous recommendation9)whereby significant 
institutions are recommended to refrain from distributing cash dividends and 
repurchasing shares until 30 September 2021 or to limit such distributions. In the 
latter case, the dividends and share buybacks are expected to remain below 15% 
of the accumulated profits for 2019 and 2020 or below 20 bp of CET1, whichever is 
lower. They are also recommended to refrain from announcing the distribution of 
provisional dividends charged to their profits for 2021. The Banco de España10 
decided to extend the ECB’s recommendation to all the less significant institutions 
under its direct supervision. Along the same lines, the European Systemic Risk 
Board issued its own recommendation on dividend restrictions for credit institutions, 
investment firms and insurers throughout the EU11; as did the European Banking 
Authority12, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority13 and the 
Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds in Spain14. The restriction on 
dividend distribution is having a significant impact (see Chapter 2) on credit 
institutions’ capital and a regulated framework of these interventions within 
prudential regulations is worth considering in the medium term. Additionally, the 
empirical analysis undertaken with granular information on bank loans shows that 
the Spanish institutions which did not distribute dividends last year were more 
active granting loans and, consequently, helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis 




outlook	 for	 the	 financial	sector.	 In the area of micro-prudential supervision and 
accounting regulation, among other developments, progress has been made in 
applying the quick fix, new supervisory guidelines on bank mergers have been 
introduced, the operational flexibility measures remain in place and accounting 
standards have been tailored to this crisis (e.g. the presence of support measures), 
 8  Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 15 December 2020 (ECB/2020/62)	on dividend distributions 
during	the	COVID-19	pandemic	and	repealing	Recommendation	ECB/2020/35.
 9	 	Recommendation	of	the	European	Central	Bank	of	27	July	2020	(ECB/2020/35)	on dividend distributions during 
the	COVID-19	pandemic	and	repealing	Recommendation	ECB/2020/19.
10  Banco de España recommendation on dividend distribution and variable remuneration of 15 December 2020. (In 
Spanish only). 
11  Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 15 December 2020 (ESRB/2020/15)	 amending 
Recommendation	ESRB/2020/7	on	restriction	of	distributions	during	the	COVID-19	pandemic.
12 EBA press release of 15 December 2020.
13  EIOPA press release of 18 December 2020.
14	 	Note	of	the	Directorate	General	of	Insurance	and	Pension	Funds	of	January	2021.	(In	Spanish	only).
15  See Martínez Miera, D., and R. vegas, 2021, Impact	of	the	dividend	distribution	restriction	on	the	flow	of	credit	
to	non-financial	corporations	in	Spain, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España.
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with significant updates to EBA guidelines, and proposals have been presented for 
asset management in Europe. Notable among the long-term developments are the 
impact of the completion of Basel III on the banking sector, whose implementation 
was delayed owing to the impact of the crisis, and the introduction of new 




as intangible assets. Following the approval of Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2020/2176, the deduction of software assets from CET1 shall no longer be 
required and the difference between the prudential amortisation and the amortisation 
for accounting purposes, with certain restrictions, should be deducted16. The main 
reason for this deduction was the low value of these assets in bank resolution and, 
consequently, their limited loss absorbing capacity. However, investment in software, 
databases and their management is considered a basic input for institutions to pursue 
their activities amid the economy’s and society’s growing digitalisation, and to be 
able to better compete with BigTech firms, which are software asset-intensive. 
Furthermore, European legislation is thus aligned with that of the United States and 
Switzerland, neither of which deducted these assets from their banks’ CET1. By 
contrast, the UK recently announced that it will maintain the deductions.
The	 European	 Central	 Bank	 published	 its	 final	 guide	 on	 the	 supervisory	
approach to consolidation in the banking sector. This guide clarifies the prudential 
supervision principles followed to determine whether the arrangements applicable to a 
credit institution resulting from a consolidation ensure the sound management and 
coverage of its risks. Box 2.4 analyses its implications in greater detail.
the Eba reactivated its guidelines on legislative and non-legislative 
moratoria	 in	 December	 2020	 and	 the	 BCBS	 also	 published	 in	 2020	 H2	 a	
supplemental	 note	 to	 its	 2014	 guidance	 on	 the	 external	 audits	 of	 banks	
regarding	 the	 use	 of	 expected	 credit	 loss	 accounting	 frameworks.	 This 
reactivation of the EBA’s guidelines until end-March 2021 was set up as a support 
measure for bank borrowers (households and firms) and continues to allow 
institutions to make timely use of the flexibility in prudential regulations17. At the 
same time, it limits the maximum duration of a loan payment deferral to nine 
months to facilitate that the exit strategy from all of these measures is implemented 
as gradually and selectively as possible. These guidelines have also been adopted 
by the Banco de España.18. The note of the Basel Committee18 considers that the 
use of forecasts and forward looking information may be useful for 2020 bank 
16 See Commission	Delegated	Regulation	(EU)	2020/2176.
17  See EBA/GL/2020/15.
18 See BCBS Guidelines. December 2020.
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audits, as well as the construction of macroeconomic scenarios and weightings 
and the assessment of internal model performance.
the European commission also sent a communication to the European 
Parliament,	the	Council	and	the	European	Central	Bank	on	how	to	tackle	the	
probable	 increase	 in	 non-performing	 loans	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	COVID-19,	
proposing	greater	proactivity	to	anticipate	this	increase	at	the	same	time	as	
it	extended	the	State	aid	Temporary	Framework	until	end-December	2021.	
The communication issued by the European Commission19 proposes: (i) further 
developing the secondary market for non-performing exposures; (ii) improving 
coordination in the operation of national asset management companies to share 
information, best practices and even take coordinated action against common 
counterparties; (iii) harmonisation of national legislation on business insolvencies, 
even proposing that the European Reconstruction Fund include some type of 
conditionality based on progress in this legislation; and (iv) adapting European 
legislation on bank resolution and State aid to the extraordinary nature of 
COVID-19, exceptionally proposing capital injections for solvent institutions to 
address temporary capital shortfalls as a result of a serious shock.
As	part	 of	 the	 response	 to	 the	COVID-19	 crisis,	 the	 finalisation	 of	 certain	
aspects	of	 the	Basel	 III	 framework	has	been	delayed;	 however,	 it	 remains	
important	to	analyse	its	impact	sufficiently	far	in	advance	and	to	uphold	the	
commitment	to	its	full	and	consistent	implementation.	In the European setting, 
the EBA has updated its impact study on the full implementation of the Basel III 
capital framework, including the output floor requirement on internally modelled 
capital requirements (delayed until 1 January 2028). The EBA also examined the 
possibility of partially implementing the framework. Box 3.2 provides a more 
detailed description of this study, which consolidates the findings of previous work 
that the full and consistent transposition of the Basel III framework, under the new 
timetable, is desirable.
the measures which support lending to business activities in Spain have 
adapted	to	the	economic	crisis	and	continue	to	factor	in	the	need	for	ongoing	
monitoring	and	sufficient	 flexibility	 to	 react	 to	possible	 future	changes	 in	
the economic situation. For instance, Royal Decree-Law 34/2020 extends the 
maximum duration and payment holidays of the guarantee programmes, 
respectively, by three years (up to a maximum of eight years) and by 12 months. 
Royal Decree-Law 5/2021 (see Box 1.3) introduces different measures to bolster 
business solvency: direct assistance to compensate businesses and the self-
employed for lower revenue, a toolkit (restructuring, conversion into participating 
loans, even debt reductions as a measure of last resort) to reduce the 
19  See “Tackling non-performing loans in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic”, 16 December 2020.
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overindebtedness of firms which have loans with State guarantees, and the 
creation of a recapitalisation fund for medium-sized firms20.
The	effectiveness	of	business	solvency	support	programmes	will	hinge	on	them	
being	designed	and	implemented	satisfactorily.	The design of the procedures for 
monitoring and selecting the recipients of funds should be guided by economic 
principles that maximise the economy’s growth potential and reach businesses that 
really need them. Programmes should be implemented sufficiently rapidly within a well-
defined timeframe to boost the productive use of the funds and maintain adequate 
incentives. As a result of the existing uncertainty, programmes must be monitored 
continuously in order to potentially recalibrate their various parameters, if needed.
The	 dynamic	 assessment	 of	 support	 measures	 is	 of	 a	 more	 far-reaching	
importance,	and	anticipating	the	reaction	of	regulatory	and	supervisory	policies	
to	 different	 scenarios	 of	 how	 the	 crisis	may	 unfold	 is	 particularly	 necessary.	
Under the baseline scenarios of economic activity gradually returning to normal, a 
credible and sufficiently long timetable for the withdrawal of measures (e.g. the 
relaxation of capital requirements for banks) needs to be considered. This should avoid 
a sudden increase in the financial pressure on the private sector at a time when medium-
term expectations are improving, but agents are somewhat fragile as a result of the 
pressure exerted by the crisis since March 2020. The timetable should, however, be 
well defined to avoid perpetuating certain sectors’ reliance on support programmes 
and the possible distortion of incentives, if they were to remain in place over an 
excessively long horizon. If downside risks were to materialise, the measures should be 
adapted selectively to maximise their impact on productive capacity and to limit their 
cost, particularly the increased pressure on public finances.
The	 strong	 impact	 of	 the	 current	 crisis	 does	 not	 diminish	 the	 importance	 of	
developing	sufficiently	far	in	advance	a	suitable	framework	of	macroprudential	
tools	 to	 absorb	 future	 shocks.	 Worth noting in this connection is the public 
consultation of the amendment to Banco de España Circular 2/2016 on the supervision 
and solvency of credit institutions, which makes it possible to impose new measures 
such as the sectoral CCyB and limits on sectoral concentration and on credit standards. 
These regulatory tools, which are described in detail in Box 3.3, enlarge the Banco de 
España’s capacity, as the designated authority for applying macroprudential instruments 
to the banking sector, to act in the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk.
20  The Announcement of the Spanish Council of Ministers of 20 April 2021	 (in	 Spanish	 only)	 modified	 some	
conditions	 of	 the	 aid	programmes,	 so	 that	 they	 can	be	 applied	 to	 a	wider	 group	of	 sectors	 of	 activity,	 and	
permitted certain selection requirements to be relaxed in exceptional circumstances.




aSSESSinG cREDit RiSK On tHE baSiS OF StOcK MaRKEt inFORMatiOn
Despite the sizeable downturn in economic activity over the 
last year, the NPL ratio in the banking sector’s credit portfolios 
has yet to increase significantly (see Chapter 2). This is due 
mainly to the economic support measures implemented 
during the pandemic. Moreover, these measures are being 
extended selectively so that they are not withdrawn abruptly, 
which could lead to cliff effects for many firms and households. 
Nonetheless, it is important to investigate whether the 
economic downturn is causing a build up of risks that may 
materialise as credit losses in the near and medium term.
This box applies a methodology that is consistent with recent 
academic work assessing the impact of the COVID 19 crisis. 
This method enables an assessment of the probability of 
default (PD) of listed firms using the Merton model1,2. In this 
model, a firm’s value is the sum of its debt and stock market 
capitalisation. Assuming the limited liability of its shareholders, 
a firm will default when its value is less than the nominal 
value of the debt on its maturity date3. The resulting model 
estimates a firm’s PD using a statistical formula that 
depends on debt, stock market capitalisation, expected 
growth and volatility of the stock market return on the 
share. Higher debt levels or greater volatility will tend to 
increase PD, whereas greater expected growth in the 
share price will tend to lower it. 
This exercise focuses on firms listed on the STOXX Europe 
600 Index (see sectoral breakdown in Chart 1). Consistent 
with previous papers that have used this methodology, these 
firms’ long-term debt was chosen as the value of debt. Also 
in line with some previous academic papers, it was assumed 
that the expected stock market return would be equal to 
the real interest rate of three-year sovereign debt. Lastly, the 
volatility of the stock market returns was estimated using a 
SOURCES: Refinitiv and Banco de España.
a Distribution by economic sector of the firms included in the exercise listed on the STOXX Europe 600 Index as at November 2020. The sample totals 
479 firms with the available information required to perform the exercise's calculations.
b The vertical axis represents the implied PD. The black line shows the average distribution of PDs in each month and the blue and red shaded areas 
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1  See	H.	J.	Reinders,	D.	Schoenmaker	and	M.	A.	Van	Dijk	 (2020),	 “Is	COVID-19	a	 threat	 to	financial	stability	 in	Europe?” CEPR Discussion Paper 
DP14922.	See	 also	 a	 prior	 application	 of	 the	methodology	 in	A.	A.	Dar	 and	S.	Qadir	 (2019),	 “Distance	 to	 default	 and	probability	 of	 default:	 an	
experimental study”,	Journal	of	Global	Entrepreneurship	Research,	9,	32.
2 See R. C. Merton (1974), “On	the	Pricing	of	Corporate	Debt:	The	Risk	Structure	of	Interest	Rates”,	Journal	of	Finance,	Vol.	29,	pp.	449-470.
3  The	debt	maturity	parameter	is	calibrated	in	the	model	using	an	average	empirical	time	to	maturity	of	three	years,	consistent	with	Reinders	et	al.	(2020),	
cited in footnote 1.
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4  A GARCH model. See T. Bollerslev (1986), “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity”,	Journal	of	Econometrics,	Vol.	31,	pp.	307-327.
Box 3.1
aSSESSinG cREDit RiSK On tHE baSiS OF StOcK MaRKEt inFORMatiOn (cont’d)
time series econometric model enabling the cyclical changes 
in this variable to be captured4.
The results show that the implied PD of the firms 
underwent sizeable increases in 2020 after the outbreak 
of the pandemic (see Chart 2). Nonetheless, on average 
these increases were not of the magnitude of those in 
the 2009 global financial crisis. The riskiest firms (above the 
90th percentile) have, however, shown very high PDs5. 
Most of the increase in these PDs occurred during the 
first wave of the pandemic. They fell gradually after that 
wave, until the third wave gave rise to a temporary 
surge. However, PDs have subsequently resumed their 
downward pattern, although they are yet to return to 
their pre-health crisis values.
Meanwhile, a characteristic of this crisis has been its much 
deeper adverse impact on certain economic sectors, such 
as tourism. For instance, PD in the tourism sector rose 
sharply during the first wave of the pandemic. This 
increase is more than twice as large as that observed 
during the global financial crisis (see Chart 3). The 
worsening eased during the second wave, when several 
vaccines were approved, but it deteriorated again during 
the third wave. This reveals the sector’s fragile position, 
which may constitute an important source of latent risk. 
The improved performance of stock prices in 2021 Q1 
has moderated the increase in this sector’s PDs to levels 
more comparable to, albeit still higher than, those of 
the global financial crisis. The increases in PD during the 
pandemic have also been significant for the banking 
sector. This may have reflected market expectations 
regarding the impact on the banking sector of credit 
impairment in the non-financial sectors. After the third 
wave, the increase in the banking sector’s implied PDs 
has edged down significantly, although it still exceeds 
that in other sectors, except for the tourism sector.  In 
these other sectors, such as the non bank financial 
sector, other services (excluding tourism) and the 
industrial sector, the situation appears to have returned 
to pre-crisis levels during the second wave and, despite 
some surges during the third wave, continued to rise 
moderately in 2021 Q1.
SOURCES: Refinitiv and Banco de España.
a Charts 3 and 4 depict the change in aggregate PD by sector in pp, after weighting the PD of each firm by its market value within the corresponding 
sector and country, respectively. The brown dot represents the change between the average pre-pandemic value (January-February 2020) and the 
value at end-2021 Q1. The stacked bars depict the change attributable to the first wave of the pandemic (March-May 2020), to the period between 
the first and second waves (June-November 2020), to the third wave (December 2020-February 2021) and to the period of 2021 Q1 after the third 
wave (February-March 2021). The pink dot represents the peak change in 2008-2009 with respect to the 2006-2007 average.
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5  The	average	stands	above	the	75th	percentile	due	to	the	influence	of	the	values	at	the	upper	end	of	the	distribution	(75th	percentile–90th	percentile).
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Box 3.1
aSSESSinG cREDit RiSK On tHE baSiS OF StOcK MaRKEt inFORMatiOn (cont’d)
Comparing the main European economies, Spanish and 
Italian firms were the hardest hit during the first wave of the 
pandemic (see Chart 4). There was a widespread recovery 
during the second wave, although it displayed cross-country 
heterogeneity. Conversely, PDs rose during the third wave 
(except for in the Netherlands). Improved stock prices in 
2021 Q1 have generally moderated the implied increases 
in PDs, although they remain at higher levels in Spain and 
Italy. In any event, in all countries’s PDs have worsened 
substantially less than during the global financial crisis.
To prevent a downturn in activity, the economic policy 
response to a sudden shock like the COVID-19 crisis 
cannot wait for risks that behave inertially, such as credit 
risks, to materialise. These market information based 
indicators are thus useful to steer possible economic 
policy response actions ahead of time. 
However, using the indicators is also subject to caveats. 
Specifically, PDs depend on investors’ valuations of 
firms via stock prices. For example, optimistic 
(pessimistic) valuations would result in lower (higher) 
estimates than the actual PDs. As stated in Chapter 1 
and Box 1.1, there are some signs of overpricing in the 
financial markets, which could also result in sudden 
increases in the PDs estimated by investors in response 
to a worsening of their expectations for economic 
activity or the duration of the support measures. It is 
therefore advisable to use these models alongside the 
broadest possible regulatory and supervisory 
information. Lastly, it should also be borne in mind that 
listed firms are not necessarily representative of a 
country’s overall productive system, in which smaller 
firms are of greater significance. In this connection, 
the results may represent a lower bound of the 
actual impacts.
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Recuadro ?.?
tÍtUlO REcUaDRO
In response to a new request from the European 
Commission, on 15 December 2020 the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) published the updated impact analysis of 
Basel III capital regulation reform on European banks1. 
The report updates the starting point of the June 2018 
analysis to December 2019 and considers two scenarios: 
(i) implementation of Basel III with no deviations (“Basel 
III scenario”) and (ii) the so-called “EU-specific scenario”. 
The first scenario corresponds to the final Basel III framework 
with no deviations. This framework imposes on banks a series 
of restrictions and common standards in the calculation of 
risk-based capital requirements, limiting the use for regulatory 
purposes of the internal models of these entities. This reform 
would thus make regulatory risk metrics more comparable 
across entities, reinforcing also the minimum degree of 
prudence embedded in the requirements. This scenario 
includes, in particular, the new frameworks for: i) credit 
risk risk (new standard method and restrictions on internal 
models2); ii) operational risk (full exclusion of internal models 
and introduction of a new standardised approach, based on 
a business volume indicator and the use of historical losses); 
and iii) market risk and capital requirements linked to the 
credit value adjustment3 (CVA).
The second scenario includes deviations from Basel III in the 
SME supporting factor4 and excludes certain counterparties 
from the capital requirements due to the  CVA calculation. 
It also considers the exercise of national discretion to 
exclude historical losses from the calculation of the capital 
requirements for operational risk, which would depend only 
on the business volume indicator of each bank, and other 
adjustments5. 
Lastly, and for both scenarios, the EBA considers three 
implementation options for the output floor, that is, a restriction 
such that bank capital requirements calculated with internal 
models do no fall below a certain percentage of requirements 
under the standard method.6: The three options are: (i) the 
main Basel III approach, whereby the output floor would be 
applied to the full stack of requirements; (ii) an alternative 
approach, whereby the output floor would not be applied 
to to all requirements, excluding Pillar 2 requirements (P2R) 
and the Systemic Risk Buffer7; and (iii) the so-called parallel 
stack approach, which the EBA considers to be non-
compliant with Basel III8.
The Basel III impact (in 2028) is expected to be lower, 
based on December 2019 data, than that obtained using 
June 2018 data. Under the Basel III scenario, the Tier 1 
requirements would now increase by 18.5%, compared 
with a rise of 24.1% based on June 2018 data (see Chart 1). 
This is primarily attributable to the lower output floor impact 
and the application of the new CVA framework, revised by 
the Basel Committee in July 2020. The capital shortfall9 
is reduced from €109.5 billion (based on June 2018 data) 
to €52.2 billion (based on 2019 data), due to the smaller 
increase in the requirements and to institutions’ higher 
capital position. Of this shortfall, 83% is concentrated in 
global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs).
Box 3.2
UPDatED iMP ct OF tHE FinaliSatiOn OF tHE baSEl iii FRaMEWORK On tHE banKinG SEctOR  
1  See the EBA’s Basel III impact study. 




of its impact.  
4 	The	SME	supporting	factor	entails	applying	a	factor	of	0.7619	to	RWAs	–	under	both	the	standardised	and	the	IRB	approaches	–	for	exposures	of	less	
than	€2.5	million.	CRR2	also	considers	a	factor	of	0.85	for	SME	exposures	exceeding	this	threshold,	although	the	EBA	was	unable	to	take	this	second	











9  Additional capital required to maintain the minimum total capital ratio (including Pillar 1, the combined buffer and P2R).
Recuadro ?.?
TÍTULO RECUADRO
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Box 3.2
UPDatED iMPact OF tHE FinaliSatiOn OF tHE baSEl iii FRaMEWORK On tHE banKinG SEctOR  (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Chart 1
INCREASE IN TIER 1 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND ASSOCIATED CAPITAL 
SHORTFALL
European banks (a)
Owing to the exemptions and discretionalities explained 
above, the impact under the EU-specific scenario, using 
the main approach to implement the output floor, is 
expected to be reduced by 5.4 pp to 13.1% relative to the 
Basel III scenario. The capital shortfall is also reduced from 
€52.2 billion to €33 billion, with G-SIIs accounting for 77% 
(see Chart 1). 
Considering the different output floor options separately, 
and without including the other EU specificities, the capital 
shortfall would be €45 billion under the alternative approach 
and €32 billion under the parallel stack approach (the option 
with the most significant differential impact). In any event, 
when assessing its impact (and given its importance in 
the total impact of the reform), it should be noted that a 
phase-in period of five years has been envisaged for the full 
implementation of the output floor. Thus, the output floor 
impact would not be especially significant until the fourth 
year, i.e. 2027 (see Chart 2). 
Under the Basel III scenario10, cross-country heterogeneity 
is observed both in total impact and in the materiality of each 
element of the reform. However, as occurs at the aggregate 
level, the most important factors are the output floor and 
the operational risk adjustments. Broadly speaking, three 
groups of countries can be identified:
— Countries where the impacts are higher than the 
average of 18.5%, essentially owing to the output floor. 
These are Germany and Sweden, followed by the 
Netherlands, Denmark and France.
— Another set of countries where the impact is below, but 
closer to, the average: Belgium, Spain and Italy. In 
Belgium, the impact is essentially attributable to credit 
risk, CVA and, to a lesser extent, the output floor. 
Meanwhile, in Spain and Italy there is no appreciable 
output floor impact, and the impact of operational risk is 
higher than in other countries, comparable only to France.
— A third group (Greece, Ireland, Poland and Portugal), 
where the impacts are less than 10%; these countries 
are unaffected by the output floor.
As described for the aggregate level, an across-the-board 
reduction is observed in the impacts under the EU-specific 
scenario. Although there are cross-country differences in 
how sharp this reduction would be, the countries rank in an 
order similar to that under the Basel III scenario.
10 See Figures 1 and 2 of the EBA’s report “Basel	III	Reforms:	Updated	Impact	Study”	EBA/Rep/2020/34.
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Box 3.2
UPDatED iMPact OF tHE FinaliSatiOn OF tHE baSEl iii FRaMEWORK On tHE banKinG SEctOR  (cont’d)
Analysing the results for Spain in somewhat greater detail, it 
can be observed that:
— Under the Basel III scenario, there is no output floor 
impact. The greatest impacts stem from operational 
risk, Spain presenting the highest impact in this 
regard, followed by credit risk and CVA, with similar 
magnitudes.
— Under the EU-specific scenario, using the output floor 
main approach, there is a sharper reduction in the 
impact for Spain than for the European average. This is 
because the EU specificities – SME supporting factor, 
CVA exemption and operational risk discretion – cause 
a relatively greater reduction in the requirements and 
adjustments other than the output floor (which has no 
impact for Spain). However, if the parallel stack 
approach to the output floor is applied to the EU-specific 
scenario, the impact for Spain would be reduced 
somewhat less compared with the European average. 
The EBA considers that the results of this report do not 
alter the conclusions drawn in its previous analyses. In 
summary, the EBA concluded that the benefit in terms of 
reducing unwanted RWA variability, as sought by Basel 
III, would outweigh the savings in capital requirements 
derived from accepting deviations in Europe11. As regards 
the EU specificities that are analysed in its latest report 
and discussed in this box, the EBA does not support their 
implementation. The EBA also prefers applying the so-
called main approach to implement the output floor.
The banking sector faces the COVID-19-induced crisis from 
a more solid starting position, largely thanks to the Basel 
III reforms. In this regard, and as reiterated by the Basel 
Committee and by the Group of Central Bank Governors and 
Heads of Supervision (GHOS), fully, timely and consistent 
implementation of Basel III by member jurisdictions, is key 
to ensuring that the banking sector continues to be resilient 
to future crisis scenarios.
11  See the EBA’s previous impact study August 2019.




nEW MacROPRUDEntial tOOlS aPPlicablE tO tHE actiVity OF cREDit inStitUtiOnS in SPain1
Royal Decree-Law 22/2018 and Royal Decree 102/2019 
empowered the Banco de España to develop a new 
macroprudential toolkit applicable to the banking sector to 
address systemic risks, including a sectoral countercyclical 
capital buffer (SCoCCyB), which is built in as an additional 
component of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), 
sectoral concentration limits (SCLs) for credit exposures, 
and limits and conditions on lending and other transactions 
(known internationally as Borrower-Based Instruments or 
BBIs). This regulatory development is part of a broader 
reform establishing the Spanish macroprudential authority 
(AMCESFI) and allocating new macroprudential tools to 
the three sectoral supervisory authorities: the Banco de 
España, the National Securities Market Commission 
(CNMV) and the Directorate General of Insurance and 
Pension Funds (DGSFP).
In this setting, on 2 February the Banco de España 
submitted a draft amendment of Circular 2/2016 on the 
supervision and solvency of credit institutions for public 
consultation2,3. This reform aims, firstly, to establish new 
CCyB regulation that is consistent with the revised wording 
of Article 45(1) of Law 10/2014 and which allows the Banco 
de España to require such a buffer both for all the credit 
exposures of an institution and for those to a specific 
sector (i.e. the SCoCCyB, defined as a sectoral component 
of the CCyB). Likewise, the reform implements regulations 
on the setting of SCLs for credit exposures and also of 
certain limits and conditions on the granting of BBIs. 
The Banco de España, as the designated authority for 
using macroprudential tools for the banking sector, is 
responsible for safeguarding financial stability by seeking 
to prevent systemic financial shocks that could have an 
adverse impact on the real economy. To this end, it must 
have at its disposal the tools needed for carrying out this 
task effectively4.
The aim of the SCoCCyB is to contain the systemic risk 
arising from potential imbalances (excessive credit growth) 
that may emerge in a given economic sector, by seeking to 
alter the relative cost, in regulatory capital terms, of lending 
to that sector. In turn, in order to avoid undesirable side-
effects stemming from its application, the reaction of other 
sectors must be monitored in order to prevent the 
excessive credit growth from shifting to them. The 
SCoCCyB also seeks to provide institutions with sufficient 
capital to cope with potential losses from a disorderly 
propagation of the imbalances originating in the sector 
where excessive credit growth is detected.
Implementation of the SCoCCyB must strike an appropriate 
balance between the accuracy and the scope of the 
definition of the economic sectors giving rise to the 
imbalances. Historical evidence shows that, in previous 
crises, most systemic risks were concentrated in exposures 
to specific economic sectors, as was the case for the real 
estate sector in the run-up to the global financial crisis (see 
Chart 1). However, the definition of the sectors subject to 
this measure must be broad enough to ensure that the tool 
has the broad-based scope proper to its macroprudential 
purpose. Empirical evidence suggests that the SCoCCyB 
should generally be activated at the earliest stages of the 
build-up of the systemic risk. Its release should be 
immediate if the systemic risk materialises and progressive 
if it gradually subsides.
The SCL tool limits the total volume of credit exposures to 
a specific sector. This limitation is defined relative to a 
capital metric, not as a limit on the absolute level of 
exposure. Thus, if a particular institution decides to further 
increase its exposure to a sector subject to such limit, it 
may do so as long as it sufficiently increases its capital 
levels. In this way, it would be able to cope with potential 
losses in the sector in which the systemic risk builds up. 
Chart 2 shows how exposure to real estate credit grew 
relative to bank capital before the global financial crisis 
and how this was subsequently corrected. 
As the SCL is also a sectoral tool, some of its features 
are analogous to those of the SCoCCyB. Again, this 
requires a cautious analysis of the potential spillovers to 
1  This box is based on the content of C. Trucharte Artigas (2021), “Nuevas Herramientas Macroprudenciales para las entidades de crédito”, Revista de 
Economía, No. 918, ICE.
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nEW MacROPRUDEntial tOOlS aPPlicablE tO tHE actiVity OF cREDit inStitUtiOnS in SPain (cont’d)
other sectors that might be produced by limits in a specific 
sector, and the proper identification of sectors with an 
effect on systemic risk. The key difference between this 
tool and the SCoCCyB is that its activation would limit 
sectoral credit concentration growth more directly (as this 
would be done via a restriction on quantity), while the 
SCoCCyB would act more via disincentives, by making it 
more expensive, in relative capital terms, to increase the 
credit exposure to the sector or sectors for which it has 
been activated. For this reason, the SCL can be generally 
considered as a last resort, to be used in the later stages 
of the unfolding of the systemic risk when the other tools 
have proved to be ineffective. However, in special 
circumstances it could also be used earlier. It should be 
immediately deactivated upon materialisation or 
dissipation of the systemic risk.
BBIs monitor credit standards in the granting of financing 
(for example, value of collateral, term, capacity to repay 
the loan). The available evidence suggests that loans 
granted under lax criteria, be it in terms of the value 
covered by the required collateral, leverage, the debt-
to-income ratio required of borrowers or maturity, entail 
higher repayment risks down the line5.
The decision to set limits on some characteristics rather 
than others will depend on the nature of the systemic risk, 
and the most effective alternative for its mitigation will be 
decided accordingly. However, it must be borne in mind 
that setting limits on a particular characteristic may lead to 
easing others, requiring action to be taken on several 
characteristics at the same time. Moreover, the easing of 
standards may spill over to other credit portfolios, requiring 
the measures to be extended to them.
BBI regulation should also provide for the possibility of 
adjusting the limitations according to the characteristics 
of the borrower and the lender, thus ensuring their 
effectiveness and that they do not impinge 
disproportionately on a specific group or hinder other 
public policy measures. These limitations through BBIs 
would be activated on an individual basis or jointly and 
will be in place alongside other macroprudential tools. 
Generally speaking, this instrument should be activated 
in the intermediate stages of the build-up of the 
systemic risk.
The reform of Circular 2/2016 thus expands the toolkit 
that has to date been available to the Banco de España, 
in its role as designated authority for the use of 
macroprudential instruments for the banking sector. 
These tools are specifically designed to control systemic 
risk and would therefore make it possible to limit, for 
example, the potential adverse effects that an overly lax 
5	 	See	J.	Galán	and	M.	Lamas	(2019),	“Beyond	the	LTV	ratio:	new	macroprudential	lessons	from	Spain”, Working Paper No. 1931, Banco de España, for 
an empirical analysis of the impact of mortgage credit standards in Spain on default behaviour.
SOURCE: Banco de España.



































































ADJUSTED REAL ESTATE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP
ADJUSTED CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (right-hand scale)
Chart 1
TOTAL AND SECTORAL  (real estate credit) CREDIT-TO-GDP GAPS (a)
Chart 2
RATIO OF REAL ESTATE CREDIT TO TOTAL CAPITAL
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monetary policy could have on excessive risk-taking by 
agents. These tools can also be adapted to the financial cycle 
and to specific shocks in the Spanish banking sector. These 
features are very useful for building resilience and the capacity 
to absorb unexpected shocks, as evidenced by the current 
economic crisis arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
fulfilment of these objectives of the new framework will need 
to be underpinned by the Banco de España’s risk analysis 





CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET (a)
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
Annex 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The figures for total assets, total liabilities and net equity, and for the components thereof, correspond directly to the consolidated accounting 
information reported to the Banco de España in confidential returns. As a result of a merger operation, the assets and liabilities of a significant 
institution are reclassified in the consolidated information to the assets and liabilities of disposable groups classified as held for sale, which would 
be included in other assets and liabilities. In this annex, the specific assets and liabilities items (e.g. other private sectors) are adjusted using 
subconsolidated information in order to reverse this reclassification. These adjustments allow the changes in each specific balance-sheet item 
since 2019 to be measured, without the distortions arising from the accounting requirements for this specific corporate operation.
b Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. December 2020 data.







€m % % %
5.016.61.86339,504sknab lartnec htiw secnalab dna hsaC











9.652.166.2-202,981,2rotces etavirp ot gnicnaniF
2.312.318.4527,805tnemnrevog lareneg ot gnicnaniF
2.24.25.2-947,48sLPN latoT







€m % % %
9.82.54.77661,143sknab lartnec morf secnalaB









0.00.06.69179,062)b( gnidnel ten metsysoruE
1.76.79.1-492,372sdnuf nwO
5.06.08.61-703,81stseretni ytironiM
2.1-8.0-7.66917,74-ytiuqe latot ot gnitaler stnemtsujda noitaulaV
3.64.73.01-288,342YTIUQE LATOT
0.0010.0017.4389,748,3YTIUQE DNA SEITILIBAIL LATOT
Assets
Liabilities and equity
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 119 Financial Stability REPORt. SPRinG 2021  ANNEXES




SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The upper items of the income statement include sub-consolidated data for an institution in the process of merger, while the lower items (from other 
income downwards) include its consolidated data. The reason for including sub-consolidated data is so as not to lose information on the activity of 
that institution during the year, which is not reflected in the consolidated statement. This institution has recorded, as a result of the approval of its 
merger and in accordance with accounting policies, a correction to fair value of €-5,585 million.
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